投资决策中个人理性与集体理性博弈分析及对策研究

针对近期多起曝光的企业对外投资、担保大案,本文应用博弈论分析方法,在强调个人理性与集体理性矛盾的基础上研究投资决策中两者的完全信息博弈及无限阶段重复博弈,并建立相应的定量分析模型,通过分析博弈参与人均衡行为,指出投资决策中寻租的存在的必然性及巨大危害,并针对性的提出了适合实际操作的对策建议.     

Introduction to Repeated Games with Private Monitoring

We present a brief overview of recent developments in discounted repeated games with (imperfect) private monitoring. The literature explores the possibility of cooperation in a long-term relationship, where each agent receives imperfect private information about the opponents' actions. Although this class of games admits a wide range of applications such as collusion under secret price-cutting, exchange of goods with uncertain quality, and observation errors, it has fairly complex mathematical structure due to the lack of common information shared by players. This is in sharp contrast to the well-explored case of repeated games under public information (with the celebrated Folk Theorems), and until recently little had been known about the private monitoring case. However, rapid developments in the past few years have revealed the possibility of cooperation under private monitoring for some class of games. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C73, D43, D82, L13, L41.     

Values, prices of production and market prices: some more evidence from the Greek economy

This paper extends the empirical investigation of the relationbetween labour values and different price forms in the caseof the Greek economy. Subjecting the labour theory of valueto empirical tests with data from various countries helps inthe derivation of general conclusions regarding its empiricalvalidity and practical usefulness. Our results on the closenessof values and prices as measured by their absolute deviationand correlation, the shape of the wage–profit curves,the predictive power of labour values over market prices comparedwith other ‘value bases’, and the comparison offundamental Marxian categories when estimated in value and priceterms provide further support for the empirical strength ofthe labour theory of value.     

Money as Social Exergy

Synopsis It has been proposed that open thermodynamic systems will act to dissipate available energy gradients by self-organizing into coherent structures that, with time, evolve and develop into nested hierarchies – panarchies – that adapt to internal and external changes according to a characteristic adaptive cycle. This paper seeks to apply these ideas in the purely societal realm by investigating the role of money in economic systems. Money represents the value embodied in goods; a value that is separate from the exact nature of those goods. We suggest that money thereby liberates the ‘free value’ of economic desire and that this free value has properties analogous to energy. The result is the self-organization of structures and systems (‘econosystems’) that dissipate this ‘free value’. Econosystems act at different scales, and nested levels of econosystems form a panarchy, having effects that can be observed. In particular, it appears that money facilitates the creation of relationships between econosystem actors, increasing the connectedness of the econosystems that envelop those actors. We have identified a phenomenon whereby freed social value (i.e. money) can aggregate, or pool, at a larger econosystem scale in structures such as banks. These pools act as gradients that actors at the neighborhood scale can exploit for self-organization in the econosystem. Thus, econosystem actors appear to be freed from thermodynamic constraints by using money as a means of self-organization. However, because of these pools of aggregated social exergy, connectedness is increased at the larger scale of the econosystem. The potential consequence of this dynamic is that money may act to push larger scale econosystems toward a state of heightened vulnerability to collapse, while freeing smaller scale actors from apparent constraints. In this way, we propose that money acts to skew information feedback loops between econosystem actors and larger scale structures such as economies and ecosystems.      

Régulation School and environment: Theoretical proposals and avenues of research

The article explores the relevance of a particular approach of the institutionalist movement, régulation theory, to deal with the relationship between the economy and the environment. Régulation theory, which appeared in France at the end of the 1970s, is mainly interested in macroeconomic issues. In contrast, until now it has tended to neglect environmental questions. By taking several key concepts of this theory (accumulation regime, mode of régulation, institutional forms), we have sought to assess its significance vis-à-vis the environmental field. More precisely, from the perspective of establishing an environmental regulationist theory, we propose considering the economic relation to the environment as the articulation of three forms: a transhistorical form, a general capitalist form and a specific capitalist form, the latter being variable in capitalist time and space. We give several illustrations of the variability of the relation to the environment, depending on the different accumulation regimes and the different modes of régulation. Two principal avenues of research are proposed: historical analyses for given economic areas, and comparative analyses relating in particular to different capitalist areas.     

上市公司控制权争夺的动机及其特征

本文结合国内外研究成果以及我国当前的市场环境,对可能成为控制权争夺目标的公司会具备什么样的财务特征、股权结构以及公司治理进行了分析,以寻找上市公司控制权争夺的真正动机和目的.我们研究发现:上市公司经营业绩越差,债务比率越高,当年具有增发或配股资格,产权的可转让性越低,产权性质为国有企业和终极控制人为国有企业或政府机构时,其控制权被争夺的可能性也越高.     

基金羊群行为的博弈分析

本文从博弈角度对信息不完全和声誉报酬型羊群行为的生成机理进行了剖析，最后从博弈均衡解出发，给出了弱化羊群行为的对策。     

基于循环经济理论的建筑节能研究

建筑节能是贯彻国家可持续发展战略的重要组成部分,循环经济理论将为我国建筑节能政策提供良好的思路.文章在分析循环经济理论基本内涵的基础上,分析循环经济理论对我国建筑节能工作的指导意义,并结合当前我国建筑节能现状及其存在的问题,根据“十一五“规划目标,提出新时期我国建筑节能对策.     

行为决策理论及决策行为实证研究方法探讨

作者对行为决策理论发展的历程及各阶段中决策行为的实证研究方法进行了梳理,发现决策行为的实证研究方法在很大程度上决定了行为决策理论发展的进程。在对决策行为一般实证研究方法及其特点进行分析之后,作者认为观察法较适用于决策行为的初步探索性研究;调查法则较适用于一般决策行为的总体状况和特征的研究;如果理论假说源于决策者某些特定的、深层次的主观动机,假设的证实或者证伪又需要大量的检验,实验法的优势比较明显。为了取得对本研究的实证效果,这里对如何将实验法应用于中国投资者决策行为研究做了一次实证性尝试,以供学术争鸣。     

Pure joint production and international trade: a note

This paper applies the principles of the neo-Ricardian (or Sraffian)theory of international trade to certain joint production systems.It is shown that, in contrast with single-product systems, (i)there is not always a pattern of international specialisation,which would entail the increase of the real wage rate in botheconomies, and (ii) the ‘law of comparative advantage’has no general validity. Furthermore, not only the existenceof such a pattern of specialisation but also the validity ofthis law depend on the values of the variables of distributionof income. The analysis is wholly based on two of the numericalexamples formulated by Bidard in 1997, and further generalisedin an elementary way only when this is considered necessary.