Budgetary institutions and fiscal discipline: Edmund Burke's insightful contribution

Recent developments in the political economy of public finance literature have focused on the features of budgetary institutions that facilitate budgetary discipline — a sub-discipline of constitutional economics. In this literature, there has been no attempt to trace the development of economic thought on the relationship between budgetary institutions and fiscal discipline. This may be because debt accumulation in peacetime is seen as a late twentieth-century phenomenon. As a result, Edmund Burke's contribution, in his speech ‘On Economical Reform’, seems to have been forgotten. This paper highlights Burke's contribution and identifies the extent to which it captures those features of budgetary institutions that are currently recognized as facilitating budgetary discipline.     

The development of political skill and political capital by global leaders through global assignments

The purpose of this paper is to explain how developing global leaders through global assignments (i.e. in the form of expatriation and inpatriation) may lead to their acquisition of valuable political skill and political capital. First, using the theoretical frame of political influence theory, the benefit of political skill is explained relative to the development and augmentation of global leaders' capital portfolio during global assignments. Second, a distinction between social capital and political capital, as the integral components of global leader's capital portfolio, is made. In conclusion, the value of acquiring political skill and building human, cultural, social and political capital by global leaders is discussed separately for expatriate and inpatriate assignments.     

Direct democracy: obstacle to reform?

Swiss direct democracy is often accused of being an obstacle to reforms, with the strong influence of interest groups being the reason. Actually, the referendum has a retarding effect: it implies a status quo bias. On the other hand, the initiative has an accelerating effect. The influence of interest groups is hardly larger in direct compared to representative democratic systems. Thus, it is highly questionable whether the abolition of Switzerland’s direct democracy (at the federal level) would—in the long-run—really lead to political decisions which are more open to reforms.     

论知识型员工的流动与留用

知识型员工是现代组织的重要生产要素,是各类组织争相聘用的对象。如何留住高素质人才是人力资源管理的新课题。本文阐述了知识型员工的流动特点和影响其流动的因素,提出了建立在组织与个人彼此适应基础上的知识人才的留用方式。     

发展经济学经济发展思想三种思路的比较分析

发展经济学自诞生以来 ,其经济发展思想基本上有结构主义、新古典主义、新古典政治经济学这三种基本思路。通过其理论特征和实践战略的比较分析 ,结构主义在实践中表现为唯资本论、唯计划论和唯工业化论 ;新古典主义主要强调微观经济基础、市场机制和资源配置效率的重要性 ;而新古典政治经济学却认为制度是内生的 ,制度结构和非经济因素对资源配置和经济发展的影响显著 ,强调技术内生化、边干边学、知识外溢、劳动分工和政府作用的内生性 ,而且提倡可持续发展是一种科学的发展观 ,是发展经济学的新发展。     

COVID-19 fatalities and internal conflict: Does government economic support matter?

This study examines the association between COVID-19 mortality rates and internal conflict and investigates the possible moderating role of government economic support during the pandemic years of 2020 and 2021. Our main hypothesis suggests that countries with lower levels of government economic support are more likely to experience a positive correlation between higher COVID-19 mortality rates and the emergence of internal conflict. Using cross-country data from over 100 countries and controlling for various factors that may influence internal conflict, our analysis provides some support for this hypothesis. The results suggest a possible moderating role for government economic support, with the evidence indicating a weakening or elimination of the association between COVID-19 mortality rates and internal conflict when government economic support is adequate. However, the moderating effect of government economic support is not always significant, and caution is needed when interpreting the results. Our analysis also highlights the potential risks associated with low levels of government economic support during the pandemic. Specifically, we find that in countries where the government's macro-financial package in response to the pandemic is less than approximately 25% of GDP, there is a possible risk of growth in civil disorder resulting from increased COVID-19 deaths per million.     

债务上限与信评机构的政治悖论性选择

金融危机后,以危机推手著称的美国信评机构因群体性道德风险和贩卖劣质公信力而备受国际谴责.为此,三大机构不同程度地修订了主权信用评级规则,并自2010年下半年以来,联袂发布了美国主权信用评级的负面意见,尤其是2011年轮番下调美国主权信用评级前景展望至负面,希望借此塑造其公正、客观的商业形象.但是,三大机构的政治附属物属性决定了三大机构发布的美国主权信用评级负面意见,本质上是一场政治逻辑与资本逻辑的较量,更多展现为一种政治博弈的需要,并使自己陷入了债务上限与主权信用评级的政治悖论困境.     

A Political Economy Approach to the Neoclassical Gradualist Model of Transition

Abstract.  A political economy approach to the neoclassical gradualist model of transition requires the exposition of what I define the primary elements of the model, which are economic analysis, definition of a good society, speed, political structure, ideological structure and whether the initial conditions were incorporated in the model. After the identification of the primary elements of the neoclassical gradualist model the next step is to identify secondary elements, the desired changes with respect to price liberalization-stabilization, privatization, institutional structure, monetary policy and the financial system, fiscal policy, international trade and foreign aid and social policy. The analytical framework developed makes possible to understand the neoclassical gradualist model from a new and more enlightening perspective. We are better able to comprehend the complexities involved and the disagreements about the reform process. The adoption of a gradual process of transition did not only involve specifying the required policies of a successful transition but also entailed a process, a sequence by which the reforms should be introduced. As such, a process of transition consistent with the policies recommended by the neoclassical gradualists economists is developed. The conclusion reveals the inconsistencies in the model.     

Social Conflict and Gradual Political Succession: An Illustrative Model*

This paper studies the evolution of political institutions in the face of conflict. We examine institutional reform in a class of pivotal mechanisms—institutions that behave as if the resulting policy were determined by a “pivotal” decision maker drawn from the potential population of citizens and who holds full policy‐making authority at the time. A rule‐of‐succession describes the process by which pivotal decision makers in period t + 1 are, themselves, chosen by pivotal decision makers in period t. Two sources of conflict—class conflict, arising from differences in wealth, and ideological conflict, arising from differences in preferences—are examined. In each case, we characterize the unique Markov‐perfect equilibrium of the associated dynamic political game, and show that public decision‐making authority evolves monotonically downward in wealth and upward in ideological predisposition toward the public good. We then examine rules‐of‐succession when ideology and wealth exhibit correlation.     

Constitutionalism and credibility in reforming economies1

There has been relatively little investigation of the effect of constitutional transformations on the economic transition in post‐communist countries. We develop a simple signalling model in which constitutionalism – a commitment to limit political power and provide judicial defence of basic rights – reinforces the credibility of pro‐market candidates’ electoral promises and boosts public support for economic reforms. These findings are tested using opinion poll data on public support for reform in Central and Eastern Europe, and in the former Soviet Union, in the 1990s. In a two‐stage procedure we show that public support for market reforms is higher in countries where incumbents have taken deliberate steps to increase political accountability and judicial independence. Public support also spurs actual economic reform.