THE ECONOMICS OF VOLUNTARY EXPORT RESTRAINT AGREEMENTS

Abstract. The three substantive sections of this survey deal with the economic consequences of voluntary export restraint agreements (VERs), e.g. the Multi-Fibre Arrangement and VERs on Japanese auto exports. Section 2 focuses on the disposition of quota rents under the assumptions of perfectly competitive markets and the absence of substitute suppliers. Section 3 considers imperfect competition and the role of VERs as cartelization instruments, facilitating collusion. Section 4 analyzes the discriminatory effects of VERs when there are third country suppliers. A broad conclusion is that the economic consequences of VERs are more complex than the standard trade policy analysis based on tariffs because of the issues discussed in Sections 3 and 4.     

Granting preferential market access in services sequentially versus jointly with goods

Despite the cost and resource‐effectiveness of joint trade negotiations and complementarities between goods and services‐trade flows, more than 12% of the 132 WTO‐notified services‐trade agreements (STAs) in force until August 2015 were entered into effect sequentially to goods‐trade accords. This stylised fact motivates our study of the determinants of joint versus sequential negotiation/accession of goods and services accords, a subject hitherto unexplored in the growing literature on the determinants of STA membership. Our results suggest larger marginal effects of fundamental economic, geographic, institutional, doing business and services regulatory factors on the propensity of joint negotiation/accession compared to STA formation alone. Moreover, cultural‐distance variables are only found to affect the likelihood of joint preferential liberalisation of goods and services trade, without influencing STA‐only membership.     

Managerial labor-market discipline and the characteristics of merger and acquisition transactions

This study evaluates how state regulation of noncompetition agreements affects merger and acquisition activity. Noncompetition agreements put restrictions on postemployment activities, thereby reducing management mobility and forcing top managers to bear the long-term consequences of their corporate decisions. In this sense, state regulation of noncompetition agreements functions as a mechanism to align management's interests with those of the shareholders when management makes major corporate decisions. To examine this hypothesis empirically, this study tests whether the legal enforcement of noncompetition agreements across states affects the choice of payment methods, the premium paid for targets, and the acquirers' abnormal returns on their merger or acquisition activity. The results suggest that stricter enforcement of noncompetition agreements significantly reduces the likelihood of using stock in takeovers and the premiums paid for targets. In addition, the study documents that stronger enforcement of noncompetition agreements is related with more favorable market reactions for large acquirers.     

论植物品种权与农民权利的冲突

分析了农民权利问题产生、发展的历史过程,重点考察了农民权利在有关的国际条约中的性质、地位、作用,提出了解决农民权利问题的基本政策思路。研究结果表明:农民权利与育种者权利产生对抗的主要原因在于不合理的基因资源知识产权制度;不合理的基因资源知识产权制度严重损害发展中国家农民利益;CBD中基因资源国家主权原则应当成为构建发展中国家的农民权利和基因资源保护的法律体系的基本准则。     

A comparative institutional analysis of agreements on product standards

The WTO and the EU have chosen two different agreements on product standards. While the WTO's approach is primarily based on a “National Treatment” (NT) principle, the EU's approach crucially relies on a principle of “Mutual Recognition” (MR). This paper offers a first look at the comparative performance of these two principles. We show that standards are imposed for levels of externalities that are too low under NT and too high under MR. This suggests that NT should be preferred to MR when the amount of trade in goods characterized by high levels of externalities is large.