我国上市公司股权集中度与公司绩效的理论与实证研究

本文以净资产收益率、主营业务资产收益率及市净率为被解释变量,股权集中度为被解释变量,并使用公司总资产的自然对数代表公司规模、财务杠杆、净利润增长率作为控制变量,从公司治理角度分析股权结构对公司绩效的影响。从农林牧渔业、采掘业、制造业等11个行业中挑选了923家上市公司为样本,分别对样本总体和各行业的数据进行了回归分析。此研究的政策意义在于现阶段上市公司治理结构的改革不应盲目模仿英美模式无视中国的国情,过于强调股权分散。认为只有保持股权的适度集中才有助于我国上市公司的长远发展和整体绩效的提高。     

Majority and Minority Ownership of Publicly-Traded Firms: A Test of the Value of Control Using Market Multiples

Publicly-traded companies that are controlled by other publicly-traded companies provide a unique setting in which to test whether the market values of majority and minority ownership interests are proportionate to their ownership percentages. Test results indicate that the value of subsidiary net assets and net income are greater to majority shareholders than to minority shareholders. However, comparison of asset and income valuation with a sample of diffusely-held firms indicates that this valuation asymmetry is not due to a wealth transfer from the minority to the majority owners but to a discounting of the portion of the subsidiary owned by the minority shareholders.     

我国银行业改革与引进外资的开放竞争策略

针对我国银行业面临的问题和外资银行进入后的竞争压力,本文通过分析几种不同改革思路后认为,我国银行业改革的核心问题是产权和公司治理,两者紧密相连,产权改革是为了获得良好的公司治理,私有化和引入外资都是可供选择的产权改革方式之一,理论上不存在何者更优.国有商业银行改革的关键在于改变国有独资所有权结构为多元投资结构,可供选择的方案有不改变所有权性质的多个国有投资主体的单一所有制和引进包括国有、民营、外资参股的多元所有制.鉴于我国银行业目前的特点,外资参股并不是一种最优的选择,引进外资银行的正确策略是:独资优于合作,合作优于合资.     

Performance of closely held firms in Russia: evidence from firm-level data∗

This paper evaluates the impact of ownership concentration on firm performance in a weak institutional environment. Specifically, using new survey evidence, we seek to appraise quantitatively the performance of block-holder-controlled firms in Russia and to identify, within the domain of corporate governance theory, factors that may explain such performance. We find evidence of negative association between the size of the dominant owners’ shareholding and performance parameters such as investment, capacity utilization, and profitability. At the same time, we establish that control structures with multiple, large shareholders increase efficiency. The ambiguity of the effects of ownership concentration suggests that country-specific factors play an important role.     

Empirical evidence of the value of monitoring in joint ownership

Joint ownership of assets by two partners can have an adverse effect on the incentives to invest and can result in unstable and inefficient organizational structures. Control sharing, however, plays an important role in economic, political, and social institutions. There is scarce empirical evidence on the benefits of joint ownership in corporate finance. We analyze acquisitions of corporate assets by joint ventures to empirically ascertain the value of joint ownership in economic activities. The results indicate that firms experience significantly larger returns in joint acquisitions than in full-control acquisitions and that this difference is restricted to the sample of firms in which both partners share equal ownership in the target. These findings suggest that monitoring in joint ownership structures ameliorates the possibility of value-destroying corporate decisions.     

建立国有自然资源性资产管理体制的思考

本文首先分析了我国目前国有资产管理体制不完善对国民经济产生的影响,进一步阐述了资源性国有资产管理的现状以及应对国有资产进行价值和功能上的定位的观点,最后提出了完善资源性国有资产管理体制的建议.     

纽约州支持电动汽车发展的政策举措及其启示

纽约州将电动汽车产业发展作为打造创新经济的先行产业,自2011年以来,推出了一系列系统性的政策举措,包括加强与加快可再生能源特别是太阳能的发展,资助先进储能技术,支持建设纳米级锂硫电池材料制造中心,启动"充电纽约"、"卡车券计划"和纽约绿色银行计划等,使纽约州的电动汽车产业发展和推广在美国处于领先水平。总结纽约州支持发展电动汽车的经验,得出4点启示:一是顶层设计,系统筹划,善于利用与开发本地优势;二是政府组织设立示范项目,引导企业参与投入;三是普适与专项激励政策并举;四是发展目标法律化与阶段化相结合。