Auditors' and governmental financial officers' views on expanding the Sarbanes–Oxley Act provisions to state and local governments

This paper examines whether certain provisions of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX, 2002) should be expanded to include state and local governmental entities. Surveying governmental financial officials (GFOs) and their external auditors to gauge support for SOX-like legislation for governmental entities, we find the strongest support for auditor independence rules similar to SOX, management assessment of, and reporting on, internal controls, and severe penalties for destruction of records, fraud, and failure to report fraud.     

Has the likelihood of appointing a CEO with an accounting/finance background changed in the post-Sarbanes Oxley era?

Congress passed the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) in July 2002 to improve the accuracy and reliability of financial reporting. The Act increased boards of directors’ responsibilities for financial reporting and control. Did it consequently increase boards’ preferences for a CEO with financial experience to protect against the potential reputational and/or legal losses that directors incur when financial scandals happen? We investigated whether newly appointed CEOs in the post-SOX period were more likely to have accounting or finance experience than in the pre-SOX period. Using a sample of 264 CEO changes from 2001 to 2004, we found that the percentage of newly-appointed CEOs with accounting/finance backgrounds significantly increased in the post-SOX period compared to the pre-SOX period. Our results suggest that the events surrounding the passage of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act may have affected the CEO background experience preferred by boards of directors.     

The effect of internal control deficiencies on the usefulness of earnings in executive compensation

Since SOX 404 disclosures are informative about earnings, and due to the widespread practice of using earnings-based measures in executive compensation, this study examines whether reports of internal control material weaknesses (ICMW) under SOX 404 influence firms' reliance on earnings in tying executive pay to performance. Using 391 (366) firm-year observations with reported ICMW and 3648 (3138) firm-year observations for CEOs (CFOs) reporting NOMW under SOX 404, we find a decreased strength in the association between earnings and executives' (CEO and CFO) compensation when the firm reports an ICMW, and as the number of reported ICMW increases. In addition, we find this decreased weight on earnings for the more severe Company-Level than Account- Specific material weaknesses. Our study suggests that the ICMW report under SOX 404 provides incremental information for executive compensation beyond that contained in reported earnings.     

The effect of auditors’ internal control opinions on loan decisions

We examine the effect of internal control reports on lending officers’ assessments of a company’s creditworthiness. We suggest that an adverse internal control opinion can undermine the assurance provided by an unqualified opinion on financial statements taken as a whole and have a negative affect on lenders’ assessments. In addition, we investigate whether auditor size plays a role in determining the effect on lenders’ judgments.     

THE IMPACT OF SARBANES‐OXLEY ON OFF‐BALANCE SHEET SUPPLY CHAIN ACTIVITIES

This study seeks to provide readers with an overview of sections 401, 404 and 802 of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act as they pertain to supply chain managers, while empirically assessing the impact of SOX on some of the most common off‐balance sheet supply activities from familiarity, compliance, and time spent perspectives. Agency theory is used to provide the theoretical foundations for this study. The results of this study provide important implications for supply managers such as that stronger SOX compliance has a positive impact on off‐balance sheet activities.     

Study on the applications of the Sarbanes Oxley Act in multinational corporations

The United States Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002 （Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002）. The Act included many provisions that reflect on corporate governance for publicly traded corporations. The authors thought that the provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act generally should apply to all US and non-US companies that had reporting obligations under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended or that had filed registration statements under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended which they had not withdrawn. In Section two of the paper, from different perspectives, the author discussed why Many Multinational Companies （MNCs） should abide by the provisions pertaining to publicly trade corporation in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. At last, the authors examined which provisions that related to publicly traded corporations should be applied in MNCs and why others should not be applied.     

International Cross‐Listings and Subsequent Security‐Market Choices: Evidence from ADRs

We study the link between the attributes of American depositary receipt (ADR)‐listed firms and their post‐listing security‐market choices. We find that developed market firms are more likely to issue equity and debt than their emerging market counterparts. Furthermore, we find that large firms are more likely to issue debt and less likely to issue equity. When we examine locations where ADR firms raise their capital, we find that firms originating from countries where the protection of minority shareholders is weak are more likely to issue debt on their home markets and less likely to issue debt on international markets (excluding U.S. markets). Furthermore, ADR firms originating from developed (emerging market) countries are more (less) likely to issue their equity on their domestic markets and less (more) likely to issue equity on international markets (excluding U.S. markets).     

美国证券法与萨班斯法的比较研究——基于注册会计师法律责任视角

美国证券法和萨班斯法是两部影响美国证券市场意义深远的法规，二者在立法背景、规范内容、作用及影响等方面具有许多可比之处。本文通过对证券法与萨班斯法在规范和治理会计信息以及对注册会计师法律责任的惩戒等方面的综合比较，旨在揭示美国金融法律监管的独到之处和现实意义，为我国资本市场监管和注册会计师法律责任规范提供借鉴。     

IT internal control weaknesses and firm performance: An organizational liability lens

The information systems literature and the public press have called for organizations to more closely scrutinize their information technology (IT) controls; however, little more than anecdotal evidence exists on the business value of quality IT internal control, beyond regulatory compliance. In this paper, we (a) advance an organizational liability perspective to the question of IT internal control value; and (b) use the unique setting provided by the enactment of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) to investigate the relationship between IT internal control weaknesses (ICWs) and both accounting earnings (a contemporaneous measure of firm performance) and market value (a forward looking, risk-adjusted measure of firm performance). Using a data set that provides audited annual assessments of the effectiveness of both IT and non-IT internal controls for a cross-section of companies as mandated by SOX, we find that firms that report an IT ICW have lower accounting earnings compared to firms with strong IT internal controls. We also find that IT ICW moderates the association between accounting earnings and market valuation, with firms reporting weak IT internal controls having a lower earnings multiple. These results are sustained even after controlling for non-IT ICWs and firm-specific factors that are known determinants of ICWs, and are reinforced using an inter-temporal changes analysis in which we use each firm as its own control at a different point in time. Overall, our results provide empirical evidence which suggests that IT internal controls are a strategic necessity and that information systems risk is priced by the capital markets. The implications of these findings for theory and practice are discussed.     

The Impact of Disclosures of Internal Control Weaknesses and Remediations on Investors' Perceptions of Earnings Quality

We hypothesize and find that firms making SOX‐mandated disclosures of material weaknesses in internal control over financial reporting (ICOFR) exhibit lower investor‐perceived earnings quality (IPEQ) than nondisclosers. We measure IPEQ using e‐loading, a market‐returns–based representation of earnings quality developed by Ecker, Francis, Kim, Olsson, and Schipper (2006). Firms do not exhibit decreases in IPEQ after initially disclosing material weaknesses. This is consistent with investors having anticipated ICOFR strength based on observable firm characteristics. However, firms exhibit increases in IPEQ after receiving their first clean audit reports that confirm the remediation of previously disclosed weaknesses. This indicates that, although investors do not find initial weakness disclosures to be incrementally informative, SOX motivates firms to remediate weak controls and provides a venue for credible remediation disclosures, thus enhancing investors' perception of financial reporting reliability. These findings are consistent with the existence of regulatory benefits associated with SOX's internal control disclosure and audit requirements.