From Benevolent Dictator to Constitutional Monarch

SUMMARY

Frustration with didactic methods in teaching American students about European-style “participation” led to the use of a semester-long simulation of a European works council in a graduate cross-cultural course. Students shaped in the American culture of person-centered, direct participation learned by living an institutionalized, representational participation system. A written class council charter contractually bound both instructor and students to power-sharing via redefined roles in the management of the class. Student testimony documents the effectiveness of this simulation in driving learning to previously unreached levels.     

Formation of interdependent regional trade agreements and production networks

Production networks (PNs) can be defined as a determinant of trade partnership. Deepening PNs may generate positive welfare effects and lead to a proliferation in the formation of interdependent regional trade agreements (RTAs). This paper theoretically develops the link between PNs and the formation of RTAs and empirically investigates the link by applying a qualitative choice model estimation methodology (probit) with panel data that covers bilateral country‐pairs among 147 countries between 2000 and 2010. We find that the RTA formation has been strongly driven by deepening PNs between members as well as with third countries. We also find that production network‐driven RTA interdependence is member specific.     

Is the growth of regionalism as significant as the headlines suggest? Lessons from agricultural trade

The proliferation of regional trade agreements (RTAs) has motivated a significant number of ex post econometric studies investigating their agricultural trade impacts. The general conclusion is that RTAs increase members’ trade by as much as 150%, on average. In this article, we demonstrate that previous empirical work likely misrepresents the impact of RTAs because of considerable heterogeneity in the depth of economic integration pursued by these agreements. Contrary to previous studies, the results reveal that RTAs are not universally trade creating, and some agreements appear to provide very little benefit. “Deep integration agreements,” on the other hand, are largely responsible for the impressive agricultural trade flow increases reported in the literature. Testing the hierarchy of RTAs largely confirms the theory: the benefits of regionalism are an increasing function of the depth of economic integration.     

Non-compete agreements: How fiduciary duty and covenants not to compete restrict managers’ mobility

Companies spend time and money training employees; in the case of a merger or acquisition, they spend resources such as cash, stock, and debt. It makes sense, then, that they do not want an employee to take the expertise the company underwrote to a competitor. Thus, employment contracts will often include non-compete clauses—sometimes known as covenants not to compete—which state that the employee cannot move to a competitor for a certain period of time. Though not all employees have the heightened fiduciary duty of board members and officers, they frequently have signed agreements that, at least on paper, restrict their employment mobility. Not only have officers and board members often signed such agreements as well, but they also have fiduciary duties further restricting their new employment plans. In decades of teaching courses in the legal environment of business as well as in business ethics, no topic flummoxes students more than this one. After all, in a free country, a person should be able to work where they wish, right? How can such restrictions be fair? Legally and ethically, this is a complicated area and one in which the old lawyer’s answer—it depends—is true. This article provides some parameters for employees and employers to know when fiduciary duty precludes certain employees from moving to a new company, including when those are legal in what ways they are fair.     

国际经济格局变动中的区域主义发展新趋势

本文研究指出全球化再造过程中新区域主义的特点和发展趋势,以及由此引发的学术界研究方法的巨大变革和对世界经济格局变动的影响,通过对美墨加协定、下一代欧盟复苏计划、东亚一体化RCEP协定的研究,论证了区域主义和全球化之间的关系,研究RTA本身与WTO是否一致,梳理并分析区域贸易协定是全球自由贸易的绊脚石还是垫脚石的争论,得出北美和欧盟的区域主义是全球化的“绊脚石”,更多是替代作用且具有防御性,而东亚的区域主义则是全球化的“垫脚石”,发挥互补作用且具有开拓性,RCEP在内容上是WTO的升级版,在范围上是WTO的降级版,中国未来在WTO改革、全球治理和人类命运共同体构建方面将担负更大的使命,通过新区域主义的形式推进全球化治理与改革,从“外围”走向“中心”。     

Firm Size and Cooperation: The Determinants of Cooperative Agreements in Information Technology Industries

This paper aims to shed light on factors that lead firms to resort to collaborative ventures. Specific attention is devoted to the role of firm size. The study relies on an extensive econometric analysis of a representative sample of firms in three Information Technology industries (semiconductor, data processing, and telecommunications). Data relating to the number and type of agreements concluded by firms, provided by the ARPA database developed at Politecnico di Milano, are correlated with firm–, industry– and country–specific variables. The findings of the econometric estimates point to the importance of firm size, scope of activity within the industries considered, diversification in related industries, and, to a less extent, degree of internationalization in explaining use of agreements. Moreover, the study provides preliminary evidence in support of a complementary relation between interfirm linkages and R&D expenditures. A positive correlation with growth rates also seems to emerge. In contrast, the s regarding the relation between internal capital expenditures and recourse to agreements are mixed.     

Multilateral trade negotiations, bilateral opportunism and the rules of GATT/WTO

Trade negotiations occur through time and between the governments of many countries. An important issue is thus whether the value of concessions that a government wins in a current negotiation may be eroded in a future bilateral negotiation to which it is not party. We identify rules of negotiation that serve to protect the welfare of governments that are not participating in the bilateral negotiation. Our main finding is that the two central principles of GATT/WTO—nondiscrimination (MFN) and reciprocity—preserve the welfare of nonparticipating governments and therefore offer a “first-line of defense” against bilateral opportunism.     

Discriminatory tariffs and international negotiations

Recent research has highlighted the efficiency of the MFN principle within the GATT/WTO structure. This paper analyzes the exception made to MFN within Article XXIII that allows discriminatory punishment for deviations from the agreement. We argue that, in the absence of collusion, the MFN exception reduces the severity of punishment and thus lowers the level of cooperation that can be achieved by the agreement. However, discriminatory punishment may still be beneficial as we show that it reduces the problems associated with the potential for renegotiation during the punishment phase. Finally, we argue that our results are also applicable to the question of whether to use trade policy sanctions as a means of enforcing agreements covering domestic policies.     

Negotiating free trade

We develop a dynamic bargaining model in which a leading country endogenously decides whether to sequentially negotiate free trade agreements with subsets of countries or engage in simultaneous multilateral bargaining with all countries at once. We show how the structure of coalition externalities shapes the choice between sequential and multilateral bargaining, and we identify circumstances in which the grand coalition is the equilibrium outcome, leading to worldwide free trade. A model of international trade is then used to illustrate equilibrium outcomes and how they depend on the structure of trade and protection. Global free trade is not achieved when the political-economy motive for protection is sufficiently large. Furthermore, the model generates both “building bloc” and “stumbling bloc” effects of preferential trade agreements. In particular, we describe an equilibrium in which global free trade is attained only when preferential trade agreements are permitted to form (a building bloc effect), and an equilibrium in which global free trade is attained only when preferential trade agreements are forbidden (a stumbling bloc effect). The analysis identifies conditions under which each of these outcomes emerges.     

Free trade networks

The paper examines the formation of free trade agreements (FTAs) as a network formation game. We consider an n-country model in which (possibly asymmetric) countries trade differentiated industrial commodities. We show that if all countries are symmetric, the complete FTA network is pairwise stable and it is the unique stable network if industrial commodities are not highly substitutable. We also compare FTAs and customs unions (CUs) as to which of these two regimes facilitates global trade liberalization, noticing that unlike CUs, each signatory of an FTA can have another FTA without consent of other member countries.