Welfare reducing licensing

In this paper, we characterize situations where licensing a cost reducing innovation to a rival firm using two-part tariff contracts (a fixed fee plus a linear per unit of output royalty) reduces social welfare. We show that it occurs if (i) the firms compete in prices, (ii) the innovation is large enough but not drastic, and (iii) the goods are close enough substitutes. Moreover, we show that, regardless of the type of competition, first, the optimal contract always includes a positive royalty and, second, even drastic innovations are licensed whenever the goods are not homogeneous.     

On optimality in intergenerational risk sharing

Summary. This paper defines and studies optimality in a dynamic stochastic economy with finitely lived agents, and investigates the optimality properties of an equilibrium with or without sequentially complete markets. Various Pareto optimality concepts are considered, including interim and ex ante optimality. We show that, at an equilibrium with a productive asset (land) and sequentially complete markets, the intervention of a government may be justified, but only to improve risk sharing between generations. If markets are incomplete, constrained interim optimality is investigated in two-period lived OLG economies. We extend the optimality properties of an equilibrium with land and give conditions under which introducing a pay-as-you-go system at an equilibrium would not lead to any Pareto improvement. Received: October 5, 1998; revised version: April 3, 2001     

心理契约破坏不利于组织认同?

在探讨心理契约破坏对员工组织认同影响中,可探讨以领导成员交换为中介变量和互动公平氛围为调节变量在此关系中的作用。通过对中小科技型制造企业的354名员工调查研究发现,心理契约破坏对员工组织认同有显著的负向影响;员工领导成员交换部分中介心理契约破坏对组织认同有负向影响;互动公平氛围调节心理契约破坏与领导成员交换有负向关系;进一步,互动公平氛围既调节心理契约破坏对组织认同的直接影响,也调节了心理契约破坏经过领导成员交换对组织认同的间接影响。     

论第三方物流合同违约责任的归责原则

20世纪末,第三方物流迅速发展,由传统第三方物流逐渐向现代整合性第三方物流过渡,相应的,第三方物流合同也逐渐从传统的运输、仓储合同向类型结合型的第三方物流合同转化。这种类型结合型的第三方物流合同系无名合同,其裁判依据包括双方之间订立的第三方物流合同本身(包括补充协议、体系解释、交易习惯)和民事法律规范。从双方之间订立的第三方物流合同角度而言,其违约责任多采用的是严格责任归责原则。从民事法律规范的角度来说,基于个案中能否确认货损发生的区间,第三方物流合同适用不同的违约责任的归责原则,或适用《合同法》总则的严格责任原则,或适用损失确认区间适用法律的违约责任的归责原则。     

Public–private partnerships: Task interdependence and contractibility

We examine the proper scope of public–private partnerships in the context of a project consisting of two tasks, building and operation of a facility. We investigate the optimal arrangement regarding bundling versus unbundling and private ownership versus public ownership. Like Bennett and Iossa (2006), we assume that the innovative activity in the building stage has impacts on, among other things, the subsequent operational cost. We relax the nature of task interdependence and study different contractual frameworks. The general insight is that given limitations in contractibility, contrary to common sense, complementarity between tasks favors unbundling over bundling.     

Determinacy with nominal assets and outside money

Summary. We build a finite horizon model with inside and outside money, in which interest rates, price levels and commodity allocations are determinate, even though asset markets are incomplete and asset deliveries are purely nominal.Received: 2 July 2003, Revised: 1 December 2004 JEL Classification Numbers: D50, E40, E50, E58.Correspondence to: J. Geanakoplos     

自发性会计变更、监管契约与契约成本

笔者对我国上市公司自发性会计变更的行为从契约理论的角度进行了分析。对证券市场监管规定和强制性会计政策——两种不同的监管契约对自发性会计变更的不同影响从单向强制性契约成本构成及契约成本最小化方面进行了解释,对证券市场监管契约成本和强制性会计政策契约成本进行了比较研究。     

不完全合同理论视角下渐进性创新的逆向研发外包组织模式、技术溢出与创新能力研究

既有研发外包组织理论主要基于技术优势企业视角,关注如何治理技术溢出等交易成本,忽视了缺少专利和隐性知识的企业进行渐进性创新时最优研发外包组织选择。基于不完全合同视角,从企业对研发中激励代理方努力与降低渐进性创新的不完全替代性成本之间的权衡出发,分析委托方如何合作、并购、委托以及新建研发等组织最优选择。结果表明,当委托方技术水平较低时,最优组织将需要给代理方更多控制权以激励其努力,相反,委托方则保留更多控制权以降低不完全替代性成本。委托方市场规模通过影响代理方的私人收益降低不完全替代性成本,使得委托方愿意放弃控制权以激励代理方努力。新建研发可以看作是委托方通过承担更多时间和风险成本,从而降低不完全替代性成本。在不同组织形式中,委托方对研发投入的积极性是不同的,这决定了委托方通过研发外包获得的技术溢出效应和企业创新能力。     

Computing equilibria of GEI by relocalization on a Grassmann manifold

An algorithm is described to compute equilibria of the general economic model with incomplete asset markets, that is, of GEI. The algorithm is based on the existence of a route of zeros of a homotopy whose domain includes the price simplex and a Grassmann Manifold. This route is followed, in effect, by localizing and following diffeomorphic pieces in Euclidean space, and by relocalizing as is necessary.     

Indifference,indecision, and coin-flipping

This article operationalizes a non-empty relation as implied if strict preference and indifference jointly do not completely order the choice set. Specifically, indecision is operationalized as a positive preference for delegating choice to a least predictable device.