Politically connected boards,value or cost: evidence from a natural experiment in China

This study investigates the net effect of a politically connected board for a firm. Using a natural experiment in China – a regulatory change to forbid bureaucrats from sitting on the board of public firms – we address the causality of the net effect of a politically connected board by testing the market reaction of the shares of firm targeted by the regulatory change to the policy announcement. The stocks of firms with politically connected directors who are targeted by the regulatory change show on average a significantly positive abnormal return, which suggests that the agency cost effect of a politically connected director dominates the value effect. The result is robust to various model settings and to a matched sample using the propensity score methodology. Additionally, the announcement effect of the resignation of a politically connected director is significantly positive, and significantly higher than that of a non‐connected director. Overall, our results suggest that the agency cost effect of a politically connected director dominates the value effect.     

“三元悖论”与人民币汇率制度改革浅析

"三元悖论"作为经典的金融理论之一,反映了开放经济条件下汇率稳定性、资本自由流动性和货币政策独立性三者不可兼得的矛盾,为我国2005年7月21日开始实行的"以市场供求为基础、参考一篮子货币进行调节、有管理的浮动汇率制度"提供了理论依据。通过对我国经济中的"三元"即资本流动性、货币政策独立性以及汇率制度进行分析,在世界经济全球化和资本自由流动性不断增强的背景下,为保持我国货币政策的独立性,在2005年汇率改革的基础上,应该进一步扩大人民币汇率的浮动区间并研究、完善、及时调整货币篮子的币种及其权重,改善央行在外汇市场的干预机制,同时不断完善外汇市场产品和交易制度以及稳步推进利率市场化改革。     

资产透明度、监管套利与银行系统性风险

资产不透明的金融机构过度依赖批发性融资进行监管套利不利于系统性风险的防控。在此背景下,本文首先在经典银行道德风险模型的基础上引入关联性,从资产透明度和监管套利的视角分析银行系统性风险累积的内在机理。而后利用2007-2018年中国上市银行微观数据,构建资产透明度指标和系统性风险指标(SRISK、MES),对理论推论进行实证检验。主要结论有:(1)资产不透明、监管套利会提高银行的系统性风险。(2)监管套利弱化了资产透明度和资本监管机制对银行系统性风险承担的约束作用,资产透明度与资本监管机制在约束系统性风险承担中的协调作用不明显。(3)以大银行为主的债权银行受监管套利的影响相较于受资产透明度的影响更明显。在此基础上,我们对完善金融风险防范体系以及监管机制提出了若干建议。     

Investment bank monitoring and bonding of security analysts’ research

We assess investment banks’ influence over the agreement between their analysts’ research behavior and their clients’ interests, in the post-reform era. Competing banks discipline their analysts with worse career outcomes for producing biased reports, issuing shirking reports, and for involvement in the earnings guidance game, showing meaningful monitoring of their analysts. Highly reputable banks provide more monitoring discipline of their analysts and bonding of their moral hazard than other banks. The findings agree with the banks taking responsibility for aligning analysts’ behavior with clients’ interests.     

Towards a measure of financial fragility

The paper proposes a measure of financial fragility that is based on economic welfare in a general equilibrium model calibrated against UK data. The model comprises a household sector, three active heterogeneous banks, a central bank/regulator, incomplete markets, and endogenous default. We address the impact of monetary and regulatory policy, credit and capital shocks in the real and financial sectors and how the response of the economy to shocks relates to our measure of financial fragility. Finally we use panel VAR techniques to investigate the relationships between the factors that characterise financial fragility in our model, i.e. banks’ probabilities of default and banks’ profits – to a proxy of welfare.      

CEO环境不确定性感知与企业创新模式选择关系研究

基于高阶理论与调节焦点理论,通过中国373家企业问卷调查数据,探讨CEO环境不确定性感知对企业创新模式选择的影响机制。结果表明：CEO环境不确定性感知对企业渐进性创新与突破性创新均具有显著正向影响;高管团队行为整合在CEO环境不确定性感知与企业创新间发挥部分中介作用;CEO特质调节焦点正向调节CEO环境不确定性感知与高管团队行为整合之间的关系,同时正向调节上述中介机制。     

Constitutions, regulations, and taxes: Contradictions of different aspects of decentralization

The paper confronts different aspects of decentralization: fiscal decentralization, post-constitutional regulatory decentralization, and constitutional decentralization – using a single dataset from the Russian Federation of the Yeltsin period as a politically asymmetric country and a variety of indicators. It finds no robust correlation between different decentralization aspects; moreover, three processes of devolution appearing in the same country at the same time seem to be driven by different (though partly overlapping) forces. Hence, a specific aspect of decentralization is hardly able to serve as a proxy for another one or for the overall decentralization process.     

论惩罚性赔偿的正当性

惩罚性赔偿在我国一些法律制度中已有所体现。惩罚性赔偿的正当性,是惩罚性赔偿制度架构的基石。从古代法及宗教教义中发掘惩罚的正当性思想,大陆法系理应蕴含惩罚性赔偿制度。通过经济学的方法,分析补偿性赔偿的缺陷,惩罚性赔偿的产生原因,阐释惩罚性赔偿具有的惩罚、威慑、激励等功能。此外,惩罚性赔偿蕴含着正义,秩序等法律理念,包含着促使民众为权利斗争的精神。惩罚性赔偿外在的工具价值与内在的法律价值,均体现了惩罚性赔偿的正当性。     

The Effect of Market Regimes on Style Allocation

We analyse time-varying risk premia and the implications for portfolio choice. Using Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods, we estimate a multivariate regime-switching model for the Carhart (1997) four-factor model. We find two clearly separable regimes with different mean returns, volatilities, and correlations. In the High-Variance Regime, only value stocks deliver a good performance, whereas in the Low-Variance Regime, the market portfolio and momentum stocks promise high returns. Regime-switching induces investors to change their portfolio style over time depending on the investment horizon, the risk aversion, and the prevailing regime. Value investing seems to be a rational strategy in the High-Variance Regime, momentum investing in the Low-Variance Regime. An empirical out-of-sample backtest indicates that this switching strategy can be profitable, but the overall forecasting ability for the regime-switching model seems to be weak compared to the iid model.     

集体钉住汇率制与地区金融稳定——兼评人民币汇率制度改革

20世纪90年代以来,东亚地区是国际金融比较动荡的地区之一。麦金农主张东亚各经济体实行“集体钉住美元”制度,以保证地区金融稳定。从理论和实践分析,集体钉住汇率制有其内在的稳定机制,也有内源性的动荡缺陷,稳定性和脆弱性同存。目前东亚各国和地区非正式的共同“软钉住美元”,有一定的合理性;但从长远看,这种集体钉住美元制度难以维持。当前人民币汇率改革不会影响东亚地区的金融稳定,维持国内金融稳定,才能防止地区金融动荡。