全文获取类型
收费全文 | 263篇 |
免费 | 2篇 |
专业分类
财政金融 | 13篇 |
工业经济 | 30篇 |
计划管理 | 37篇 |
经济学 | 112篇 |
运输经济 | 4篇 |
旅游经济 | 1篇 |
贸易经济 | 41篇 |
农业经济 | 20篇 |
经济概况 | 7篇 |
出版年
2023年 | 2篇 |
2022年 | 1篇 |
2021年 | 4篇 |
2020年 | 9篇 |
2019年 | 3篇 |
2018年 | 6篇 |
2017年 | 11篇 |
2016年 | 6篇 |
2015年 | 9篇 |
2014年 | 11篇 |
2013年 | 24篇 |
2012年 | 5篇 |
2011年 | 18篇 |
2010年 | 6篇 |
2009年 | 20篇 |
2008年 | 18篇 |
2007年 | 15篇 |
2006年 | 19篇 |
2005年 | 12篇 |
2004年 | 9篇 |
2003年 | 14篇 |
2002年 | 10篇 |
2001年 | 8篇 |
2000年 | 9篇 |
1999年 | 3篇 |
1998年 | 6篇 |
1997年 | 1篇 |
1996年 | 2篇 |
1994年 | 2篇 |
1993年 | 1篇 |
1992年 | 1篇 |
排序方式: 共有265条查询结果,搜索用时 0 毫秒
211.
This paper revisits a particular case involvingtwo dairy processing companies accused ofrigging bids in northern Kentucky schooldistricts during the 1980s. Evidence andarguments presented to support a conclusion ofovert collusion are reassessed. Analyses ofincumbency rates, market shares, bid levels, biddispersions, bid distance relationships, exactbidding differentials, and bids from hellindicate that the two dairies may have beenengaged in tacit collusion instead of overt collusion. 相似文献
212.
The difference between people's valuations of gains and losses has been widely observed in both single trial and repeated trial experiments, as well as in survey responses and in commonplace behavior. However, the results of some Vickrey auction experiments indicate that the disparity may decrease, or even disappear, over repeated trials. This paper reports the results of two further repeated Vickrey auction experiments that test the impact of both a second price and a ninth price auction rule on valuations. Although valuations should be independent of this variation in the exchange price rule, the manipulation had a dramatic impact on subjects' stated values of a common market good. The results suggest that the endowment effect remains robust over repeated trials, and that contrary to common understanding, the Vickrey auction may elicit differing demands dependent on the context of the valuation. 相似文献
213.
We construct a family of retaliatory equilibria for the Japanese ascending auction for multiple objects and show that, while it is immune to many of the tacitly collusive equilibria studied in the literature, it is not entirely immune when some bidders are commonly known to be interested in a specific object. 相似文献
214.
Using dynamic panel data econometric techniques, we analyzethe price structure of sequential auctions of modern and contemporary art that took place inItaly during the period 1983–1996. Contrary to previous empirical studies, we do not find anyafternoon effect, or decline of auction prices relative to estimated values. Taking intoconsideration the structure of the auctions and the dynamic nature of price determination, we proposean interpretation of the empirical results that encompasses previous contributions. 相似文献
215.
Christine Riefa 《Journal of Consumer Policy》2008,31(2):167-194
This paper discusses the legal classification of online “eBay” auctions. The discussion has key implications on the scope
of consumer protection law as sale by auctions are, for example, excluded from the scope of the Consumer Protection (Distance
Selling) Regulations 2000. The paper uncovers that online “eBay” auctions cannot always be considered as traditional auctions
and that eBay, as an intermediary, is not to be considered as an auctioneer. This creates difficulties associated with a distributive
application of consumer protection laws such as the Consumer Protection (Distance Selling) Regulations 2000. Another set of
difficulties is associated with a lenient legal regime applicable to the liability of eBay under the Electronic Commerce (EC
Directive) Regulations 2002. The paper concludes that there is an urgent need to clarify the legal classification of online
auctions and to rethink the liability of online auction sites to better protect consumers.
相似文献
Christine RiefaEmail: |
216.
Within the context of a single-unit, independent private values auction model, we show that if bidder types are multidimensional, then under the optimal auction exclusion of a positive measure of bidder types occur. The results complements Armstrong’s (1996) exclusion of types result. 相似文献
217.
Sidhartha S. Padhi Pratap K.J. Mohapatra 《Journal of Purchasing & Supply Management》2011,17(4):207-221
Research on bidder collusion in procurement auctions is reasonably successful in unveiling the mechanisms of collusion among the bidders. But it is relatively weak in forwarding effective practical methods of collusion detection before the winner is declared, because they presuppose the knowledge of collusion in specific auctions. Past studies, however, point out the need for working with bid price-to-reserve price ratios rather than bid prices or winning bid prices, to be free from the problem of heteroscedasticity. They also draw an important inference that the set of collusive data are significantly different from the set of competitive data. On the basis of these basic facts, the current paper outlines a seven-step approach to collusion detection. The approach makes rudimentary statistical analysis of bid price-to-reserve price ratios for all the bidders. The analysis comprises tests of equality of means, medians and variance and tests of skewness, autocorrelation and normality of the ratios. It divides the ratios into two significantly different clusters. The cluster with the higher mean and variance values of the ratios corresponds to collusive bidding with the other cluster corresponding to competitive bidding. The paper proposes the construction of a process control chart to detect occurrence of collusion in an auction immediately after the price bids are opened. The approach is illustrated by applying it to data from procurement auctions for construction projects in a State Department of the Republic of India. 相似文献
218.
I study a market where agents with unit demand jointly own heterogeneous goods. In this market, the existence of an efficient, incentive compatible, individually rational, and budget balanced mechanism depends on the shares of the agents. I characterize the set of shares for which having such a mechanism is possible. This set includes the symmetric allocation and excludes the allocation in which every agent owns a separate good. 相似文献
219.
Sushil BikhchandaniJoseph M. Ostroy 《Journal of Economic Theory》2002,107(2):377-406
We study assignment problems where individuals trade packages consisting of several, rather than single, objects. Although buyers' reservations values are non-additive, efficient assignments can be formulated as a linear programming problem in which the pricing functions expressing duality may be non-linear in the objects constituting the packages. The interconnections among the linear programming formulation, Walrasian equilibrium, and the core are established. In the single seller (auction) version, a necessary and sufficient condition is given for the Vickrey payoff point to be implementable by a pricing equilibrium. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C62, D44, D51. 相似文献
220.
We use numerical methods to compute Nash equilibrium (NE) bid functions for four agents bidding in a first-price auction. Each bidderi is randomly assigned:r
i
[0,r
max], where 1 –r
i
is the Arrow-Pratt measure of constant relative risk aversion. Eachr
i
is independently drawn from the cumulative distribution function (·), a beta distribution on [0,r
max]. For various values of the maximum propensity to seek risk,r
max, the expected value of any bidder's risk characteristic,E (r
i
), and the probability that any bidder is risk seeking,P (r
i
> 1), we determine the nonlinear characteristics of the (NE) bid functions. 相似文献