Strategic knowledge sharing in Bayesian games

This paper provides a model for the study of direct, public and strategic knowledge sharing in Bayesian games. We propose an equilibrium concept which takes into account communication possibilities of exogenously certifiable statements and in which beliefs off the equilibrium path are explicitly deduced from consistent possibility correspondences, without making reference to perturbed games. Properties of such an equilibrium and of revised knowledge are examined. In particular, it is shown that our equilibrium is always a sequential equilibrium of the associated extensive form game with communication. Finally, sufficient conditions for the existence of perfectly revealing or non-revealing equilibria are characterized in some classes of games. Several examples and economic applications are investigated.     

Designing Optimal Crop Revenue Insurance

When the indemnity schedule is contingent on the farmer's price and individual yield, an optimal crop revenue insurance contract depends only on the farmer's gross revenue. However, this design is not efficient if, as is the case with available contracts, the coverage function is based on imperfect estimators of individual yield and/or price. The producer's degree of prudence and the extent of basis risks have important influences on the optimal indemnity schedule. In this broader context, optimal protection is not provided by available U.S. crop insurance contracts and may include combinations of revenue insurance, yield insurance, futures, and options contracts.     

Intergovernmental transfers and fiscal behavior insurance versus aggregate discipline

This paper evaluates the trade-off between the advantages of risk sharing and the perils of common pool problems in federal fiscal arrangements. Under the assumption of asymmetric information we evaluate two alternative regimes of intergovernmental transfers. In one regime, the central government pre-commits to a certain level of transfers that compensate vertical fiscal imbalances and provide some limited ex-ante insurance. In the other regime, it accommodates ex-post the fiscal needs of the different provinces. In this second case, full-insurance results, but the economy is subject to a tragedy of the fiscal commons, with excessive subnational spending, insufficient local taxation, and reduced production of federal public goods. We find the range of parameters for which one or the other institutional regime will be preferable. The result is a fiscal-federalism version of the usual trade-off between rules and discretion.     

创建"新知识城市" 促进新兴工业化的发展

新知识的成长和飞跃是国内新兴工业城市发展的主要动力。结合若干城市的经验 ,参考国外在高新技术发展中的历程 ,提出创建“新知识城市”的倡议及其对城市规划和建设的新要求     

职业型企业家成长论

本文首先介绍了知识资产和知识资产管理的概念 ,然后分析了当前知识资产管理存在的问题 ,最后就企业进行知识资产管理进行了对策性研究     

Organizational rejuvenation for knowledge exploitation: Exploring corporate entrepreneurship in an MNE

The purpose of this paper is to study how organizational rejuvenation is used to increase and support knowledge exploitation in multinational enterprises. Using case-study data to explore the theoretical arguments, interesting findings emerge. The main finding is that entrepreneurial activities in IT industry enable organizational rejuvenation with repercussions beyond the focal function. Other findings relate to how corporate entrepreneurship activities provide possibilities for continuous knowledge exploitation within the MNE and how entrepreneurial groups inside MNEs form the foundation from which the organizational rejuvenation originates. Finally, the form of organizational rejuvenation studied embraced both structural and behavioral changes. The authors acknowledge an equal share in the development of this article.     

浅论知识经济时代的人才观

知识经济是二十一世纪的主导经济。创新是知识经济的灵魂。知识经济时代的人才必须具备创新意识、创新精神和创新能力。本着重从知识经济的含义、特征及对人才素质的要求，阐述知识经济时代的人才观。     

知识管理在供应链中的应用研究

随着知识经济时代的到来,知识管理的重要性日益突出.本文结合案例,试图将知识管理的基本理念和方法从单个企业拓展到整条供应链中,并提出了其中的一些问题和挑战.     

基于合作关系的供应链信息共享模式研究

首先研究了供应链上下游合作伙伴间信息共享博弈情况，并分析了影响信息共享的障碍因素。然后，从合作伙伴合作关系的视角探讨了供成链中合作伙伴的类型及合作目的，最后以此为基础构建出供应链合作伙伴的信息共事模式及技术支撑体系。     

The effect of interfirm dependence structures on governance mechanisms

Despite recent developments regarding the study of interdependence structures, previous research has rarely investigated the simultaneous effect of both interdependence magnitude and interdependence asymmetry on governance mechanisms among exchange parties. A survey of manufacturing companies has been used to test a theory about the interactive effect of buyer dependence and supplier dependence on inter-firm governance. The analysis of the survey supported the proposition that both buyers and suppliers that are highly dependent on each other (high interdependence magnitude and low interdependence asymmetry) may choose to rely on monitoring and the norm of information sharing. However, when a buyer's dependence is low regardless of the supplier's dependence level, the buyer does not rely on the norm of information sharing (buyer's relative interdependence advantage, buyer's relative interdependence disadvantage, and low interdependence magnitude). On the other hand, when the supplier's dependence on the buyer is low, the buyer relies on monitoring regardless of its dependence level (buyer's relative interdependence disadvantage and low interdependence magnitude). However, this study did not empirically measure performance. Further research should be done on the effect of congruence between the governance mechanism and its antecedents on buying performance.