Robust political economy

This paper introduces the idea of “robust political economy.” In the context of political economic systems, “robustness” refers to a political economic arrangement's ability to produce social welfare-enhancing outcomes in the face of deviations from ideal assumptions about individuals' motivations and information. Since standard assumptions about complete and perfect information, instantaneous market adjustment, perfect agent rationality, political actor benevolence, etc., rarely, if ever actually hold, a realistic picture and accurate assessment of the desirability of alternative political economic systems requires an analysis of alternative systems' robustness. The Mises-Hayek critique of socialism forms the foundation for investigations of robustness that relax ideal informational assumptions. The Buchanan-Tullock public choice approach complements this foundation in forming the basis for investigations of robustness that relax ideal motivational assumptions. JEL Code B53, P16, P26     

美国财政分权的效率分析

美国作为一个高度发达的市场经济国家,不但在经济发展领域里取得了令人瞩目的成就,而且在制度的设计、创新和发展等方面也有许多值得借鉴之处,美国财政分权体制就是其中之一.本文在分析财政分权效率的含义及要求的基础上,从美国政府问事权和财权划分明确且相互匹配、科学合理的转移支付制度、分权与制衡并存的预算机制、地方政府自治以及整个财政分权体制的法律依据等方面分析了美国财政分权高效的原因.     

Unemployment dynamics in an OLG economy with public pensions

Pension benefits in old age establish a disincentive to save in youth, thereby yielding lower levels of capital stock and the wage rate. As a result, the trade union has an incentive to change the composition of its two targets: employment and the wage rate. This paper develops a model that includes employment effects of public pensions via capital accumulation and union wage setting. Within this framework, we consider how contribution rates to the pension system influence the level and time path of the unemployment rate. It is demonstrated that (1) a higher contribution rate results in a lower unemployment rate, and (2) the economy with a high (low) contribution rate experiences monotone convergence towards (oscillatory convergence towards or a period-2 cycle around) the steady state. The author would like to thank an anonymous referee, Kazutoshi Miyazawa, and seminar participants at Osaka University for their useful comments and suggestions, and Masako Ikefuji and Hiroaki Yamagami for their research assistance. Financial support from the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS) through a Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B) (No.17730131), the Asahi Glass Foundation, the Japan Economic Research Foundation and the 21st Century COE Program (Osaka University) is gratefully acknowledged. All remaining errors are mine.     

Regulatory and environmental effects on public transit efficiency: a mixed DEA-SFA approach

This paper assesses the impact of regulatory and environmental factors and statistical noise on the efficiency of public transit systems within a DEA-based framework. Using a panel of Italian companies, we implement a DEA-SFA mixed approach based on [H.O. Fried et al. (2002) Journal of Productivity Analysis, 17(1–2), 157–174] to decompose DEA inefficiency measures into three components: exogenous effects, managerial inefficiency and stochastic events. Besides providing evidence on the determinants of input-specific efficiency differentials across companies, the results point out that managerial skills play a minor role, and emphasize the relevance of regulatory policies aimed at replacing cost-plus subsidization with high-powered incentive contracts as well as improving environmental conditions of public transit networks.      

On the public provision of the performing arts

In this paper, we present a model in which the performing arts are modelled as congestible public goods. In accordance with empirical evidence, the production of seat capacity is assumed to be subject to fixed costs. We estimate the parameters of the model's demand and cost functions using German data. Using these estimates in a subsequent social choice analysis, we show that the current situation in the German performing arts sector is best described by a directorship that under the influence of a selfish theater lobby maximizes only the welfare of the spectators. Such an equilibrium, characterized by too low ticket prices and too large capacity, is most likely to establish if citizens have a very positive ex ante notion of the performing arts.     

我国财政收支划分的立法研究

财政收支划分是财政管理体制的重要组成部分.在市场经济体制下,财政收支划分立法有利于政府职能的履行和公共财政的运行,是完善分税制财政管理体制的丛然要求.完整的财政收支划分法律制度应当由财政级次划分、财政收支分类、财政支出划分和财政收入划分等制度构成.     

我国公共投资规模效率实证分析

我国公共投资规模连年扩大,改善了生活环境和生产条件,但是否存在投资过度的风险?本文运用生产函数模型分析了公共投资规模效率存在的条件,使用协整的方法分析了大口径和小口径公共投资规模的最优规模,得出我国公共投资规模不足的结论。     

和谐社会中的政府形象与政府公关

政府公关是政府公共管理的重要内容。新时期里，加入WTO、政府职能转变、公共危机的频频出现以及构建和谐社会都迫切要求政府重塑自身形象。政府公关是重塑政府形象的重要途径，其主要任务包括树立全员公关的意识、树立“公众利益至上”的行政理念、有效处理各种信息、公开政府工作人员的有关情况等。     

Dissertation abstract: Reputational benefits of altruism and altruistic punishment

Recent studies in experimental economics have shown that many people have other-regarding preferences, potentially including preferences for altruism, reciprocity, and fairness. It is useful to investigate why people possess such preferences and what functional purpose they might serve outside the laboratory, because evolutionary and social learning perspectives both predict that cooperative sentiments should only exist if they bring benefits that outweigh the costs of other-regarding behavior. Theories of costly signaling suggest that altruistic acts may function (with or without intention) as signals of unobservable qualities such as resources or cooperative intent, and altruists may benefit (possibly unintentionally) from the advertisement of such qualities. After reviewing the theories that could potentially account for the evolution of altruism (Chapter 1), I test some predictions about cooperation derived from costly signaling theory. In Chapter 2, I show that participants in experimental public goods games were more cooperative when they had cues that they could benefit from having a good reputation, and that there was apparently some competition to be the most generous group member. Furthermore, in subsequent trust games, people tended to trust high public goods contributors more than low contributors. Chapter 3 failed to find evidence that granting high status to people makes them more likely to contribute to public goods or punish free-riders, but there was suggestive evidence that physical proximity to the experimenter affected contributions and punishment. In Chapter 4, I found that people tended to trust others who were willing to incur costs to punish those who free-ride on group cooperation provided that such punishment was justified, and men were more punitive than women. In Chapter 5, I show that women find altruistic men more desirable than neutral men for long-term relationships. Together, these results suggest that humans do treat altruism as a signal of willingness to be cooperative. These findings are discussed with respect to the adaptive design of cooperative sentiments as well as the current debate over group selection. Dissertation: Department of Psychology, Neuroscience & Behaviour, McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontarion Currently: Post-Doc, Department of Neurobiology & Behavior, Cornell University     

中国农村社区公共物品投资的决定因素分析

本文使用具有全国代表性的抽样调查数据,对农村社区公共物品投资的决定因素进行了初步的分析。本文通过理论分析提出了两个理论假说,进而提出在我国公共投资中要注意的问题:既要考虑各地对公共投资有不同的需求,还要考虑区域协调发展。研究结果表明,除了一些政策因素以外,当地经济发展水平是影响农村公共投资的重要因素,一般来说,在工商业较发达的村公共投资活动也相对较多。对于外出务工人员较多的村,由于本地公共投资对外出务工人员的收入等作用较小,因此这部分村民就不那么愿意对村里进行公共投资。从政策实施角度看,本研究发现,上级政府的公共投资更多地投向贫困地区、偏远山区、农业生产条件差的地区或少数民族地区。这种投资战略有助于统筹区域发展,降低区域差异。