The role of institutional investors in propagating the 2007 financial crisis in Southern Europe

The 2007 financial crisis has affected Southern European companies (Spanish, Portuguese, Italian and Greek) more than others. From a Minskyan bubble-burst cycle perspective (Minsky, 1986), we study the relation between institutional ownership structure and corporate risk-taking for a sample of non-financial listed companies from Spain, Portugal, Italy and Greece for the period 2001–2014. Our results suggest that the financial deregulation process, that lead to the financialization of the world economy before the 2007 financial crisis and the favourable macroeconomic scenario encouraged corporate risk-taking in those countries. We also find that the lack of effective control mechanisms provided an incentive for investment funds to assume a proactive role, encouraging companies to overinvest in risky projects.     

差别化存款保险费率与银行风险承担——基于我国农村银行的经验证据

本文拓展了Freixas and Rochet(2008)的理论模型,证明存款保险差别化费率机制对银行风险承担具有抑制作用,在此基础上选取我国农村银行为研究对象,运用2015—2019年某省119家法人投保机构进行实证检验。研究发现:引入差别化费率设计显著降低了农村银行的风险承担;这一作用存在异质性,对于自身风险承担水平较低、资产规模较大的农村银行来说,抑制作用更为明显。进一步研究发现,差别化费率机制在一定程度上缓和了农信社改制短期内对农商行风险可能造成的不利影响。本文结论对加强存款保险制度的早期纠正功能、防范化解金融风险以及深化农村金融机构改革具有一定的理论意义和参考价值。     

Managerial risk-taking incentives and non-GAAP earnings disclosures

We investigate the association between risk-taking incentives provided by stock-based compensation arrangements and non-GAAP financial disclosures. Controlling for compensation to stock price sensitivity, we find that managers with higher compensation to stock volatility sensitivity (vega) are more likely to be associated with voluntary non-GAAP earnings information disclosures. In addition, higher-vega managers are found to be associated with more frequent and less opportunistic non-GAAP earnings information disclosures. Robust to alternative specifications and estimations, our findings suggest that compensation arrangements can encourage managers to make more, higher-quality voluntary non-GAAP disclosures.     

Bank dividends,risk, and regulatory regimes

This paper investigates the relation between bank dividends and bank risk over the period 1984–2011, and assesses the existence of risk-taking and risk-shifting in the US commercial banking sector subject to regulatory regime changes. The introduction of PCA in 1992 and TARP in 2008 constitute significant regulatory regime changes, and provide the necessary framework to explore whether regime-dependent risk-shifting or risk-taking is present. We find strong evidence of risk-shifting and risk-taking over the post-PCA regime spanning the period 1992–2008. We interpret this evidence as indication of ineffectiveness of PCA in controlling risk-taking and risk-shifting. The finding of risk-taking just prior to the recent financial crisis suggests that risk-taking may be a factor contributing to this crisis. As risk-taking and risk-shifting are important aspects of bank behavior (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2009), these results are of interest to bank regulators and important to Basel III.     

利率市场化、存款保险制度与银行风险承担——基于市场约束的研究

市场约束作为巴塞尔协议Ⅱ三大支柱之一以及衡量金融深化的重要标准，是近年来相关研究的热点之一。而利率市场化等又是提高银行市场约束程度的实质性推动力量。基于此，文章分析了利率市场化进程、存款保险制度与市场约束之间的关系及其对银行风险承担的影响，并藉此评估了存款保险制度实施的政策影响及利率市场化在其中所起的作用。结果发现：（1）我国银行整体的市场约束能显著抑制其风险承担，但分类的结果则表明地方性银行的市场约束效应最明显，大型银行次之，外资银行则不显著；进而，在考虑利率市场化因素之后，除外资银行以外的市场约束效应均有所增强，尤其是，利率市场化对价格约束效应的作用要远强于其对数量约束效应的影响。（2）基于合成控制法的估计结果表明，存款保险制度通过市场约束对地方银行的影响更明显，且存款保险制度通过价格约束对银行风险承担的影响较之其通过数量约束的作用效果要更强。（3）综合而言，存款保险制度会增加利率市场化通过市场约束作用于银行风险承担的正向影响。文章的研究结果显示利率市场化推进以及存款保险制度实施的影响开始趋于明显，并使市场约束机制作用的发挥逐渐与国外相符，但仍然有进一步深化的空间。     

Credit unions vs. commercial banks,who takes more risk?

