Strategic entry and externalities in groundwater resources: Evidence from the lab

This study uses economics experiments to extend the literature on common-pool resources by focusing on entry investment behavior in a stylized, spatially explicit aquifer. The model consists of a two-stage game, where participants make an entry decision in the first stage and, if they choose to enter, decide how much resource to extract in the second stage. Results show that entry behavior and groundwater pumping decisions are significantly affected by the underlying spatial externalities of the resource. In instances where the impacts of groundwater use are spread across all resource users, we observe both a greater number of users choosing to use the resource and a higher intensity of use. The results support expectations from the model that groundwater management policies should focus on entry in addition to decisions related to the volume of pumping. The results also discern the interplay of entry with both hydrogeologic characteristics of the resource and the option to exit and reveal that the option to exit increases the intensity of extraction as well as initial entry rates.     

Union-oligopoly bargaining and entry deterrence: a reassessment of limit pricing

This paper introduces wage bargaining in the framework of Milgrom and Roberts (Econometrica 50(2):443–459, 1982) where the workers’ reservation wage is the private information parameter critical for entry. We show that entry threat significantly distorts the wage, which in some cases adversely affects the firm’s ability to signal through price. Consequently, the separating equilibrium (in price) does not always exist. If, however, wage agreements are made public, signalling occurs with or without distortions in wage depending on whether the union’s bargaining power is high or low. Pooling equilibrium also exists and it features similar distortions. We also examine which signal, wage or price, generates greater social welfare. We would like to thank two referees for their helpful comments and suggestions. This paper is partially based on a chapter of Pal’s PhD thesis done at Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research (IGIDR), India. For remaining errors we are solely responsible.     

Stackelberg equilibrium with multiple firms and setup costs

I provide conditions that guarantee that a Stackelberg game with a setup cost and an integer number of identical leaders and followers has an equilibrium in pure strategies. The main feature of the game is that when the marginal follower leaves the market the price jumps up, so that a leader’s payoff is neither continuous nor quasiconcave. To show existence I check that a leader’s value function satisfies the following single crossing condition: When the other leaders produce more the leader never accommodates entry of more followers. If demand is strictly logconcave, and if marginal costs are both non decreasing and not flatter than average costs, then a Stackelberg equilibrium exists. Besides showing existence I characterize the equilibrium set and provide a number of results that contribute to the applied literature. As the number of leaders increases, leaders produce more and eventually they deter entry. Leaders produce more than the Cournot best reply, but they may underinvest in entry deterrence. As the number of followers increases, leaders become more aggressive. When this number is large, if leaders can produce the limit quantity and at the same time have market power, then they deter entry.     

Export Market Dynamics and Plant‐Level Productivity: Impact of Tariff Reductions and Exchange‐Rate Cycles*

In this paper, we examine how changes in tariff rates and industry‐specific real exchange rates affect the entry/exit process to export markets and productivity growth. Using the experience of the Canadian manufacturing sector over three decades, we find that firms in export markets enjoy faster productivity growth than non‐participants. The size of the growth advantage depends on whether real exchange rates are increasing or decreasing. The increase in the value of the Canadian dollar during the post‐2000 period almost completely offset the productivity growth advantages enjoyed by new exporters during this period.     

跨国公司进入模式决策的影响因素分析及启示——基于知识转移的观点

本文从知识转移的角度出发,从三个维度分析了跨国企业进入模式决策,提出跨国企业的知识隐含性水平、焦点企业的知识转移能力和吸收能力共同限定进入模式的可选择范围,企业国际化动机确定进入模式决策的最优解的观点,并且对我国企业实施“走出去”战略提出了建议。     

跨国并购与新建投资--作为跨国企业进入方式选择理论的最新进展及一个模型分析

跨国公司进入东道国面临两种进入方式的选择:并购进入和新建投资进入,本文展现了这一研究领域的最新进展,回顾和分析了跨国公司选择并购进入方式的各种考虑因素.本文提出了一个企业国外进入方式选择的简单模型,研究在何种情况下外国公司优先选择并购方式以及在何种情况下外国公司选要择新建投资的问题.     

Capabilities and competitive tactics influences on performance: Implications of the moment of entry

This article examines the implications that the moment of market entry has for the effect of capabilities and competitive tactics on firm performance, using a sample of 253 companies from the information and communications technology industry. The results show that technical capabilities and low cost orientation are learning factors in the firms' performance, regardless of the moment of entry into the market. The study shows how the two perspectives of competitive strategy and resource-based view complement each other to incorporate different competitive factors in a coherent model for the study of entry timing. The study takes the sustainability model of competitive advantage further, by demonstrating that certain capabilities and competitive tactics can allow pioneers and early followers to achieve and maintain superior performance in a dynamic, hostile and with high level of imitation industry. This study also shows that the availability of a combination of marketing capabilities and low cost orientation will allow late followers' firms to take advantage of early entrants' mistakes.     

Market as a Weapon: Domination by Virtue of a Constellation of Interests

The neoclassical approach toward explaining domination in the market is confronted with the approach of critical theory. Special attention is paid to domination by virtue of a constellation of interests in the market. This requires a particular technique for imposing will, namely conditional access to the market field. Interactions are modeled taking a field of domination composed of three organizational actors, one of them performing the function of drawing boundaries and controlling access. The concept of territoriality as spatially embedded power is applied to organization studies. Only one actor in the field has the ability to maximize its satisfaction, the two others minimize missed opportunities.     

Linking knowledge, entry timing and internationalization strategy

This paper contributes to the current internationalization theory by linking the characteristics of the firm's resource-base, its market-entry timing orientation and international growth orientation so as to shed more light on internationalization strategies. By employing multi-industry data, we find that the nature of the firm's knowledge, its entry timing orientation and international growth orientation are related to its internationalization strategy. Among other results, we find that the firm's accumulated expertise is positively related for both the international growth orientation and entry timing orientation. The international growth orientation, in turn, is related both to the path type of internationalization the firm employs as well as the geographical diversification in market entry. In other words, the results suggest that the firm's resource-base influences on both its entry timing orientation and to the internationalization strategy. These and other findings are discussed with regard to their scholarly and managerial implications.     

Forward induction and entry deterrence: an experiment

The Dixit (Econ J 90:95–106, 1980) hypothesis that incumbents use investment in capacity to deter potential entrants has found little empirical support. Bagwell and Ramey (J Econ 27:660–680, 1996) propose a model where, in the unique game-theoretic prediction based on forward induction or iterated elimination of weakly-dominated strategies, the incumbent does not have the strategic advantage. We conduct an experiment with games inspired by these models. In the Dixit-style game, the incumbent monopolizes the market most of the time even without the investment in capacity. In our Bagwell-and-Ramey-style game, the incumbent also tends to keep the market, in contrast to the predictions of an entrant advantage. Nevertheless, we find strong evidence that forward induction affects the behavior of most participants. The results of our games suggest that players perceive that the first mover has an advantage without having to pre-commit capacity. In our Bagwell–Ramey game, evolution and learning do not drive out this perception. We back these claims with data analysis and a theoretical framework for dynamics. Financial support by the Spanish Ministerio de Ciencia and Tecnología (SEC2002-01352 and SEJ2006-11665-C02-01) and the Barcelona Economic Program of CREA and excellent research assistance by David Rodríguez are gratefully acknowledged. The authors thank Aurora García Gallego and Armin Schmutzler for helpful comments.