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11.
Michael A. Kamins Avi Noy Yael Steinhart David Mazursky 《Journal of Interactive Marketing》2011,25(4):241-250
This research explores how social cues presented in an online auction affect sniping behavior. Sniping is a strategy of placing a bid on an item in the very ending stages of an auction with a pre-determined ending time in an attempt to win the auction. Such a strategy conceals the intentions of the bidder until the last moments of the auction and minimizes the possibility of other opposing bidders submitting higher bids due to the short period of time left to respond. The research includes two field studies and a lab experiment indicating that sniping appears to be influenced by social factors, that is, when there are a greater number of bidders in the auction or the auction site provides social information about the bidders, the relative use of sniping increases. This research supports the perspective that bidders rely on others' bidding behavior and characteristics as an indication of the true value of the item on sale, and is one of the first studies in the literature which takes this perspective. 相似文献
12.
13.
Emic and etic interpretations of engagement with a consumer-to-consumer online auction site 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Eathar Abdul-Ghani Kenneth F. HydeRoger Marshall 《Journal of Business Research》2011,64(10):1060-1066
This paper provides emic and etic interpretations of engagement with a consumer-to-consumer (C2C) online auction site, based on in-depth interviews with buyers. The study exposes three misconceptions about online C2C auctions; that the interaction between parties occurs exclusively online, that the relation between buyers and sellers is purely transactional in nature, and that the interaction between buyers and sellers does not lead to ongoing business relationships. The paper reveals the utilitarian, hedonic and social benefits that are the bases of engagement with the auction site. Social benefits materialize for auction buyers during offline exchanges. The paper also reveals marketer incentives and structural disincentives for consumers' ongoing use of the auction site. 相似文献
14.
中国城市土地供应方式经历了由无偿划拨到有偿出让,从协议出让到招拍挂出让的转变历程,当前招拍挂已经成为经营性用地的唯一出让方式。在地方政府"土地财政"的利益驱动下,土地单一垄断供应体制下的"招拍挂"土地出让方式已经成为影响房价上涨的重要因素之一。要遏制房价过快上涨的势头,应从根源上切断地方政府在房地产市场中的利益链条。 相似文献
15.
Institutional constraints on conservation auction: Organizational mandate,competencies and practices
Auctions appeal to analysts and policy designers because of their potential efficiency in recruiting new areas for nature conservation. The failure to develop genuine auctions and competitive tender processes is typically blamed on the design and the attractiveness of the instrument. However, the institutional constraints that a new competitive mechanism faces when placed in a real-world ecological-institutional setting are only partly anticipated by the theoretical and analytical approaches. This paper explores the theory-based principles of cost-effectiveness against a real-world auction instrument designed for forest biodiversity conservation in Finland. The instrument, called “Natural Values Trading”, specified that the tenders should be invited and compared on an annual basis but the competitive procedure was not operationalized. Instead, sites were evaluated on a first come – first serve basis, applying ecological criteria and pricing based on opportunity costs. The institutional constraints of the auction mechanism centred on the difficulty that public authorities geared toward implementing law and treating citizens equally faced with a competitive arrangement. The pressure to generate instant impact overrode experimenting with new mechanisms and exiting an administrative comfort zone. The findings conform to the institutional theories that identify challenges with matching organizational mandate, reallocating and developing organizational competencies as well as changing informal organizational and professional practices. The design of biodiversity conservation mechanisms will not go far by focusing solely on cost-effectiveness; instead, the institutional friction should be taken seriously and organizational mandates, competencies and practices should be addressed explicitly. 相似文献
16.
