The appropriation of endogenously provided common-pool resources

Because game theory suggests that the origin of a common-pool resource should not affect appropriation behavior, experimental studies of appropriation from common-pool resources generally presume resources are exogenously provided. However, behavioral economic research indicates that the origin of a resource may affect the use of that resource. We investigate the potential role of resource origin by considering the appropriation of a common-pool resource after users have determined its productive capacity through contributions. Results indicate that resource origin does not significantly influence aggregate appropriation levels but that endogenous resource provision leads to individual strategic behavior.     

Multilateral trade negotiations, bilateral opportunism and the rules of GATT/WTO

Trade negotiations occur through time and between the governments of many countries. An important issue is thus whether the value of concessions that a government wins in a current negotiation may be eroded in a future bilateral negotiation to which it is not party. We identify rules of negotiation that serve to protect the welfare of governments that are not participating in the bilateral negotiation. Our main finding is that the two central principles of GATT/WTO—nondiscrimination (MFN) and reciprocity—preserve the welfare of nonparticipating governments and therefore offer a “first-line of defense” against bilateral opportunism.     

破坏性领导与研发人员知识藏匿:基于本土高新技术企业的实证研究

知识藏匿现象在组织中普遍存在,而且会给组织造成严重的经济损失。基于互惠理论,从人际互动视角探讨了破坏性领导对研发人员知识藏匿的影响,尤其是消极互惠在其中的调节作用。选取253个本土高新技术企业作为研究样本进行了实证研究,结果发现:破坏性领导会导致研发人员知识藏匿的发生,但对消极互惠规范倾向高的研发人员而言,二者关系较强;对消极互惠规范倾向低的研发人员而言,二者关系较弱。     

It takes two to cheat: An experiment on derived trust

Social life offers innumerable instances in which trust decisions involve multiple agents. Of particular interest is the case when a breach of trust is not profitable if carried out in isolation, but requires an agreement among agents. In such situations the pattern of behaviors is richer than in dyadic games, because even opportunistic trustees who would breach trust when alone may act trustworthily based on what they believe to be the predominant course of action. Anticipating this, trusters may be more inclined to trust. We dub these motivations derived trustworthiness and derived trust. To capture them, we design a “Collective Trust Game” and study it by means of a laboratory experiment. We report that overall levels of trustworthiness are almost thirty percentage points higher when derived motivations are present, and this generates also higher levels of trust. In our set-up, the effects of derived trustworthiness are comparable in size to positive reciprocity, and more important than concerns for equality.     

More gain,more give? The impact of brand community value on users’ value co-creation

Users' value co-creation behaviors contribute to the prosperity of brand communities as well as brand performance. This article aims to answer a basic question: are brand community users who obtain more value from the brand community more willing to co-create value? If so, why and under what conditions? Drawing from reciprocity theory, this study proposes that information value and social value lead to value co-creation by evoking users' reciprocity norm, and this effect depends on their self-presentation in the community. Results based on structural equation modeling combining survey data and archival data largely validate this framework, revealing that the reciprocity norm mediates the influence of brand community value on value co-creation. Additionally, information value increases value co-creation only when the level of self-presentation is high, and the positive effect of social value is not altered by self-presentation. By uncovering the mechanism and boundary conditions of how brand community value affects users’ value co-creation behaviors, this study extends the current literature on value co-creation and provides important practical implications.     

Individual characteristics and the demand for reciprocity in trade liberalization: Evidence from a survey in Japan

Reciprocity is an important concept in international trade negotiations. However, we know little about who demands reciprocity in trade liberalization. This paper characterizes reciprocitarians based on a survey of 10,816 individuals in Japan. Workers in protected sectors tend to demand reciprocity in import liberalization, but oppose the demand for foreign countries to open their markets. In contrast, individuals in managerial occupations tend to demand foreign market opening, but reject the idea of no import liberalization without reciprocity. We also examine the effects of education, nationalism, and risk aversion.     

Social preferences? Google Answers!

We analyse pricing, effort and tipping decisions at the online service ‘Google Answers’. Users set a price for the answer to their question ex ante, and they can additionally tip the researcher who provided the answer ex post.A positive wage-effort relationship is frequently found in laboratory gift-exchange games, yet field evidence for reciprocity in two-stage settings (wage, effort) is mixed. Our field data confirms lab findings for the three-stage design (wage, effort, bonus). Tipping is motivated by reciprocity, but also by reputation concerns among frequent users. Moreover, researchers seem to adjust their effort based on the user's previous tipping behaviour. An efficient sorting takes place when sufficient tip history is available.In addition, we analyse how tipping is adopted when the behavioural default is not to tip and suggest estimates for reciprocal and selfish (strategic and myopic) user types.     

Reciprocity—an indirect evolutionary analysis

This paper investigates agents who face a stylized pecuniary ‘game of life’ comprising the ultimatum game and the dictator game. Utility may but need not be attached to equity and reciprocity, as formalized by Falk and Fischbacher (Games Econom Behav, 54(2): 293–315, 2006) but, critically, this social component of preferences cannot be conditioned on whether an ultimatum or a dictator game is played. Evolutionary fitness of agents is determined solely by material success. Under these conditions, a strong preference for reciprocity, but little interest in equity as such evolves. Possible exogenous constraints that link reciprocity and equity concerns imply long-run levels of both which depend on the relative frequency of ultimatum vs. dictator interaction in agents’ multi-game environment. Financial support from the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) is gratefully acknowledged.     

A stress test of fairness measures in models of social utility

Summary. Current social utility models posit fairness as a motive for certain types of strategic behavior. The models differ, however, with respect to how fairness is measured. Distribution models measure fairness in terms of relative payoff comparisons. Reciprocal-kindness models measure fairness in terms of gifts given and gifts received. Reference points play an important role in both measures, but the reference points in reciprocal-kindness models are conditioned on the actions available to players, whereas those in distributive models are not. Data from an ultimatum game experiment that stress tests the kindness measure is consistent with the distributive measure. Data from an experiment that stress tests the distributive measure is inconsistent with the distributive measure, but moves in the direction opposite that implied by the kindness measure. A measure that combines relative payoff comparisons with a reference point conditioned on feasible actions provides a first approximation to our data.Received: 12 August 2002, Revised: 27 November 2003, JEL Classification Numbers: C78, C91, D63. Correspondence to: Axel OckenfelsBolton gratefully acknowledges the support of the National Science Foundation. Ockenfels thanks Alvin Roth and the Harvard Business School for their generous hospitality, and the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft for their support through the Emmy Noether-program. Both authors gratefully acknowledge the hospitality of the Making Choices project at the Center for Interdisciplinary Research, University of Bielefeld during the summer of 2000. We also thank an anonymous referee and seminar participants in Bielefeld, Boston, Columbus, Harvard, and Jena for helpful comments.