Sorry Winners

Bidders who receive both “common-value” and “private-value” signals about the value of an auction prize cannot fully infer their opponents’ information from the bidding. So bidders may overestimate the value of the prize and, subsequently, regret winning. When multiple objects are on sale, bidding in an auction provides information relevant to the other auctions, and sequential auctions are more vulnerable to overpayment and winners’ regret than are simultaneous auctions. With information inequality among bidders, the seller’s revenue is influenced by two contrasting effects. On the one hand, simultaneous auctions reduce the winner’s curse of less informed bidders and allow them to bid more aggressively. On the other hand, sequential auctions induce less informed bidders to bid more aggressively in early auctions to acquire information.      

Cryptographic protocols for Vickrey auctions

Although the sealed second-price or Vickrey auctions have some nice theoretical properties, they are fairly seldom utilized in practice. It has been suggested that they are vulnerable to bid-taker cheating and that the revelation of bids after the bidding makes the bidders reluctant to reveal their true valuations. We outline procedures based on modern mathematical cryptography that are instrumental in avoiding some of these difficulties and thereby will improve the properties of the Vickrey auctions.     

Coveted or Overlooked? The Psychology of Bidding for Comparable Listings in Digital Auctions

This article elaborates on, and provides evidence of the herd behavior bias -- the tendency to gravitate toward, and bid for, auction listings with one or more existing bids, ignoring comparable or even more attractive unbid-for listings available at the same time -- exhibited by buyers in digital auctions. Some listings attract many bidders and become coveted, the center of bidding attention, while other equivalent or even superior listings are overlooked, receiving no bids at all. Empirical analysis using data from digital auctions across different product categories shows that this herd behavior bias is attenuated with increasing bid price, but increases with the difficulty of evaluating quality. The practical implications of these findings, and promising research opportunities in this area are also discussed.     

Sequential versus Bundle Auctions for Recurring Procurement

We compare sequential and bundle procurement auctions in a framework of successive procurement situations, where current success positively or negatively affects future market opportunities. We find that in bundle auctions procurement cost is lower and less risky than in sequential standard auctions, but still higher than in the optimal sequential auction. Only a sequential second price auction leads to the efficient outcome.     

Are auction revenues affected by rising art buyers’ premia? The case of early American art

The steady rise in the premiums charged to art buyers at auction (above hammer price) has been underway since 1992. This article, using a stable and bounded sample of repeat purchase of American works created before 1950, reveals that this tact has reduced hammer prices for that art. However, renewed and hyper-competitive efforts to bring more and higher quality art to market by the two main houses, Sotheby’s and Christie’s, have resulted in general profitability. Nevertheless, we calculate that a rise in buyers’ premia at Sotheby’s, a publically traded company, has reduced revenues and profits below their potential in the absence of such increases.     

EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE ON ENGLISH AUCTIONS: ORAL OUTCRY VERSUS CLOCK

This paper tests experimentally, in a common value setting, the equivalence between the Japanese English auction (or clock auction) and an oral outcry auction where bidders are allowed to call their own bids. We find that (i) bidding behaviour is different in each type of auction, but also that (ii) this difference in bidding behaviour does not affect significantly the auction prices. This lends some support to the equivalence between these two types of auction. The winner's curse is present: overbidding led to higher than expected prices (under Nash bidding strategies) in both types of auction. Although interesting and encouraging, the results clearly indicate that further research is necessary, particularly with a modified experimental design.     

Market Power and the Power Market: Multi-Unit Bidding and (In)Efficiency in Electricity Auctions

In this paper we apply auction theory to the modelling of competition in a multi-unit wholesale electricity market. Bidding strategies of multi-plant producers are derived and examined assuming various degrees of market concentration. Unlike previous literature, which mainly focuses on demand uncertainty, we assume both demand and cost uncertainty as well as cost differentials among the two types of generating units considered in the model, namely baseload units and peak units. Results indicate that the System Marginal Price (competitive pricing) rule provides incentives for bid shading on the part of all those generators-units who have a non-null probability of setting the market price. We also show that the extent of the bid shading is positively affected by the differential in the endowments of the baseload generation capacity of multi-plant firms. The inefficiency of the resulting allocation is also examined and some policy implications are briefly discussed.     

Can retailers get higher prices for “end-of-life” inventory through online auctions?

Manufacturers and retailers are using online auctions to liquidate excess inventory. Using a field study of 11,879 online auctions, this paper builds upon theories of competitive processes to relate four key seller-controlled variables (starting price, day of close, auction length, and brand) to outcomes of online auction for apparel goods. Results suggest that to obtain a higher percentage of the original retail price, retailers should start with a lower price and feature national brands. These and other findings are discussed and a number of future research topics are offered.     

How do valuations impact outcomes of asset sales with heterogeneous bidders?

Differences among bidder type-specific outcomes of asset sales are theoretically related to differences in bidders’ valuations and participation. The lead application to quantify these relations is takeover auctions: bidders are classified into strategic and financial, and bids are available. I structurally estimate valuations from all bids. The positive difference in premiums between strategic and financial acquirers is driven by the difference in dispersions of valuations (e.g., strategic bidders’ synergies are more dispersed) and the set of auction participants. The difference in average valuations is relatively unimportant. My approach can help explain outcomes of asset sales, even in settings with limited bidder data.     

Self serving reference points in double auctions

We present a novel approach for modelling self serving bias by way of reference dependence. Bias is modelled as a systematic individual level deviation of the endogenous reference point from the expected price of a good in a two person k-double auction. We find that bias decreases the efficiency of the model, and that efficiency is decreasing in both the level of bias and reference dependence.