Incentives and Information Exchange in International Taxation

The exchange of taxpayer-specific information between national tax authorities has recently emerged as a key and controversial topic in international tax policy discussions, most notably with the OECD's harmful tax practices project and the EU's savings tax initiative. This paper analyzes the effects of information exchange and withholding taxes, recognizing that countries which agree to exchange information do not forfeit the ability to levy withholding taxes, and also focusing in particular on the effects of innovative revenue-sharing arrangements. Amongst the findings are that: (i) the transfer of withholding tax receipts to the residence country, as planned in the European Union, has no effect on equilibrium tax rates, but acts purely as a lump-sum transfer; (ii) in contrast, allocating some of the revenue from information exchange to the source country—counter to usual practice (though no less so than the EU agreement)—would have adverse strategic effects on total revenue; (iii) nevertheless, any withholding tax regime is Pareto dominated by information exchange combined with appropriate revenue sharing; and, in particular, (iv) sharing of the additional revenues raised from information provided, while efficiency-reducing, could be in the interests of large countries as a means of persuading small countries to provide that information voluntarily. JEL Code: H77, H87, F42     

基于价值分级的级差式石油资源税制研究

本文对我国石油业缴纳资源税的现状进行了分析,指出了实施级差式资源税的必要性,在此基础上,介绍了石油资源价值分级的理论、方法和数学模型。最后．以石油资源价值分级结果为依据．对我国实施级差式资源税的具体操作方法作了说明。     

生态税与低碳经济发展

低碳经济是生态文明建设的客观要求,也是实现人与自然和谐的必然选择。文章从当前生态环境面临市场和政府干预失灵难题的基础上,分析了发展生态税对发展低碳经济的意义,进而提出建立和完善生态税促进低碳经济发展的政策建议。     

An alternative interpretation of the discontinuity in earnings distributions

We show that the asymmetric effects of income taxes and special items for profit and loss firms contribute to a discontinuity at zero in the distribution of earnings. Income taxes draw profit observations towards zero while negative special items pull loss observations away from zero. These earnings components are thus expected to contribute to a discontinuity even in the absence of discretion. We show our results are not an artifact of deflation and that other common components of earnings do not have similar effects on the earnings distribution around zero.

Foreign Direct Investment in the Enlarged EU: Do Taxes Matter and to What Extent?

Foreign direct investment is of increasing importance in the European Union. This paper estimates the effect of taxes on foreign direct investment (FDI) flows and on three sub-components of these flows for the countries of the enlarged European Union. The model in the spirit of gravity equations robustly explains FDI flows between the 25 member states. Sample selection needs to be addressed in the estimation. We show that the different subcomponents of FDI should and indeed do react differently to taxes. After controlling for unobserved country characteristics and common time effects, the top statutory corporate tax rate of both, source and host country, turn insignificant for total FDI and investment into equity. However, high source country taxes clearly increase the probability of firms to re-invest profits abroad and lower the percentage of debt financed FDI. This might reflect profit re-allocation to avoid taxes. Market size factors have the expected signs.

对非公经济业主征交个税的探索

论文运用综评论三段式研究法,对非公经济公司所得税和个人所得税征交中存在问题、形成原因和治理对策进行了创新性研究,提出了倒逼思路、倒算方法和税转股等创新见解,以期影响立法机构修订税法。     

我国房产税改革研究

目前,由于投资购房与投资购房日益兴起,我国的楼市房价日趋上涨,房地产税制陈旧的弊端日益突显,而只有一个比较完整的房地产税制的体制,才能真正帮助解决现行房产所面临的主要问题.因此,改革现行房地产税制,开征物业税是我国未来税制改革的一项重要举措.本文针对此次我国房产税制改革进行分析,并研究试点城市的实验效果.     

美国土地价值捕获制度及其借鉴

在美国,土地价值捕获（value capture）是指将土地的自然增值全部或部分回收归于社会的过程。本文对美国“土地价值捕获”的原理与实现方式进行了分析,总结特点,提出了针对我国土地增值收益分配的借鉴意义。     

Economics of externalities and public policy

In this paper we study a particular case of “multiple” externalities associated to the production of a good/activity, whose external effects can change from positive to negative depending on the level of output (intersecting externalities). To analyze their impact on the public policy we propose a very simple two-agent partial equilibrium model in the technological context of externalities. In a static framework, the centralized solution always implies an optimal policy, which may consist of taxation or subsidization depending on the individual optimum and on the technology parameters. In a dynamic model with local knowledge of the efficiency function and instantaneous output adjustments, such an optimal policy can be structurally stable or unstable. In the latter case, under small changes of the parameters the policy may switch from low taxation/subsidization to high taxation/subsidization or vice versa, or even jump discontinuously from taxation to subsidization or vice versa. Furthermore, the decentralized solution based upon “tradable rights” can be economically equivalent to the centralized solution in the form of taxation policy but the two solutions may be not politically equivalent.