Conservation auctions are increasingly employed to increase the provision of Ecological Goods and Services (EG&S) for achieving environmental goals. Most applications of conservation auctions concern the efficient allocation of a fixed conservation budget. However an important and under-explored application of conservation auctions is in meeting environmental targets, either as part of regulatory compliance by industry or by governments in meeting specified policy objectives. This paper examines the ability of a conservation auction to meet an environmental target. We use experimental economics methods benchmarked to a wetlands restoration case study to examine bidder behavior and efficiency in both budget constrained and target constrained auctions when landowners with increasing marginal costs can offer increasing sized bundles of wetland acres. The target constrained auction is characterized by an all or nothing rule, where there is no payout if the target is not met. We find that rent seeking and average cost in the target constrained auction is less than in a budget constrained auction, but that efficiency eroded in repeated rounds suggesting learning effects as participants realize there is no budget cap. Even with learning effects the target based auction out-performs the budget based auction. Adding a reserve price to the target based auction significantly reduced rent seeking but also increased the probability that the target was not met. The results have important implications for auction design in real world settings. 相似文献
17.
This paper presents results for identification and estimation of the value distribution from eBay auction prices. The paper presents results for eBay type auctions with independent private values and unobserved participation. It is first shown that the distribution of values is identified from observing the distribution of prices and knowing the distribution of potential bidders. The main identification result presents conditions for which the distribution of values and the distribution of potential bidders are simultaneously identified. Not surprisingly, the intuition is similar to the standard results for identifying demand from observed equilibrium prices. The estimation method suggested by the identification results is used to estimate the value distribution for the “C5” Chevrolet Corvette sold on eBay. The results suggest that a simple OLS model on prices will over estimate the mean value of the item. The estimation results are then used to calculate the optimal reserve price for these cars. The estimated optimal reserves are compared to the actual reserves. Actual hidden reserves are set much higher than actual non-hidden reserves. The evidence suggests sellers set Buy-It-Nows and hidden reserves optimally to account for re-listing opportunities. 相似文献
18.
Menezes Flavio M. Monteiro Paulo K. 《The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics》1998,17(3):219-232
Suppose a seller wants to sell k similar or identical objects and there are n > k potential buyers. Suppose that each buyer wants only one object. In this case, we suggest the use of a simultaneous auction that would work as follows. Players are asked to submit sealed bids for one object. The individual with the highest bid chooses an object first; the individual with the second-highest bid chooses the next object; and this process continues until the individual with the kth highest bid receives the last object. Each individual pays the equivalent to his or her bid. When objects are identical, we show that the proposed auction generates the same revenue as a first-price sealed-bid sequential auction. When objects are perfectly correlated, there is no known solution for sequential auctions, whereas we can characterize bidding strategies in the proposed auction. Moreover, the proposed auction is optimal (given an appropriately chosen reserve price), and it may be easier and cheaper to run than a sequential auction. 相似文献
19.
Christian A. Vossler Timothy D. Mount Robert J. Thomas Ray D. Zimmerman 《Journal of Regulatory Economics》2009,36(1):44-59
This paper presents the results from an auction experiment using industry professionals and student participants who compete
in a simulated wholesale market for electricity. Motivated by the intervention by FERC in response to the “meltdown” of the
California spot market, we investigate the effect of including a “soft” price cap in a uniform price auction as a means of
mitigating high prices. When prices are driven above the soft cap, offer curves become flat, in contrast to the hockey stick
shape observed in a typical uniform price auction for electricity. This flat offer curve leads to market prices that are relatively
insensitive to both generation costs and demand reductions.
相似文献
20.
We examine theoretically and experimentally two countervailing effects of industry concentration in common value auctions.
Greater concentration of information among fewer bidders reduces competition but increases the precision of private estimates.
We demonstrate that this generally leads to more aggressive bidding. However, the reduction in competition dominates the informational
effects, resulting in lower prices. We examine these hypothesized effects experimentally by conducting a series of auctions
with constant informational content but distributed among a varying number of bidders. The experimental results are consistent
with our theoretical predictions.
The authors would like to thank Octavian Carare, Eric Friedman, Luke Froeb, Ron Harstad, Toshi Iizuka, Mike Rothkopf, Charles
Thomas, and two anonymous referees, for many useful comments and suggestions. 相似文献