Aims: This study aimed to evaluate the budget impact of niraparib and olaparib in patients with platinum-sensitive, recurrent ovarian cancer from a US third party payer perspective.
Materials and methods: A budget impact model was constructed to assess the additional per member per month (PMPM) costs associated with the introduction of niraparib and olaparib, two poly ADP-ribose polymerase ribose polymerase (PARP) inhibitors recently approved to be used in platinum-sensitive, recurrent ovarian cancer patients with and without a gBRCA mutation. The model assessed both pharmacy costs and medical costs. Pharmacy costs included adjusted drug costs, coinsurance, and dispensing fees. Medical costs included costs associated with disease monitoring and management of adverse events from the treatment. Epidemiological data from the literature were used to estimate the target population size. The analysis used 1-year time frame, and patients were assumed on treatment until disease progression or death. All costs were computed in 2017 USD. One-way sensitivity analyses were conducted to evaluate the model robustness.
Results: In a hypothetical plan of 1,000,000 members, 206 patients were estimated to be potential candidates for niraparib or olaparib maintenance treatment after applying all epidemiological parameters. At listed 30-day supply WAC prices of $14,750 for niraparib and $13,482 for olaparib, budget impacts of these two drugs were $0.169 PMPM and $0.156 PMPM, respectively, most of which were contributed by pharmacy costs. Sensitivity analyses suggested that assumptions around market share, platinum-sensitive rate after first treatment, and WAC prices affected results the most.
Limitations: In this model, it was assumed that adopting niraparib and olaparib would not affect utilization of existing medications. Also, the estimated clinical parameters from clinical trials could differ from real-world data. 相似文献
We prove an existence result for the principal–agent problem with adverse selection under general assumptions on preferences and allocation spaces. Instead of assuming that the allocation space is finite-dimensional or compact, we consider a more general coercivity condition which takes into account the principal’s cost and the agents’ preferences. Our existence proof is simple and flexible enough to adapt to partial participation models as well as to the case of type-dependent budget constraints. 相似文献
Background: Overactive bladder (OAB) is a common condition that has a significant impact on patients’ health-related quality-of-life and is associated with a substantial economic burden to healthcare systems. OnabotulinumtoxinA has a well-established efficacy and safety profile as a treatment for OAB; however, the economic impact of using onabotulinumtoxinA has not been well described.
Methods: An economic model was developed to assess the budget impact associated with OAB treatment in France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK, using onabotulinumtoxinA alongside best supportive care (BSC)—comprising incontinence pads and/or anticholinergic use and/or clean intermittent catheterisation (CIC)—vs BSC alone. The model time horizon spanned 5 years, and included direct costs associated with treatment, BSC, and adverse events.
Results: Per 100,000 patients in each country, the use of onabotulinumtoxinA resulted in estimated cost savings of €97,200 (Italy), €71,580 (Spain), and €19,710 (UK), and cost increases of €23,840 in France and €284,760 in Germany, largely due to day-case and inpatient administration, respectively. Projecting these results to the population of individuals aged 18 years and above gave national budget saving estimates of €9,924,790, €27,458,290, and €48,270,760, for the UK, Spain, and Italy, respectively, compared to cost increases of €12,160,020 and €196,086,530 for France and Germany, respectively. Anticholinergic treatment and incontinence pads were the largest contributors to overall spending on OAB management when onabotulinumtoxinA use was not increased, and remained so in four of five scenarios where onabotulinumtoxinA use was increased. This decreased resource use was equivalent to cost offsets ranging from €106,110 to €176,600 per 100,000 population.
Conclusions: In three of five countries investigated, the use of onabotulinumtoxinA, in addition to BSC, was shown to result in healthcare budget cost savings over 5 years. Scenario analyses showed increased costs in Germany and France were largely attributable to the treatment setting rather than onabotulinumtoxinA acquisition costs. 相似文献
This article presents the Kaleckian model of growth and distribution that sets a budget deficit ratio as an indicator of fiscal policy and examines the short- and long-run effects of an increase in budget deficits and a rise in income tax rates on the economy. The key short-run outcomes are as follows. First, expanded budget deficits have a positive effect on the rate of capacity utilization. Second, the tax rate for wage income does not affect the rate of capacity utilization, whereas the tax rate for capital income has a favorable impact on it. This result implies that raising the tax rate for capital income can be an important policy instrument for stimulating the economy. Third, we find that the economy exhibits a wage-led aggregate demand in the short run. The main long-run results are as follows. First, the effect of expanded budget deficits on the growth rate is ambiguous, since a higher debt burden negatively influences the rate of capacity utilization and hence economic growth, despite the increase in demand caused by government borrowing. A higher budget deficit ratio thus raises the growth rate only if a certain condition is satisfied. Second, the tax rate for capital income has a positive impact on the growth rate. Third, the economy shows a wage-led growth in the long run. 相似文献
We analyze the nonlinear pricing problem faced by an incomplete information monopolist operating in a market populated by agents with budget constraints. We show that if other goods are available and if the monopolist's goods are nonessential relative to other goods, then there exists an optimal, individually rational, and incentive compatible selling mechanism for the monopolist (Theorem 1). Moreover, we show that a solution to all such nonlinear pricing problems exists if and only if the monopolist's goods are nonessential (Theorem 2). In the absence of nonessentiality, we show that if the monopolist's profit function is independent of quantity (e.g., if all costs are fixed), then an optimal selling mechanism exists (Theorem 3). Finally, we show that if there is reporting (of types by agents) and partial recognition of types (by the monopolist), then an optimal selling mechanism exists, even in the absence of nonessentiality, provided agents' utility functions are affine and continuous in goods (Theorem 4). 相似文献
Allergic rhinitis (AR) is a chronic disease with a substantial clinical and economic burden. This study estimated the potential budget impact (BI) associated with market entry of Sweet Vernal, Orchard, Perennial Rye, Timothy, and Kentucky Blue Grass Mixed Pollens Allergen Extract Tablet for Sublingual Use (‘5-grass SLIT tablet’) for patients aged 10–65 with grass pollen-induced AR. 相似文献
We consider an innovation contest between n firms in the presence of knowledge leakages from an innovating firm to its rivals. Our analysis focuses on the effects of these knowledge spillovers on merger activities between firms. In particular, we are interested in how different organizational designs of R&D after mergers affect profits of firms taking part in a merger and profits of their non-merging rivals. Three organizational arrangements are analyzed: first, a fusion of R&D departments in which the newly merged firm decides to close down one of the previously two R&D departments. Second, a profit center arrangement in which the newly merged firm keeps the old R&D departments as fully functional entities with a sovereign budget responsibility at each of the two departments. Third, a multisubsidiary organizational form in which the newly merged firm still keeps the old R&D departments but with restricted budget responsibility in the sense that they are forced to determine cooperatively their R&D budgets in order to maximize overall firm’s profits. It turns out that the different organizational designs of R&D after the merger and the budget responsibilities have major impacts on merger outcomes. 相似文献