基于互惠视角的团队协作激励机制博弈分析

团队激励的关键问题是团队成员的合作问题。修正放松了关于团队成员的理性人假设,引入互惠性假设,用考虑互惠心理效用的效用函数替代物质效用函数,构建包括两个团队成员的团队协作生产的博弈模型。研究了两种博弈模型的团队成员最优自身努力水平和帮助他人的努力水平,并进行对比分析。结果表明,在同时考虑物质效用和互惠心理效用的情况下,非理性团队成员的行为更加复杂,他们会在物质收益和互惠收益之间寻求平衡。     

Altruism,reciprocity and health: A social experiment in restaurant choice

We used an experimental game to determine whether people imitate restaurant choice, reciprocate food gifts, and thus spread health choices. We randomly paired 138 subjects and recorded their decision to give or keep restaurant vouchers and their choice of restaurant. The majority (83.3%) chose an unhealthy restaurant if their randomly assigned partner chose an unhealthy restaurant. Similarly, 77.8% chose a healthy restaurant if their partner did (p = 0.005). The altruistic were more likely to choose a healthy restaurant (p = 0.017). In sum, restaurant choice is influenced by reciprocity. A cycle of projection, gifting and reciprocation may explain the social dynamics of food choice. We propose policies that capitalize on people’s tendency towards altruism and imitation.     

经济实验对社会偏好识别的研究述评

实验经济学在分配方面观察到了大量相对经典理性假设的偏离行为,并总结认为这些"公平行为"受到了若干不同性质的社会性偏好的影响。本文将社会偏好的种类分为关心结果的分配性偏好和关心行为背后意图的互惠偏好两大类,然后从经典实验中行为背后的偏好识别问题出发,总结近年来实验研究的相关发现。这些发现可以为企业和社会治理提供一些新的思路。     

Individual versus group behavior and the role of the decision making procedure in gift-exchange experiments

We test for behavioral differences between groups and individuals in gift-exchange experiments. Related studies in economics establish group behavior as often closer to the standard game-theoretic equilibrium under the assumptions of rationality and selfishness. We show that this result may depend crucially on the decision making procedure within groups and the nature of the task. A novel experimental decision making protocol opens the black box of group decision making and allows tracking important features of the group interaction process. We are also able to show that acting in a group may shift initial individual choices.

Do consumers pay voluntarily? The case of online music

The paper analyses the payment behaviour of customers of the online music label Magnatune. Customers may pay what they want for albums, as long as the payment is within a given price range ($5–$18). Magnatune's comprehensive pre-purchase access facilitates music discovery and allows an informed buying decision setting it apart from conventional online music stores.On average customers pay $8.20, far more than the minimum of $5 and even higher than the recommended price of $8. We analyse the relationship between artists/labels and customers in online music. We consider social preferences, in particular concerns for reciprocity. The resulting sequential reciprocity equilibrium corresponds to the observed pattern of behaviour.We conclude that Magnatune's open contracts design can encourage people to make voluntary payments and may be a viable business option.     

Reciprocity in evolving social networks

We study the viability of conditional cooperation in a dynamically evolving social network. The network possesses the small world property, with high clustering coefficient but low characteristic path length. The interaction among linked individuals takes the form of a multiperson prisoners’ dilemma, and actions can be conditioned on the past behavior of one’s neighbors. Individuals adjust their strategies based on performance within their neighborhood, and both strategies and the network itself are subject to random perturbation. We find that the long-run frequency of cooperation is higher under the following conditions: (i) the interaction radius is neither too small nor too large, (ii) clustering is high and characteristic path length low, (iii) the mutation rate of strategies is small, and (iv) the rate of adjustment in strategies is neither too fast nor too slow.

Polycentricity, reciprocity, and farmer adoption of conservation practices under community-based governance

Significant steps have occurred under Australia's ‘regional delivery model’ towards devolving responsibilities for natural resource management (NRM) to community-based regional bodies, particularly in respect of motivating farmers to adopt priority conservation practices. Challenges remain in effectively engaging the large populations covered by these bodies, especially with these bodies expected to assume responsibilities that risk them becoming perceived as extensions of government and favoring particular stakeholders. In this article, I examine whether polycentric systems of collaborative community-based governance can help address these challenges. The examination involves double-censored regression analyses of data from postal surveys of farmers in three regions. The findings suggest that community-based approaches are capable under the regional delivery model of motivating greater voluntary cooperation from farmers than otherwise possible. They highlight the importance of farmers coming to adopt reciprocity strategies in their key institutional relationships under this model. It seems subregional bodies have an advantage over regional bodies in motivating such behavior from farmers because the former are better positioned to engage them sufficiently to turn around norms of free-riding or opposition entrenched by earlier paternalistic approaches to agri-environmental conservation. This indicates the value of a polycentric approach to community-based NRM wherein responsibilities are devolved to the lowest possible governance level consistent with the principle of subsidiarity. The economic dividend from increased voluntary adoption of conservation practices under this approach arises from the reduced transaction, political and other opportunity costs of achieving the same result entirely through coercion or financial inducements.     

Reciprocity and informal institutions in international market entry

This article first identifies two gaps in the literature: (1) the need to expand international market entry research beyond contractual modes of “make, buy, and ally;” and (2) the need to address the imbalance in the institution-based view that has paid inadequate attention to informal institutions. To help close the two gaps, we identify reciprocity—the mutually contingent exchange of gratifications that is supported by informal institutions—to be a non-contractual mode of international market entry. We focus on how informal institutions provide some of the conditions, motivations, and precipitating circumstances behind the use of reciprocity.