我国农产品冷链物流现状分析及优化研究

我国农产品冷链物流的发展相对落后,严重影响了农业的发展。文中从界定农产品冷链物流概念的基础出发,分析其构成、条件、特点,指出目前存在的问题,并在此基础上提出了优化措施。     

动态项目型新产品开发组织模式研究

产品开发组织是新产品开发系统的组织保证。根据多产品多层次并行的产品开发过程,讨论建立了动态项目型新产品开发组织。为了顺利实现产品开发,在产品层、子阶段层和设计层并行;在动态项目型产品开发组织中,又讨论了组建产品策划团队、产品开发管理团队和产品开发技术团队等内容,以确保相应的新产品开发战略的实现。     

试析FDI对我国产业结构的影响

外商直接投资对一个国家产业结构优化有着重要的影响，它直接关系着产业结构优化的程度。就我国目前的情况来看，外商直接投资对中国的产业结构的调整和优化还需要有不小的改进。基于此．本文对外商直接投资对我国产业的利弊作分析，进而提出解决的对策。     

翻译方法技巧谈

本文从翻译理论和实践两个方面探讨了一些翻译方法和技巧,并用实例说明了掌这些方法和技巧后的翻译效果。作者同时认为在翻译中对翻译理论和翻译实践还有许多探讨空间。     

供应链管理下的采购管理方法辨析

如何对物料采购实施有效的管理以获取竞争优势是由物料的多种因素综合决定的。文章在分析传统ABC分类法的基础上,给出了一种依据价值、质量影响及市场采购的难易程度的一个三维分类模式,并分析给出了在供应链管理下不同物料的采购管理要点。     

基于微粒群优化算法的物流配送中心选址问题研究

结合物流配送中心选址的特点，建立数学模型．在此基础上研究了基于微粒群算法的物流多配送中心选址问题，得到一种新的多配送中心选址方法。仿真结果证明此方法比传统选址方法更适合多配送中心选址和非线性问题的优化，并且具有传统算法所不具备的灵活性，适用多样的物流配送模型。     

基于网络环境的会计教学问题探究

随着互连网与通讯技术、计算机软硬件设备与科技的快速进步,信息技术将是会计教育与教学中的必要元素,信息技术与会计学科领域整合将是未来会计教育的主流。新的教育环境要求会计教育必须转变教育理念,改变传统的教学模式、更新教学内容、探究新的教学方法。本文就网络环境下的会计教育理念、教学模式、教学内容、教学方法等进行了研究。     

会计学原理精品课程教学创新——以人为本教学原则的探索及成果

专业课教学如何体现“以人为本”,这是会计教学面临的新课题。近年来,我们实行了给予学生选择教师权利的挂牌教学法促进学生个性发展的教学科研化方法,创新探索了学生自我评价及自发的经验学习等方法进行了创新与探索,取得了显著成效。本文对此进行介绍,对其对会计教学改革提供参考。     

An efficiency analysis of Swedish employment offices

In this paper the method–production frontier analysis is used to analyse differences in efficiency between different Swedish Employment Offices. Earlier empirical labour market policy evaluation studies have utilised various measures that, however, do not take into consideration differences between organisation units. The main result of this investigation is that employment offices show major differences in the efficiency with which they carry out their job matching services.     

Dissertation abstract: “Essays in applied economics on the intervention of a third player in agency relationships”

Agency theory has established that appropriate incentives can reconcile the diverging interests of the principal and the agent. Focusing on three applications, this dissertation evaluates the empirical relevance of these results when a third party interacts with the primary contract. The analyses provided rely on either laboratory or natural experiments. First, corruption is analyzed as a two-contract situation: a delegation contract between a Principal and an Agent and a corruption pact concluded between this Agent and a third player, called Briber. A survey of the recent microeconomic literature on corruption first highlights how corruption behavior results from the properties of those two agreements. We thereafter show that the Agent faces a conflict in reciprocities due to those two conflicting agreements. The resulting delegation effect, supported by observed behavior in our three-player experimental game, could account for the deterrence effect of wages on corruption. Second, health care is governed by contradictory objectives: patients are mainly concerned with the health provided, whereas containing health care costs is the primary goal of health care administrators. We provide further insights into the ability of incentives to balance these two competing objectives. In this matter, our theoretical and econometric analysis evaluates how a new mixed compensation scheme, introduced in Quebec in 1999 as an alternative to fee-for-services, has affected physicians’ practice patterns. Free switching is shown to be an essential feature of the reform, since it implements screening between physicians. Finally, the demand for underground work departs from the traditional Beckerian approach to illegal behavior, due to the dependence of benefits from illegality on competitors’ behavior. We set up a theoretical model in which the demand for underground work from all producers competing on the same output market is analyzed simultaneously. We first show that competition drastically undermines the individual benefits of tax evasion. At equilibrium, each firm nonetheless chooses evasion with a positive probability, strictly lower than one. This Bertrand curse could then account for the “tax evasion puzzle” i.e. the overprediction of evasion in models that ignore market interactions. We thereafter show that allowing firms to denounce competitors’ evasion is not likely to solve this curse—by providing a credible threat against price cuts, it fosters illegal work. Empirical evidence from a laboratory experiment confirms these predictions. Without denunciation, experimental firms often choose evasion whereas evasion benefits are canceled out by competition. When introduced, denunciation is rarely used by firms, but the threat makes evasion profitable. JEL Classification K42, I18, D21, C25, C91