商业银行表外业务风险管理及信息披露

商业银行的表外业务一直以低风险、低成本、高利润成为各国银行业竞争的焦点。我国银行业如何在金融市场逐步放开的情况下 ,在同国外银行的竞争中立于不败之地 ,表外业务的发展状况、风险管理程度及信息披露的完善程度将发挥非常重要的作用。     

论资本市场中的信息披露问题

本文分析论述了资本市场信息披露的含义、意义 ,分析了会计模式、审计模式以及监管当中目前存在的问题 ,并给出了一些解决问题的对策     

基于计算机信息集成技术的房产管理信息系统

基于计算机信息集成技术的房产管理信息系统是房管部门实现房产管理现代化的一种重要途径。这种系统不但具有房产信息管理的输入、查询、检索、修改、计算、统计等一般功能，而且在信息集成技术的支持下还可以实现信息的数据集中、网络共享、并行处理、数据完整等优点。本详细探讨了这种基于计算机信息集成技术的房产信息管理系统系统分析、系统设计以及系统实施等几个重要开发过程的设计思想和作业内容，对计算机信息集成技术的相关内容也进行了一定介绍。     

Voluntary disclosure and information asymmetry in Denmark

This paper examines if the level of voluntary disclosure affects information asymmetry for industrial companies listed on the Copenhagen Stock Exchange. Economic theory suggests that disclosing more information should lower the information asymmetry component of a firm's cost of capital [Leuz, C., & Verrecchia, R. E. (2000)]. The results indicate that voluntary disclosure is negatively associated with proxies for information asymmetry. The results are robust even after controlling for various firm characteristics introduced in related literature. Despite differences in institutional settings the findings in our paper are similar to the ones based on US data.     

美国证券法对衍生交易市场风险披露的监管及借鉴——以SEC“305规则”体制的监管要求为视角

在以市场风险披露为基础的衍生交易监管政策下,SEC的“305规则”体制由定量、定性信息披露要求与前瞻性信息披露的安全港规则有机构成。我国应当借鉴先进的风险监管规则,构建创新的衍生工具市场风险披露法律框架,并解决好创新规则实施过程中的成本-收益权衡问题、收益波动性问题。     

项目管理软件系统的功能、分类和发展趋势

目前项目管理软件系统如雨后春笋般涌现出来，一方面使软件有更大的选择空间，另一方面也给软件的选择带来了困难。基于这一原因，章分析了目前项目管理软件的系统的功能、分类及其发展趋势，以利于需求选择项目管理软件系统。     

Political uncertainty and firms' information environment: Evidence from China

How political uncertainty affects the supply of value relevant information about a firm is an important but unresolved question. Using an emerging market setting where political leaders are expected to exert significant influence on economic activities, we examine the effect of political uncertainty caused by turnovers of local government leaders on a firm’s information environment. We find that during periods of political uncertainty, the total amount of idiosyncratic information about a firm that is available to the market is reduced. The adverse effect on information supply is manifest in firms that are more politically dependent and stronger when uncertainty is more severe. Further, we provide evidence suggesting that firms react to political uncertainty by reducing the amount and the quality of information provided to investors. We find that information intermediaries such as financial analysts and the media have a moderating effect on the information environment as they increase the production of information during periods of political uncertainty. However, these intermediaries do not negate the net loss of information.     

Shadow costs of incomplete information and short sales in the valuation of the firm and its assets

This paper presents a simple framework for the valuation of compound options within shadow costs of incomplete information and short sales. The shadow cost includes two components. The first component is the product of pure information cost due to imperfect knowledge and heterogeneous expectations. The second component represents the additional cost caused by the short-selling constraint. Information costs are linked to Merton's (1987. Journal of Finance 42, 510) model of capital market equilibrium with incomplete information, CAPMI. This model is extended by Wu et al. (1996. Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 7, 136) who propose an incomplete-information capital market equilibrium with heterogeneous expectations and short sale restrictions, GCAPM. This model is used in our paper to provide for the first time in the literature analytic solutions for derivatives in the presence of both shadow costs of incomplete information and short sales.When deriving the compound call option formula, we consider a call option on a stock, which is itself an option on the assets of the firm. Our methodology incorporates shadow costs of incomplete information and short sales on the firm's assets as well as the effects of leverage in the capital structure. The formula can be useful in the valuation of several corporate liabilities in the presence of information uncertainty and short sales constraints about the firm and its cash flows. Our analysis can be used for the valuation of several real options.     

Compulsory versus voluntary voting: An experimental study

We report on an experiment comparing compulsory and voluntary voting institutions in a voting game with common preferences. Rational choice theory predicts sharp differences in voter behavior between these two institutions. If voting is compulsory, then voters may find it rational to vote insincerely, i.e., against their private information. If voting is voluntary so that abstention is allowed, then sincere voting in accordance with a voter's private information is always rational while participation may become strategic. We find strong support for these theoretical predictions in our experimental data. Moreover, voters adapt their decisions to the voting institution in place in such a way as to make the group decision accuracy differences between the two voting institutions negligible. The latter finding may serve to rationalize the co-existence of compulsory and voluntary voting institutions in nature.     

New technology and old institutions: An empirical analysis of the skill-biased demand for older workers in Europe

Using panel data from nine European countries over the period 1970 to 2007, we examine the impact of information and communication technology (ICT) on the demand for older workers (aged 50 and over). We find evidence of a decrease in demand for older workers in the 1970s and 1980s. It can be argued that the impact of ICT on demand for older workers is skill-biased. However, the skill-biased demand for older workers is mainly reflected in the skill-biased changes in employment shares rather than relative wages. There is some evidence of a gradual deskilling of older workers. We find that labour market institutions such as the national minimum wage, social pacts on wage issues and union density mostly benefit skilled older workers, while coordination of wage setting, extension of collective agreements, social pacts on pensions and centralisation of wage bargaining can alleviate the adverse effects of skill-biased technological change.