Consistency and asymptotic normality for equilibrium models with partially observed outcome variables

We derive conditions under which structural econometric models that rely on numerical computation of equilibria produce consistent and asymptotically normal parameter estimates. The conditions are weaker than those required for the application of the implicit function theory.     

Estimates of gender differences in firm’s access to credit in Sub-Saharan Africa

Based on firm level data from 16 Sub-Saharan African countries we show how three different measures of credit constraints lead to three different estimates of gender differences in manufacturing firms’ credit situation. Using a perception based credit constraint measure female owned firms appear relatively more constrained than male owned firms. Using formal financial access data we find no gender effect. Finally, using direct information on credit constraints, male owned small firms appear disadvantaged. Furthermore we show a strong size gradient in the gender gap for the two measures for which we find significant gender differences.     

Estimating dynamic demand for airlines

This paper uses an original panel dataset with posted prices and sales to estimate a dynamic demand. We find that consumers become more price sensitive as time to departure nears which is consistent with having lower valuations. This result provides empirical support to a key theoretical implication in Deneckere and Peck (2012)—high-valuation consumers purchase earlier. We also find that the number of active consumers increases closer to departure.     

Which business model for e-book pricing?

We characterize and compare equilibrium pricing strategies in a marketing channel in two scenarios. In the first scenario, the manufacturer chooses the wholesale prices of the two versions of a product, i.e., tangible and digital. and the retailer their prices to consumer. In the second scenario, the players use a revenue-sharing contract for only the digital version, while the competing version is managed by a wholesale price contract. The problem is inspired from a pricing controversy in the e-book industry.     

Injecting demand through spillovers: Foreign direct investment,domestic socio-political conditions,and host-country entrepreneurial activity

This study examines how foreign direct investment (FDI) spurs entrepreneurial activity in host countries. We also investigate why this relationship varies across countries because of domestic socio-political conditions. The findings from our panel analyses of 104 countries from 2000 to 2009 are consistent with our predictions that foreign direct investment positively relates to business creation and this positive effect is strongest in countries with poor institutional support, weak political stability, and low general human capital. Our work provides new insights into how cross-border investments and domestic socio-political conditions jointly influence entrepreneurial activity, especially in emerging and developing economies.     

VALUE CONTENT AND PRODUCTION NETWORKS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: APPLICATION OF AFTA AND ASEAN‐PLUS‐ONE FTA FORMULAS

Rules of origin are an integral part of all trade rules. To be eligible for Common Effective Preferential Tariffs under the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) agreement, a product must satisfy the conditions relative to value content. The present paper seeks to calculate value content of industries in Southeast Asia, using the formula specified by the rules of origin in AFTA, the ASEAN–China FTA, the ASEAN–Korea FTA, and the ASEAN–Japan FTA. Moreover, the paper attempts to calculate true value content of industries by applying a simple technique of input–output analysis, and to estimate error margins (i.e., overestimates) in calculating value content. The paper also examines the relationship between value content and production networks. The paper finds that many industries exhibited declines in local content during the period 1990–2000, but that the geographical spread of production networks raised the proportion of inputs supplied by the neighboring ASEAN countries, so that the contribution of the cumulative rule of origin increased.     

The trade reducing effects of market power in international shipping

Developing countries pay substantially higher transportation costs than developed nations, which leads to less trade and perhaps lower incomes. This paper investigates price discrimination in the shipping industry and the role it plays in determining transportation costs. In the presence of market power, shipping prices depend on the demand characteristics of goods being traded. We show theoretically and estimate empirically that ocean cargo carriers charge higher prices when transporting goods with higher product prices, lower import demand elasticities, and higher tariffs, and when facing fewer competitors on a trade route. These characteristics explain more variation in shipping prices than do conventional proxies such as distance, and significantly contribute to the higher shipping prices facing the developing world. A simple back of the envelope calculation suggests that eliminating market power in shipping would boost trade volumes by 5.9% (for the US) to 15.2% (for Latin America). Our findings are also important for evaluating the impact of tariff liberalization. Cargo carriers decrease shipping prices by 1–2% for every 1% reduction in tariffs.     

Socially excessive dissemination of patent licences

Abstract .  Compared with the social optimum, a monopolist usually sells too little. This result seemingly includes the case of a lab that licences its patented cost innovation: Katz and Shapiro (1986) find 'conditions under which [the lab] will issue fewer than the socially optimal number of licences.' However, I find instead that its incentives can be socially too high; the monopoly seller may sell too much. For example, it can be profit maximizing to sell several licences, while it is socially optimal that none is sold.     

The effect of corruption on bidding behavior in first-price auctions

When the owner of an object sells it through an auction run by an agent of hers, corruption may appear. In a first-price auction, corruption can make honest bidders more or less aggressive, or their behavior can remain unchanged. We identify sufficient conditions for each of the three possibilities. We analyze the effects of corruption on efficiency, bidders’ welfare and expected revenue. Our results apply as well to the situation—unrelated to corruption—where one of the bidders is granted a right of first refusal.     

Vertical integration, raising rivals’ costs and upstream collusion

This paper analyzes the impact vertical integration has on upstream collusion when the price of the input is linear. As a first step, the paper derives the collusive equilibrium that requires the lowest discount factor in the infinitely repeated game when one firm is vertically integrated. It turns out this is the joint-profit maximum of the colluding firms. The discount factor needed to sustain this equilibrium is then shown to be unambiguously lower than the one needed for collusion in the separated industry. While the previous literature has found it difficult to reconcile raising-rivals’-costs strategies following a vertical merger with equilibrium behavior in the static game, they are subgame perfect in the repeated game studied here.