Individual characteristics and the demand for reciprocity in trade liberalization: Evidence from a survey in Japan

Reciprocity is an important concept in international trade negotiations. However, we know little about who demands reciprocity in trade liberalization. This paper characterizes reciprocitarians based on a survey of 10,816 individuals in Japan. Workers in protected sectors tend to demand reciprocity in import liberalization, but oppose the demand for foreign countries to open their markets. In contrast, individuals in managerial occupations tend to demand foreign market opening, but reject the idea of no import liberalization without reciprocity. We also examine the effects of education, nationalism, and risk aversion.     

De-growth and critical community psychology: Contributions towards individual and social well-being

This contribution sets out to combine the perspective of the degrowth paradigm with that of Critical Community psychology. Following the degrowth argument, the advancement of human well-being calls for a shift from growth-based societies to ones grounded in the ethos of degrowth. In this regard, we acknowledge the necessity for both theoretical principles and examples of good practice, which can lead to this transition. To this end, the article combines some of the underlying principles of the degrowth paradigm (i.e. decolonisation of the imaginary, reciprocity and conviviality, and environmental sustainability) with those of Critical Community Psychology, as well as, in one case, of Liberation Psychology (i.e. conscientisation and de-ideologisation, responsible togetherness, and environmental justice). This integration intends to equip academic scholars, practitioners, and social activists with visions and practices for the implementation of strategic actions aimed at individual and social well-being. The article concludes with a thorough reflection on social justice and how to better promote it through the combined contributions of both degrowth and Critical Community psychology.     

Multilateral trade negotiations, bilateral opportunism and the rules of GATT/WTO

Trade negotiations occur through time and between the governments of many countries. An important issue is thus whether the value of concessions that a government wins in a current negotiation may be eroded in a future bilateral negotiation to which it is not party. We identify rules of negotiation that serve to protect the welfare of governments that are not participating in the bilateral negotiation. Our main finding is that the two central principles of GATT/WTO—nondiscrimination (MFN) and reciprocity—preserve the welfare of nonparticipating governments and therefore offer a “first-line of defense” against bilateral opportunism.     

It takes two to cheat: An experiment on derived trust

Social life offers innumerable instances in which trust decisions involve multiple agents. Of particular interest is the case when a breach of trust is not profitable if carried out in isolation, but requires an agreement among agents. In such situations the pattern of behaviors is richer than in dyadic games, because even opportunistic trustees who would breach trust when alone may act trustworthily based on what they believe to be the predominant course of action. Anticipating this, trusters may be more inclined to trust. We dub these motivations derived trustworthiness and derived trust. To capture them, we design a “Collective Trust Game” and study it by means of a laboratory experiment. We report that overall levels of trustworthiness are almost thirty percentage points higher when derived motivations are present, and this generates also higher levels of trust. In our set-up, the effects of derived trustworthiness are comparable in size to positive reciprocity, and more important than concerns for equality.     

The appropriation of endogenously provided common-pool resources

Because game theory suggests that the origin of a common-pool resource should not affect appropriation behavior, experimental studies of appropriation from common-pool resources generally presume resources are exogenously provided. However, behavioral economic research indicates that the origin of a resource may affect the use of that resource. We investigate the potential role of resource origin by considering the appropriation of a common-pool resource after users have determined its productive capacity through contributions. Results indicate that resource origin does not significantly influence aggregate appropriation levels but that endogenous resource provision leads to individual strategic behavior.     

破坏性领导与研发人员知识藏匿:基于本土高新技术企业的实证研究

知识藏匿现象在组织中普遍存在,而且会给组织造成严重的经济损失。基于互惠理论,从人际互动视角探讨了破坏性领导对研发人员知识藏匿的影响,尤其是消极互惠在其中的调节作用。选取253个本土高新技术企业作为研究样本进行了实证研究,结果发现:破坏性领导会导致研发人员知识藏匿的发生,但对消极互惠规范倾向高的研发人员而言,二者关系较强;对消极互惠规范倾向低的研发人员而言,二者关系较弱。     

Decomposing trust and trustworthiness

What motivates people to trust and be trustworthy? Is trust solely “calculative,” based on the expectation of trustworthiness, and trustworthiness only reciprocity? Employing a within-subject design, we run investment and dictator game experiments in Russia, South Africa and the United States. Additionally, we measured risk preferences and expectations of return. Expectations of return account for most of the variance in trust, but unconditional kindness also matters. Variance in trustworthiness is mainly accounted for by unconditional kindness, while reciprocity plays a comparatively small role. There exists some heterogeneity in motivation but people behave surprisingly similarly in the three countries studied.     

城市间经济联系的定量计算

城市之间经济联系的准确判断和度量是制定城市和区域发展战略的重要依据.本文考察了空间相互作用模型在实际应用中存在的问题,提出了改进的途径.经济联系是个不可能精确表述的量,本文通过逻辑思辩和数学推导,梳理了相关概念和模型,给出了描述经济联系相对量的表达式.实践证明,本文所提出的模型是可行的,也是比较可靠的,而且我们还发现,经典引力模型中的人口因素并不那么重要.     

How to identify trust and reciprocity

This paper uses a three-games (or triadic) design to identify trusting and reciprocating behavior. A large literature on single-game trust and reciprocity experiments is based on the implicit assumption that subjects do not have altruistic or inequality-averse other-regarding preferences. Such experimental designs test compound hypotheses that include the hypothesis that other-regarding preferences do not affect behavior. In contrast, experiments with the triadic design do discriminate between transfers resulting from trust or reciprocity and transfers resulting from other-regarding preferences that are not conditional on the behavior of others. Decomposing trust from altruism and reciprocity from altruism or inequality aversion is critical to obtaining empirical information that can guide the process of constructing models that can increase the empirical validity of game theory.     

Rent-seeking versus productive activities in a multi-task experiment

Incentive instruments like asset ownership and performance pay often have to strike a balance between the productive incentives and the rent-seeking incentives they provide. Standard theory predicts that these instruments become less attractive when the effectiveness of rent-seeking activities increases. In contrast, theories that emphasize the importance of reciprocity suggest that this relationship may go the other way around. In this paper we test these predictions by means of a laboratory experiment. By and large our findings confirm standard theory. Incentive instruments typically become less attractive when the scope for rent-seeking activities increases. However, reciprocity motivations do seem to mitigate the adverse effects of rent-seeking opportunities to a considerable extent.