Management and Accounting Developments in Executive Agencies

The executive agency programme has moved ahead rapidly since its introduction in 1988 and by 1996 over 70% of all civil servants were working under executive agency conditions. This has resulted in a major change in the structure of the civil service and in the management of the activities of central government. The question that then emerges concerns the benefits, if any, that these changes have brought about. This paper reports the results of a survey of a sample of senior managers in executive agencies. The survey attempted to ascertain the extent to which agencification was felt to have led to increases in autonomy and freedom to manage and also to obtain the views of managers on a range of issues including changes in operational effectiveness and quality of service delivery. These, after all, are some of the key measures of the success or otherwise of the agencification programme. The survey also examined changes in specific management accounting practices and a broad overview of the findings is provided in the paper. In general, it seems that the senior managers of executive agencies do feel that agencification has achieved many of the benefits hoped for and that is has brought about changes and improvements in management and management accounting practices.     

Earnings Announcements: Good News for Institutional Investors and Short Sellers

In this paper, we consider the trading behavior of institutional investors and short sellers around earnings announcements. The results suggest that institutional investors, and to a lesser extent short sellers, successfully anticipate earnings news. In the period immediately after the earnings announcement, both types of traders are active in the market and trade in response to the earnings announcement. In particular, short sellers are quick to increase their short positions when a company releases bad news. Institutional traders also trade in response to the news; however, they take longer to react.     

Audit opinion improvement and the timing of disclosure

Companies have been found to report positive information more quickly than they report negative information (i.e., good news early, bad news late). This paper investigates the potential impact of audit opinion change on the timeliness of financial disclosures, with improvements in audit opinion considered to be “good news.” We take both the direction and the magnitude of audit opinion change into consideration, with magnitude measuring how far the opinion is from an unqualified opinion (i.e., an unqualified opinion with explanatory paragraph is closer to an unqualified opinion than a qualified opinion is). We find that firms experiencing an improvement in their audit opinions disclose their financial results earlier, while those with audit opinion deteriorations report their financial results later, and that these effects were related to the magnitude of the opinion change. What's more, there is an asymmetric response to good audit opinion news vs. bad audit opinion news, with bad audit opinion news having a larger effect on earnings timeliness than the effect on earnings timeliness of good audit opinion news. Overall, our results support the “good news early, bad news late” notion. Finally, we also find that overall earnings timeliness has improved in China since the enactment of new reporting regulations in 2006.     

我国会计师事务所效率的实证研究——基于中注协2008—2010年发布数据

运用DEA数据包络和Malmquist生产力指数相结合的方法,综合考虑投入和产出以及它们之间的关系,对我国会计师事务所行业2007至2009年的效率变动进行实证研究;实证了会计师事务所投入要素的使用效用具有波动性,在经营管理上存在投入成本的浪费,技术效率变动为正增长,总的生产力水平在逐渐下降;事务所管理层可以通过控制并即时调整、优化和整合有效资源,加强技术创新的投入,实现规模经济效益,提升市场竞争力。     

场外市场会计盈余的信息含量

以万德数据库提供的新三板企业为样本,检验场外主体市场的会计盈余信息含量。混合样本检验显示,盈余信息披露对投资者超额收益有显著影响。分期检验中,2009年披露的盈余信息还不具备有效的信息含量;2010年披露的盈余信息具有信息含量,可能预示着场外市场的完善和成熟。此外,样本检验结果没有找到场外市场具有半强势有效的证据,但可以推断该市场处于弱势有效状态。     

上市公司信息环境和分析师的盈利预测——来自中国上市公司的经验证据

分析师在证券市场中扮演着重要角色,而上市公司信息环境则直接将影响分析师作用的发挥。本文研究了我国上市公司信息环境对分析师预测行为的影响。实证研究表明：公司信息环境越差,证券分析师将越少使用历史会计信息,分析师向证券市场传递的增量信息就越多,相对历史会计信息而言,分析师预测信息的竞争力就越高。由于国内研究上市公司信息环境的文章相对较少,所以本文为国内分析师的盈利预测及相关研究提供了一个新视角。     

业绩预告披露与盈余管理研究

盈余管理存在的根本原因在于投资者与管理层之间的信息不对称。业绩预告作为上市公司未来经营成果、财务状况与现金流量的预测,在很大程度上会影响投资者对上市公司的评估及其投资决策。从业绩预告披露的特征方面出发,研究业绩预告披露与盈余管理之间的关系,包括业绩预告的性质、预告精确度、预告误差分别与盈余管理程度的关系,结果发现：发布业绩预告的公司,盈余管理水平更高。预告精确度以及预告期间与预测当期盈余管理水平正相关,预测误差与盈余管理水平负相关。当消息类型不同的时候,预测的强制性与否以及＂变脸＂对盈余管理水平的影响不同。结论支持了上市公司财务报告迎合业绩预告披露的说法。     

盈余重述的市场反应及其影响因素研究——基于我国2004-2010年数据的经验分析

本文以2004-2010年盈余重述为样本,检验了我国盈余重述的市场反应及其影响因素。根据重述披露的时点选择特征,首次提出聚合重述和分离重述概念。研究发现,年报的利好消息或非利好消息对盈余重述负面影响的"抵减效应"或"加剧效应"都十分显著;剔除年报影响的分离重述的市场反应显著为-3%。研究还发现,相对于被动重述,主动重述被认为是"主动说真话"的表现,具有"坦白从宽"的效果;重述追溯调整的幅度、公司盈利能力、财务风险和债务水平,都会显著影响重述公告时的市场反应程度。     

公平信息披露与分析师预测精度——来自中国上市公司的经验证据

证券分析师是证券市场重要的信息加工者和传播者,他们的信息行为对中小投资者和市场效率有重要影响。本文基于2003~2009年分析师的年度盈利预测数据,运用面板计量模型实证检验了公平信息披露规则的实施对分析师预测精度的影响。研究结果表明:分析师预测精度在规则实施后显著下降了;而且,随着规则实施时间的推移,分析师预测精度进一步下降;另外,分析师对信息披露水平较差的上市公司的预测精度下降幅度更大。     

Bank size, market concentration, and bank earnings volatility in the US

We examine whether bank earnings volatility depends on bank size and the degree of concentration in the banking sector. Using quarterly data for non-investment banks in the United States for the period 2004Q1-2009Q4 and controlling for the quality of management, leverage, and diversification, we find that bank size reduces return volatility. The negative impact of bank size on bank earnings volatility decreases (in absolute terms) with market concentration. We also find that larger banks located in concentrated markets have experienced higher volatility during the recent financial crisis.