从语用失误看高职学生英语语用能力的培养

语用能力的培养对于高职英语教学至关重要。为了提高高职学生的语用能力,以学生的语用失误为切入点,分析语用失误的类型及原因,提出培养学生语用能力的教学方法。     

韩国发展风险企业的核心制度及对中国的启示

中国与韩国虽然社会制度不同、经济发展水平存在差异,但都具有出口主导型经济发展的明显特征,且韩国作为先于中国的新兴工业化国家较早地进行了经济结构调整和转变经济发展方式。基于国际金融危机背景下风险企业发展重要性的不断凸显,探讨了韩国风险企业发展的核心制度安排,可为中国提供参考。     

外资银行参股中资银行的选择模式

至2006年12月11日,中国市场向外资全面开放。外国银行以参股中国的银行来迅速渗透市场,已成为外资银行投资的一种重要方式。四大国有银行轰轰烈烈的IPO,将股份制改革推向高潮。在这样的大环境下,外国银行参股国有商业银行,相比较中小银行,国有银行的优势对外资银行更加具有吸引力。参股时,外资银行应当注意针对国有银行关心的技术转移度提出合适的方案,同时分散投资以降低非系统风险,获得理想的投资状态。     

关于国有风险投资发展困境与对策的思考

国有风险投资面对着退出渠道不畅通、平均投资收益低、管理体制僵化、增值服务能力弱、募资能力不足、政府实质性扶持政策欠缺等困境,从现阶段生存与再发展角度考虑,国有风险投资除期待中国投融资环境进一步改善外,必须面对国情主动进行体制创新与管理创新。     

A theoretical analysis of optimal financing strategies for different types of capital-constrained entrepreneurs

In this paper, we compare two alternative financing strategies that capital-constrained entrepreneurs can adopt: they can either wait until they raised enough money to complete their project (the more conservative strategy) or use limited resources to achieve some intermediate milestone before contacting large outside investors such as venture capitalists (the more adventurous strategy). We examine how the choice of financing strategy is affected by entrepreneurial types (life-style, serial and pure profit-maximizing entrepreneur). We show that specific entrepreneurial characteristics may ultimately affect the shape of firms as they may pursue different strategies to achieve similar goals. The paper generates a number of empirical predictions on security design, the interplay between angel and venture capital finance, and the professionalization of the venture capital market.     

企业并购估值中的威斯通模型扩展研究

威斯通模型是企业并购估值贴现现金流模型中具有代表性的研究。在威斯通固定增长模型的基础上,建立了考虑未来经营失败概率的估值模型;对威斯通超常增长而后无增长模型进行了修正,探讨了企业在超常增长期采取不同投资策略对其价值的影响,建立了一个更为简明的估值模型,并给出隐含超常增长期限的一种计算方法。     

风险投资主体借助保险分散风险的模式初探

在讨论分析了风险投资内涵及我国风险投资机构所面临的风险的基础上。认为借助保险分散风险投资主体的风险是我国风险投资主体的必然选择。并采用状态空间图分析了风险投资主体与保险公司之间的均衡保单问题，构造了风险投资主体借助保险分散风险的模型。对不同市场结构下的均衡问题进行了分析，最后得出了在不同市场结构下保险提供给风险投资主体的保单类型。     

An Adversarial Ethic for Business: or When Sun-Tzu Met the Stakeholder

In the economic literature on the firm, especially in the transaction–cost tradition, a sharp distinction is drawn between so-called “market transactions” and “administered transactions.” This distinction is of enormous importance for business ethics, since market transactions are governed by the competitive logic of the market, whereas administered transactions are subject to the cooperative norms that govern collective action in a bureaucracy. The widespread failure to distinguish between these two types of transactions, and thus to distinguish between adversarial and non-adversarial relations, has led many business ethicists to develop a “uniform” moral code. Yet in market transactions, the checks and balances built into the system of commercial exchange are such as to permit more instrumental forms of behavior. In administered transactions, by contrast, these checks and balances are absent, and thus the institutional context calls for much greater exercise of moral restraint. In this paper, I begin the task of developing an adversarial ethic for business. According to this view, the competitive environment licenses a greater range of “self-interested” behavior, but also imposes its own constraints on the strategies that firms may adopt in the pursuit of their interests. Joseph Heath is Associate Professor in the Department of Philosophy and the Centre for Ethics at the University of Toronto. He is the author of three books: Communicative Action and Rational Choice (MIT Press, 2001), The Efficient Society (Penguin, 2001), and with Andrew Potter. The Rebel Sell (HarperCollins, 2004). His research focuses on practical rationality, normative economics, and critical theory.     

LESSONS FROM THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION

The current financial crisis has arisen as a result of entrepreneurial and business error rather than because of inappropriate incentives within the private sector. However, government failure has exacerbated the problem. The case for responding to government failure by greater international co-ordination of banking regulation is weak. The IMF is particularly ill-suited for this job.     

Duration analysis of venture capital staging: A real options perspective

This study takes a real options perspective towards venture capital staging and views the staging decision as a choice between holding the current option to invest and investing now to obtain the option to invest subsequently. It proposes that this staging decision depends on the factors that influence the value of these two options, such as competition and various sources of uncertainty. The empirical results suggest that market uncertainty encourages venture capital firms to delay investing at each round of financing, whereas competition, project-specific uncertainty and agency concerns prompt venture capital firms to invest sooner. This study has useful implications for theory and practice.