地域比较、政策构建与创业激励

地域特点、政策构建和创业激励具有内在关联。与中关村、东湖、张江自主创新示范区创业激励政策相比较,长株潭示范区创业政策制定缺乏主体性,政策内容和政策执行还存在不足。优化长株潭自主创新示范区的创业激励政策,须通过完善机构职能、实现多元主体协调,突出战略性和创业激励政策的整体性,并从创业教育、创业贷款和创业投资政策方面完善创业激励政策的具体内容;通过舆论宣传、组织保障和动态评估提高创业政策执行力度。     

企业自主知识产权成果产业化的财政政策研究——基于国际经验的分析及借鉴

自主知识产权成果产业化,能够提高我国自主创新能力、转变经济增长方式、增强我国核心竞争力。本文分析了我国现行促进企业知识产权成果产业化的财政政策存在的诸多问题,例如财政资金投入不足、政府采购规模相对偏小、提出优惠政策不够;并通过研究发达国家促进企业自主知识产权成果产业化的财政政策,提出为促进我国企业自主知识产权成果产业化,我国应增加对企业自主知识产权成果产业化的投入,建立自主知识产品采购制度,以及构建我国企业自主知识产权成果产业化的税收激励政策。     

Sales contest research: Business and individual difference factors affecting intentions to pursue contest goals

Calls for sales contest research (1980/81 and 1998) suggest glaring holes in our knowledge of how to design appealing contests, whether and to what extent contests motivate salespeople, and the types of behaviors contests provoke. This study adds to our knowledge of the relationship between sales force attitudes for sales contests and intention to pursue the contest by exploring the effects of business type, demographic, and psychological variables on this relationship. Using surveys and a sorting task for several sales contest designs, a national sample of a firm's multi-business unit sales force (n = 620) provided the data for our study. A replication with two additional companies confirms that intention to pursue sales contest goals is affected by several variables, particularly for consumer/commercial salespeople. The findings and ensuing discussion provide contest planners useful direction for anticipating likely sales force responses to sales contests.     

Channel Incentives as Unilateral and Bilateral Governance Processes

Abstract

The authors investigate channel incentives as extra-contractual governance processes that maintain and extend marketing channel relationships. More specifically, instrumental incentives are monetary-based payments made by a manufacturer in a unilateral channel arrangement to motivate distributor compliance, while equity incentives are bilateral expectations of fair treatment that motivate both parties to continue to cooperate with one another. A model of the antecedents and performance consequences of channel incentives is conceptualized and tested on 314 marketing channel relationships using a structural equation modeling methodology. The findings support the conceptual model and suggest that unique facets of the channel relationship explain the type of incentive mechanism in use.     

外资开放引入的创新虹吸是否依然有效——基于知识产权价值激励的动态检验

在全面开放新格局与创新型国家建设战略驱动下,科学研判外资开放的创新虹吸效应至关重要,亟待破解的问题是如何有效撬动外资引入的创新溢出红利。基于内外技术势差探讨FDI创新虹吸的演化逻辑,阐释知识产权价值激励对FDI创新溢出的影响机制,基于中国（内地）30个省份面板数据实证研究发现,外资开放引入的创新虹吸效应并非静态不变,对区域创新发展呈现出边际递减的抑制性影响;借助高强度知识产权价值激励能够有效调节FDI的创新溢出轨迹,以“U”型规律打开外资引入的创新虹吸通道,驱动区域创新发展;知识产权价值激励的调节效应存在一定的空间异质性,对东部地区和中部地区FDI创新溢出的撬动更为有效。研究结论为优化外资开放引入与知识产权价值激励的共轨溢出,赋能创新型国家建设,提供了新的经验依据和路径启示。     

The Efficiency of Stock-Based Incentives: Experimental Evidence

The authors report the results of laboratory experiments in which subjects are offered contracts structured similar to equity compensation packages and result in subjects receiving cash payments that are a function of their effort and random factors. The authors compare the outcomes from alternative contractual forms to theoretical benchmarks and report the efficiency of the contracts to provide evidence on whether options or stocks that have same economic cost to the employer yield the same or different effort levels from the managers. Both contracts elicit lower levels of effort than would be chosen by an expected-payoff-maximizing decision maker. Effort choices under the option contract did not differ significantly from effort choices under the stock contract except for male subjects. The option contract elicits a higher effort level for these subjects and condition than the stock contract. Effort choices reflect loss aversion and regret based on past stock price realizations.     

金融业上市公司高管薪酬激励研究

目前,金融机构高管的薪酬是否合理有效,能否最大程度的激励高管人员的积极性,已成为学者们研讨的热门话题.科学、合理、高效的薪酬激励机制不仅能促使高管人员努力为企业发展目标奋斗,促进企业经营业绩的提高,更能促进整个金融业,乃至整个国民经济的健康持续发展.因此,从实证角度对我国上市金融机构高管薪酬激励的研究具有重要的理论意义和现实价值.     

An Agency Perspective on the Costs and Benefits of Privatization

This paper proposes a unified theoretical framework to discuss the costs and benefits of privatization using the recent advances of Incentive Theory. I begin by presenting a simple model in which the State (the principal) delegates a task (e.g., the production of a public good) to the private sector (the agent). I give and discuss conditions for the “Irrelevance Theorem” due to Sappington and Stiglitz [Sappington, D., & Stiglitz, J. (1987) Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 6, 567–582] to hold under complete contracting. I then show how various contract incompletenesses can make either public or private ownership optimal. Finally, I provide critical assessments of these results. I thank Patrick Rey and Wilfried Zantman for useful comments on an earlier draft. The excellent comments of two referees have also improved substantially the presentation and organization of the paper. I am deeply indebted to Denis Gromb for his extremely detailed comments.     

On the design of incentive mechanisms in environmental policy

The objective of this paper is to present environmental policy as a simple game in two stages within a principal-agent framework. At the outset the authority adopts a transfer payment rule. Then the firms react by carrying out abatement activities, based on their chosen levels of emission and output. Next the authority measures the emissions (and residual profit of the industry) and revises the level of its instrument. Then the game starts again. Our purpose is to narrow the scope of ad hoc incentive schemes by characterizing families of optimal linear schemes.We thank two anonymous referees for their valuable suggestions. We have also benefited from comments from I.-M. Andréasson, J. B. Opschoor, H. Verbruggen and the other members of the Task Force II: Environmental Policy instruments of the European Science Foundation Programme: Environment, Science and Society. Wang acknowledges support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG).     

浅析内地企业员工激励性管理

要提高内地企业的激励性,就要突出公平,保持物资激励与非物资激励结合,组织目标和个人目标相结合,约束与激励结合。具体来说,内地企业需要扩大员工职业生涯发展空间,强化绩效考核的反馈面谈,严格实行合同化管理,实施全面薪酬战略,加强员工培训,注重内部晋升。