A unique feature of the financial services industry is that both shareholder-owned banks and member-owned credit unions coexist and compete against each other. In this study, we investigate two research questions. First, we compare risk-taking by banks and credit unions, with an additional consideration as to how regulatory oversight (state or federal) relates to such risk-taking. Second, we examine how competition affects the difference in risk-taking between these two types of financial institutions. To answer both questions, we rely on a matched sample (by loan type, size, and county) of commercial banks and credit unions, covering the period between 2010 and 2017. We use three empirical proxies for risk-taking, the Z-score, measuring an institution’s insolvency risk, as well as the ratios of non-performing loans to total loans and loan charge-offs to total loans, measuring the credit risk. Our results suggest that banks tend to engage in more risk-taking than credit unions; however, state regulatory oversight reduces the risk-taking gap, especially in terms of the Z-score. We further find that competition induces different risk-taking behaviors in banks and credit unions. Our results are robust to several alternative specifications.     

Monetary policy,bank leverage,and financial stability

This paper shows that with limited liability banks lever up excessively to finance new loans. Lower monetary policy rates can worsen or reduce these incentives depending on the size of the shock when equity financing is ruled out. When this constrained is relaxed but the bank faces costly dividend adjustment, lower monetary policy rates always worsen risk-taking incentives and the effect is persistent. The reason is that costly dividend adjustment lowers the opportunity cost of lending. In this model, capital requirements are closer to the source of the distortion and thus work better than loan-to-value caps in reducing excessive risk taking.     

Examining export trade and corporate innovation: A multiphase difference-in-differences method

Using a multiphase difference-in-differences model, this study investigates the relationship between export trade and the corporate technological innovation of listed companies. It reveals that engaging in export trade increases corporate innovation input and output. In terms of patent output, export trade greatly promotes the output of invention patents and utility model patents with a high technological content. These conclusions remain valid after a series of robustness and endogeneity tests. Regarding the mechanisms of the observed relationships, export trade stimulates corporate technological innovation mainly by realizing economies of scale and increasing risk-taking. The positive correlation between export trade and corporate technological innovation is strongest among state-owned enterprises, non-high-tech enterprises, enterprises based in central and eastern China, enterprises engaged in general trade, and enterprises exporting to developed economies. Given the growing trade frictions ongoing at the time of writing, the conclusions of this study provide vital practical guidance and empirical evidence for a national strategy of innovation-driven development.     

谦卑型文化与知识型员工创新绩效关系:风险承担意愿与情感信任的链式中介模型

谦卑型文化是组织生存与发展的内在精神动力。作为组织文化理论研究的新兴主题,谦卑型文化研究正处于起步阶段。整合社会交换和内在动机理论,旨在探讨谦卑型文化影响知识型员工创新绩效的心理中介机制。采用问卷配对法调查268对有效知识型员工及其直接领导的研究结果表明:谦卑型文化对知识型员工创新绩效具有显著正向影响;情感信任和风险承担意愿在谦卑型文化与知识型员工创新绩效关系中发挥链式中介作用,即谦卑型文化通过增强知识型员工对组织的情感信任,提高其风险承担意愿,进而促进其创新行为。研究结果首次从谦卑型文化视角探索知识型员工创新绩效的影响因素和诱发机制,可为组织创新管理提供理论指导。     

市场结构、资本管制与银行冒险行为

针对资本管制对商业银行冒险行为的管制效应,本文从理论上推导出资本管制在银行业不同市场结构中作用机理不同,并提出"资本管制效应"假说。然后利用61个国家421家银行数据进行实证检验,研究发现:在集中度低的市场中,商业银行特许权价值低,具有为增加特许权价值银行采取冒险策略的动机,资本管制能有效减轻其风险行为;而在高集中度市场里,对银行冒险行为管制效果不明确。考虑到金融业发展、法律效应及国家和银行其它相关潜在因素的影响,结论仍然保持不变。