CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND INNOVATION: A SURVEY

Abstract The traditional economics of innovation, inspired by Schumpeter and more recent advances on his work, seem unable to explain why firms with similar external conditions may show greatly different performance in innovation. Contrastingly, the literature on corporate governance provides some useful insights for understanding corporate innovation activity, to the extent that such literature examines the economic effects of different modes of coordination between firm members. The process through which individuals integrate their human and physical resources within the firm is central to the dynamics of corporate innovation. This paper provides the first survey of the literature on this issue. We start by discussing how various theoretical approaches to the analysis of the firm deal with technological innovation. We then describe three main channels – corporate ownership, corporate finance and labour – through which a system of corporate governance shapes a firm's innovation activity. Finally, we examine the relationship between country‐level institutional settings, national patterns of corporate governance and the aggregate innovation activity of corporations. We conclude by suggesting that future research should focus more deeply on the interrelation between the various dimensions of corporate governance and on their joint effect on firm innovation.     

Task assignment and organizational form

This paper shows that a firm prefers a process-based task assignment compared to a function-based one if the tasks are from functional areas which are neither too complementary nor too substitutable. We consider several projects (processes) with contributions from several functional areas. The organization can be structured along processes like product lines (M-form) or along functional areas like marketing or production (U-form). The U-form enables cost savings due to specialization or scale economies. The more effective incentives under the M-form might outweigh these savings if the functions are neither too complementary nor too substitutable.      

Multi-dimensional contracts with task-specific productivity: an application to universities

Academics produce science and teaching which requires specific unobservable characteristics. Applying the multi-dimensional screening methodology of Armstrong and Rochet (European Economic Review, 43, 959–979, 1999), it is shown that universities optimally propose a menu of contracts to academics: high powered incentives for those who are productive and lower ones for other agents. In some cases, the university can write a single contract for both tasks to increase production. An academic is then expected to produce more teaching to show that she likes science, which is an argument to produce science and teaching in a single institution: universities. These results are discussed in light of economic, sociological and educational literature.      

Ex post participation constraint in a principal–agent model with adverse selection and moral hazard

This paper analyzes optimal contracting when an agent has private information before contracting and exerts hidden effort that stochastically affects the output. Additionally, the contract is constrained to satisfy the agentʼs ex post participation. We highlight three features of this model. First, the agent faces countervailing incentives. Second, the separation of types is never optimal. Third, the optimal constant bonus rewarding success is distorted downward below its efficient level.     

‘Regular’ choice and the weak axiom of stochastic revealed preference

We explore the relation between two ‘rationality conditions’ for stochastic choice behavior: regularity and the weak axiom of stochastic revealed preference (WASRP). We show that WASRP implies regularity, but the converse is not true. We identify a restriction on the domain of the stochastic choice function, which suffices for regularity to imply WASRP. When the universal set of alternatives is finite, this restriction is also necessary for regularity to imply WASRP. Furthermore, we identify necessary and sufficient domain restrictions for regularity to imply WASRP, when the universal set of alternatives is finite and stochastic choice functions are all degenerate. Results in the traditional, deterministic, framework regarding the relation between Chernoff’s condition and the weak axiom of revealed preference follow as special cases. Thus, general conditions are established, under which regularity can substitute for WASRP as the axiomatic foundation for a theory of choice behavior.     

Banking with nominal deposits and inside money

Bank runs in the literature take the form of withdrawals of demand deposits payable in real goods, which deplete a fixed reserve of goods in the banking system. That framework describes traditional bank runs based on currency withdrawals as occurred historically in the US and more recently in developing countries. However, in a modern banking system, large withdrawals typically take the form of electronic payments of inside money, with no analog of a depletion of a scarce reserve from the banking system. In a new framework of nominal demand deposits repayable in inside money, pure liquidity-driven bank runs do not occur. If there were excessive early withdrawals, nominal deposits would hedge the bank and flexible monetary prices in the goods market would limit real consumption. The maturity mismatch of short term liabilities and long term assets is not sufficient for multiple equilibria bank runs without other frictions. A key role of the bank is to ensure optimal real liquidity, which allows markets to optimally distribute consumption goods through the price mechanism.     

Mixed up? that’s good for motivation

We show that career concerns can arise in the absence of ex ante uncertainty about an agent’s type, if his unobservable actions influence future productivity. Implementing effort in mixed strategies allows the principal to endogenously introduce uncertainty about the agent’s ex post productivity and generate reputational incentives. Creating such ambiguity can be optimal for the principal, even though this exposes the agent to additional risk and reduces output. This finding for an environment with imperfect commitment contrasts with standard agency models, where implementing mixed strategy actions typically is not optimal if pure strategies can also be implemented.     

The timeliness of performance information in determining executive compensation

We study whether boards of directors concentrate on performance near compensation decision times rather than providing consistent incentives for chief executive officers (CEO) throughout the fiscal year. We show empirically that managers can profit by moving sales revenue among fiscal quarters. Though this may suggest that boards use short-term trends when determining rewards, we find evidence consistent with boards tying pay to recent sales growth so as to use the best information about future performance. We also find that the timing of profits throughout the year does not affect CEO pay, which may suggest that smoothing firm income is important to CEOs.     

关系合约对网络组织经济效率的损害

关系合约为会损害网络组织的经济效率，因为多个关系舍约的相互嵌入可能在网络组织中形成低效率合作；同时，关系合约形成的交易封闭性，降低了网络组织的适应性效率，企业的创新动力被弱化，快速创新难以成为企业的最佳战略选择。网络组织如果过度依赖关系治理，就会抑制制度治理机制的作用，从而增加网络组织的交易成本。     

Procurement auctions with entry of bidders

In procurement auctions with a fixed number of bidders there is a tradeoff between cost efficiency and rent extraction. An optimal mechanism, therefore, entails distortions of effort (Laffont and Tirole, 1987). If potential suppliers must sink an entry investment before they can participate in the auction, then decreasing the firms' rent may imply reduced entry. We show that if potential bidders are uninformed before entry, commitment to a plain, nondistortive auction is optimal. In contrast, if potential bidders learn all their private information before entry, the optimal mechanism entails the same distortions as in Laffont and Tirole's static model.