Top management team incentive heterogeneity,strategic investment behavior,and performance: A contingency theory of incentive alignment

Research summary : We develop and test a contingency theory of the influence of top management team (TMT) performance‐contingent incentives on manager–shareholder interest alignment. Our results support our theory by showing that although TMTs engage in significantly higher levels of acquisition investment when their average incentive levels increase, investors' responses to those large investments are generally negative. More importantly, however, we further find that within‐TMT incentive heterogeneity conditions that effect, such that investors evaluate TMTs' large acquisition investments more positively as the variance in those top managers' incentive values increases. Thus, within‐TMT incentive heterogeneity appears to increase manager–shareholder interest alignment, in the context of large acquisition investments. Managerial summary : We find that as the average value of TMTs' incentives increase, relative to their total pay, they invest more in acquisitions and investors' respond negatively to the announcement of those deals. However, we further show that investors respond more positively to acquisitions announced by TMTs whose members' incentive values vary (some TMT members hold higher incentives and others hold lower). Results imply that when TMT members hold differing incentives levels, they approach investments from divergent perspectives, scrutinize those investments more heavily, and make better decisions, relative to TMTs with similar incentives. They also suggest that boards seeking tighter manager–shareholder interest alignment may benefit from introducing variance into TMT members' incentive structures, as doing so appears to create divergent preferences that can improve team decision making. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

CEO political ideologies and pay egalitarianism within top management teams

Research summary : We examine the influence of CEO and compensation committee liberalism on top management teams (TMT ) pay arrangements. Given that politically liberal individuals tend to value egalitarianism, we test whether firms with liberal CEO s tend to (1) reduce pay dispersion among non‐CEO executives; and (2) reduce pay gaps between CEO and non‐CEO executives, and whether compensation committee liberalism moderates these relationships. We find some evidence of a direct effect of CEO liberalism on TMT pay arrangements as well as some interaction between CEO and compensation committee liberalism on the pay arrangements. This study provides a better understanding of the antecedents of TMT pay arrangements and empirical evidence showing the influence of values at the top of organization . Managerial summary : Do the values of the CEO and compensation committee influence the pay of other top managers? Our study provides evidence that political ideology affects top manager pay. We examine whether CEO liberalism produces more egalitarian pay arrangements among top managers, and whether the liberalism of the compensation committee affects that relationship. We find that CEO liberalism reduces differences in the total pay among top managers, but does not influence the difference between CEO total pay and the total pay of top managers. We also find that compensation committee liberalism strengthens the negative influence of CEO liberalism on differences in total pay among top managers. Finally, we find that CEO liberalism reduces the difference between CEO bonus pay and the bonus pay of other top managers . Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

农村宅基地退出机制建立探讨

研究目的：探讨农村宅基地退出机制的建立。研究方法：综合分析法与文献资料法。研究结果：农村宅基地退出机制的缺失是导致目前中国农村宅基地利用存在问题的根本原因,建立以激励机制和约束机制为核心的宅基地退出机制是改革和完善农村宅基地使用管理制度的重要方面。研究结论：农村宅基地退出机制的建立应以保障农户对宅基地的合法权益、不增加合法占用宅基地农户的经济负担为基本前提,重点是建立农村宅基地收回补偿制度、健全多元化的农村住房保障体系、实施农村宅基地有偿使用制度和健全农村宅基地整理、置换、复垦机制。     

基于市场决定理念下的征地补偿标准确定方法研究 ——以甘肃省张掖市城市规划区为例

研究目的：针对现行征地补偿标准确定方法的弊端,探索符合各地实际的征地补偿标准确定方法。研究方法：社会调查法,逻辑推理法,实证研究法。研究结果：按照征地后用途不同采用不同的确定方法能够提高征地补偿标准,保障农民权益,充分体现土地价值,具有可操作性。研究结论：公益性用地采用地价构成法,非公益性用地采用基准地价反算法,从不同角度测算征地补偿标准切实可行。     

国土资源数据整合方案设计及其实现研究

研究目的：基于国土资源数据现状,提出有效整合方案,为国土资源信息化建设提供借鉴。研究方法：以ETL技术框架为基础,结合数据挖掘技术和GIS技术,设计符合国土资源数据整合要求的解决方案,并以常州市为例进行实证研究。研究结果：数据整合方案有效快捷地解决了常州市国土资源数据整合。研究结论：方案智能化提高了数据整合过程的数据分析能力、处理能力和效率,有效地从国土资源数据本身解决了整合难题,对市县级国土资源数据整合有借鉴意义。     

重构中国水电开发中的征地补偿技术路线

研究目的：构建适合中国大西南地区水电建设征地补偿的技术路线。研究方法：确立“公平补偿”的标准,从保证移民福利水平不降低出发,进行移民搬迁前后的现金流分析,构造新的补偿函数,并借助资产评估的方法测算征地补偿费。研究结果：（1）《大中型水利水电工程建设征地补偿和移民安置条例》中沿用的“产值倍数法”不适应中国大西南水电开发中的实际情况;（2）收益法测算的征地补偿费不足以弥补农业安置方式中的耕地开发成本。研究结论：（1）补偿费用中应包含新耕地开发成本;（2）依据成本法和收益法结合重构的征地补偿函数,提高了征地补偿测算的科学性和合理性。     

Board structure and CEO compensation: Evidence from U.S. lodging industry

Using a sample of U.S. lodging firms, this paper examines the relationship between board of director characteristics and chief executive officer (CEO) compensation. Previous research shows that larger boards are detrimental to the effectiveness of the board of directors and deteriorate the control imposed on CEO actions and pay. Board independence is also suggested as an important quality to emphasize the control on the CEO. We propose that U.S. lodging firms’ board of directors provide a nice setting to investigate the effects of size and independence on CEO compensation level. Our findings suggest that CEO compensation is not related to board size, and positively related to proportion of the outside board members. These findings are contrary to the findings of previous studies. Our findings may provide significant insights to lodging firms’ board of directors to structure efficient compensation packages.     

中国森林生态产品补偿标准五阶段论

在论述补偿构成、补偿实质等基本问题之后,以成本构成理论为依据,根据目前国家经济发展水平提出了中国森林生态产品补偿标准发展的5个阶段(现行标准、管护成本标准、简单再生产标准、全额生产经营成本标准、效益补偿标准),以便进一步完善中国森林生态产品补偿的理论与实践。     

无功功率补偿在供配电系统设计中的应用

无功补偿能减少线路的损耗、减小导线截面积和变压器容量、减少线路压降。无功补偿的方式有变电所集中补偿、用电负荷就地补偿、配电线路的分散补偿等。无功补偿应注意的问题有防止产生自励、谐波问题、无功倒送问题、电压调节方式的补偿给设备带来的问题等。无功补偿的发展方向有电力有源滤波器、统一潮流控制器这说明了无功补偿在企业供配电系统设计中的重要应用。