提升中国企业所得税制竞争力的探讨

税制竞争力是指税制吸引经济资源和促进国内企业及产品参与国际竞争的能力。本文通过构造社会利益集团之间争夺税收优惠的委托代理模型,剖析了我国税制决策机制的缺陷,提出了以增强税制的立宪性、公平性、效率性为目标,通过统一税制、优化税收政策、强化税务管理的路径,提升中国企业所得税制竞争力的建议。     

完善我国政府非税收入预算管理的思考

本文介绍了我国政府非税收入预算管理的沿革,总结了我国政府非税收入预算管理的现状,分析了我国政府非税收入预算管理存在的问题,研究提出了完善我国政府非税收入预算管理的建议。     

An experimental investigation of soft price caps in uniform price auction markets for wholesale electricity

This paper presents the results from an auction experiment using industry professionals and student participants who compete in a simulated wholesale market for electricity. Motivated by the intervention by FERC in response to the “meltdown” of the California spot market, we investigate the effect of including a “soft” price cap in a uniform price auction as a means of mitigating high prices. When prices are driven above the soft cap, offer curves become flat, in contrast to the hockey stick shape observed in a typical uniform price auction for electricity. This flat offer curve leads to market prices that are relatively insensitive to both generation costs and demand reductions.      

评审专家抽取中的时间距离约束分析

针对现有评审专家抽取中距离约束存在的不足,本文提出了一种新的时间距离约束。本文介绍了时间距离的含义及其提出的必要性,并给出了基于GIS技术的时间距离计算方法,具体包括相关假设、计算步骤、解决方案以及实现过程。时间距离约束的提出不仅可以保证所有被选专家都可按时到达评审地点,而且还能打破行政区域的限制,合理调配专家资源,具有重要的现实意义。     

政党软实力和社会核心价值观论

政党实力由硬实力和软实力构成,社会核心价值观是政党软实力的重要表现形式。高度重视政党软实力和社会核心价值观之间的关系,是中国共产党加强执政能力建设,提高科学建党治党水平的重要课题。     

论我国政府预算周期的改进与完善

我国政府预算周期不仅缺乏必要的法律规范，而且在时间和预算周期各环节上都存在明显的缺陷。产生这些问题的根本原因是传统的“大一统”的预算管理模式、不重视“依法理财”和长期忽视预算管理效率，改进和完善我国政府预算周期的根本途径，是建立我国的标准预算周期，科学，合理地规范预算周期各环节的起讫时间。     

Determinants and consequences of soft budget constraintsAn empirical analysis using enterprise‐level data in transition countries1

This paper presents empirical work grounded in the soft budget constraint (SBC) literature. A loan is soft when a bank cannot commit the enterprise to hold to a fixed initial budget and/or the timing of repayment. Using data collected by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) (Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS), 2002) in 26 transition economies, we analyze the determinants of managers’ expectations of having a soft loan. In particular, we find that managers’ expectations are lower when the initial financing requires collateral, and higher for larger firms and when firms had recently experienced financial distress. We also provide evidence that managers’ expectations influence their price responsiveness.     

银行规模与经理人激励——基于中国信息和不确定性环境的理论研究

本文基于委托代理激励理论,探讨不同规模银行中信息类别、不确定性信息与合同期限、政府行为等因素对经理人激励的影响.发现在中国这样的转型经济国家中,不确定性、非契约关系与政府行为使得银行规模与其竞争力和生存性的关系变得更加微妙.(1)相对大银行而言,小银行的发展面临更多的机会和风险;(2)长期合同下股权激励对于小银行经理人有着更为重要的意义;(3)客户经理的素质高低与一致性对于小银行激励效率的发挥至关重要;(4)我国小银行与地方政府天然密切的关系对其"软"信息获取作用很大,但同时也可能对其激励机制的长期有效性造成负面影响.     

基于民主化视角的高校新型预算管理体系研究

民主化预算管理体系的实施能够有效地促进高校综合体制改革,推动高校内部控制体系建设,进一步优化高校法人治理结构,对于实现高校预算管理的精细化和科学化具有重要的意义。论文首先分析了高校预算管理的现状,并指出了预算管理过程中存在的问题;其次详细阐述了基于民主化视角的新型预算管理体系的内涵、组织流程及建设思路;最后文章就如何在高校中稳步推进和进一步巩固新型预算管理体系的有效实施提供了政策建议。     

Evaluating the efficiency and productivity change within government subsidy recipients of a national technology innovation research and development program

This study analyzes the efficiency and productivity change within government subsidy recipients of a national technology innovation research and development (R&D) program. We examine 6,990 government‐sponsored, completed R&D projects during the last three performance follow‐up survey years from 2010 to 2012, and present a design of the sample of panel data to cope with the typical R&D performance time lag using a set of massive observations associated with completed R&D projects for the past 7 years from 2005 to 2011. In particular, data envelopment analysis is adopted to measure the efficiency and productivity change, which is measured in the Malmquist index. Parametric and nonparametric statistical tests are carried out to check for statistically significant differences among the characteristics regarding the types of government subsidy recipients. This study's major findings are as follows. First, during the entire period analyzed (2010–2012), there was a similar yearly pattern of statistically significant differences in the government subsidy means among the recipient types. In contrast, there were no obviously equivalent differences in the efficiency and productivity change. Second, the productivity had increased year on year, but the increments were reduced from year to year. Third, the productivity change was induced mainly by the Frontier‐shift, which indicates overall technology innovation progress, compared with the Catch‐up, which only indicates a simple increase in the efficiency. In particular, in this empirical analysis, the recipient types of ‘national laboratory’ and ‘large company’ had relatively larger sizes of government subsidies per project. However, the efficiency and productivity change of these types was not better than the others. This implies, therefore, that the government should control the ratio of the subsidy to the total R&D budget with an appropriate upper limit.

• I empirically evaluate the productivity change within a national technology innovation R&D program.
• I design a sample of panel data to cope with the typical R&D performance time lag using massive observations.
• There is no obvious relationship between the government subsidy size and R&D productivity change.
• Some particular types of government subsidy recipient are inferior in terms of R&D productivity change.
• It practically implies that the government should control the ratio of the subsidy to the total R&D budget.