基于GASA算法的提前或拖期问题优化

针对企业生产的提前 /拖期问题,提出了提前 /拖期问题的数学模型,在此基础上,利用GASA混合优化策略优化之,既保留了传统遗传算法能很快达到最优值领域的优点,又通过结合模拟退火算法大大改善传统遗传算法在后期的收敛性。     

行为资产组合理论：理论基础、内容及对异象的解释

行为金融理论于20世纪80年代兴起，它通过将行为因素引入决策过程从而对传统的金融理论做出补充。谢夫林(Shefrin)和斯特曼(Statman)在现代资产组合理论的基础上提出了行为资产组合理论，该理论是行为金融的理论基础之一。行为资产组合理论的基础包括安全第一组合理论和安全、潜力和期望理论。内容分为单一账户资产组合理论和多重账户资产组合理论。行为资产组合理论能够对市场中的一些异象做出合理的解释。     

职业学校学生学习心理之浅谈

职业学校学生的学习心理在学习动机、学习兴趣、学习能力等方面有其特殊性。职业教育应合理构筑教 学计划、强化专业技能培训,提倡“以学为中心”培养学生学习兴趣,帮助、辅导学习有困难的学生。     

FDI对中国经济发展的绩效及对策分析

改革开放以来,中国FDI流入量不断提高,对经济发展的作用也日益重要。今后,应当根据全球FDI流动的新趋势,加快我国吸收外FDI方式创新。     

ERP中工资管理子系统的解决方案研究与实现

提出典型中小制造企业信息化建设中ERP系统整体解决方案,分析了定单式中小企业ERP系统中工资管理子系统与其它子系统的联系、系统体系结构和系统开发实现的关键技术,并重点讨论了基于B/S架构ERP系统中工资管理子系统开发中的一些关键技术.     

基于岗位胜任力的某通信服务分公司的中干培训体系构建

为适应公司数字化转型,某通信服务分公司在2019年调整了中干组织结构。调整1年后,高层发现很多中干急缺管理、专业知识等相关知识和技能,这就需要公司构建培训体系来提高中干的整体能力和素质来适应快速的转型。论文通过问卷调研、统计分析、专家咨询法等方法构建了适应通信服务公司转型的中干培训体系,试图为构建完整的通信服务公司中层管理者胜任能力模型评价体系奠定基础。     

保险公司偿付能力恶化预测研究

文章在分析公司财务预测研究方法应用前提的基础上,运用MDA模型和Logistic线性回归模型预测方法对我国保险公司偿付能力恶化进行预测研究。结果表明两个主流模型均能在保险公司偿付能力恶化前1~2年较好地进行预测,但是由于两类错估率的不同,MDA模型要优于Logistic模型。     

Efficient markets and Bayes’ rule

Summary. A series of financial anomalies motivated the development of new theories that modify the rational expectations ideal. Two possibilities have been systematically explored. The literature on behavioral finance relaxes the assumption that agents form beliefs according to the laws of probability and assume, instead, that simpler heuristic rules are used. Another stream of the literature assumes that agents process information according to Bayes rule, but do not posses sufficient information to know the true data generating process. In this paper, Bayesian and Behavioral agents coexist and trade in a standard dynamic asset pricing model. A long-standing conjecture is demonstrated. It is shown that, under suitable assumptions, Bayesian agents drive Behavioral, non-Bayesian agents out of the market. Hence, asset prices are eventually determined under the Bayesian paradigm.Received: 3 June 2004, Revised: 17 September 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D83.Preliminary versions have circulated under the titles Markets Favor Bayesian Models and Market Selection of Empirical Models under Limited Information. I thank Larry Blume, David Easley, Larry Epstein, Armando Gomes, Bruce Hansen, Lars Hansen, Richard Kihlstrom, Grace Koo, George Mailath, Werner Ploberger, Andrew Postlewaite and Shakeeb Khan for useful comments. I also thank participants at the NBER GE meetings, Evolutionary Finance conference in Zurich, Latin American Meetings of the Econometric Society, Stanford Institute for Theoretical Economics, the Instituto de Matematica Pura e Aplicada, the theory seminar at Brown, Chicago, Harvard-MIT, Minnesota, Penn and Wisconsin. I gratefully acknowledge the financial support from the National Science Foundation Grant SES 0109650.     

Bargaining Outcomes with Double-Offer Arbitration

Increasingly, arbitration is becoming used to resolve bargaining disputes in a variety of settings. Reducing dispute rates is often listed as a main goal in designing arbitration mechanisms. Conventional arbitration and final-offer arbitration are two commonly used procedures, but theoretical examinations of these arbitration procedures show that disputants’ final bargaining positions do not converge and disagreement is likely. This article contains results from a set of experiments designed to compare bargaining outcomes under the two commonly used arbitration procedures with outcomes under an innovative procedure called “double-offer” arbitration (Zeng et al., 1996). This procedure requires that disputants make two final offers at impasse: a primary and a secondary offer. The arbitrator evaluates the pairs of offers using a linear criterion function, and theory suggests the secondary offers converge to the median of the arbitrator’s preferred settlement distribution. Because the procedure’s rules are that convergence of offers generates a settlement at those offers, this theoretical convergence result implies that arbitration is not needed in the end. Experimental results indicate that dispute rates in double-offer arbitration are, on average, about the same as dispute rates in conventional arbitration. However, other results show reason to favor double-offer arbitration. Specifically, in repeated bargaining, there is concern over whether use of an arbitration procedure becomes addictive and makes bargainers more likely to use the procedure in the future-a “narcotic effect.” The data show that double-offer arbitration is non-addictive, whereas both conventional and final-offer arbitration are.     

第二产业主导产业的选择与实证分析

中国目前仍处于传统工业化中期,今后的任务是推进工业现代化,向发达经济阶段迈进.第二产业主导产业的发展在整个经济发展中处于举足轻重的地位,因此,第二产业主导产业的选择是加速发展第二产业的关键,正确确定目前第二产业中的主导产业,对中国第二产业以及整个国民经济的发展意义重大.本文以第二产业主导产业选择的基准为依据,运用主成份分析法,确定了2000-2050年各阶段第二产业的主导产业.