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211.
Using dynamic panel data econometric techniques, we analyzethe price structure of sequential auctions of modern and contemporary art that took place inItaly during the period 1983–1996. Contrary to previous empirical studies, we do not find anyafternoon effect, or decline of auction prices relative to estimated values. Taking intoconsideration the structure of the auctions and the dynamic nature of price determination, we proposean interpretation of the empirical results that encompasses previous contributions. 相似文献
212.
In the context of first-price auctions with asymmetrically informed bidders, we show that risk aversion not only increases a player’s bid, but also makes him less sensitive to the probability that other bidders are informed about his private valuation. 相似文献
213.
Barbara Cresti 《Applied economics》2013,45(17):1953-1966
This paper studies the barter industry developed in North America during the 1950s, pointing out some of its main characteristics. Thus, it examines its two main sectors: (i) corporate barter and (ii) commercial barter. Contrary to expectations, the analysis of official data shows that this phenomenon is essentially pro-cyclical for the commercial barter component. Moreover, commercial barter activity turns out to be complementary to the cash economy. While the two sectors display some differences in their pattern, they both help firms to increase their profits. 相似文献
214.
215.
216.
We construct a family of retaliatory equilibria for the Japanese ascending auction for multiple objects and show that, while it is immune to many of the tacitly collusive equilibria studied in the literature, it is not entirely immune when some bidders are commonly known to be interested in a specific object. 相似文献
217.
Within the context of a single-unit, independent private values auction model, we show that if bidder types are multidimensional, then under the optimal auction exclusion of a positive measure of bidder types occur. The results complements Armstrong’s (1996) exclusion of types result. 相似文献
218.
Sushil BikhchandaniJoseph M. Ostroy 《Journal of Economic Theory》2002,107(2):377-406
We study assignment problems where individuals trade packages consisting of several, rather than single, objects. Although buyers' reservations values are non-additive, efficient assignments can be formulated as a linear programming problem in which the pricing functions expressing duality may be non-linear in the objects constituting the packages. The interconnections among the linear programming formulation, Walrasian equilibrium, and the core are established. In the single seller (auction) version, a necessary and sufficient condition is given for the Vickrey payoff point to be implementable by a pricing equilibrium. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C62, D44, D51. 相似文献
219.
Countless experimental studies have shown that markets converge quickly and efficiently to the competitive outcome under many
trading institutions, particularly the double auction mechanism. This creates difficulties for Keynesian stories of unemployment
creation—which suggest a noncompetitive outcome in an essentially competitive world. Such stories were popular in the late
1960s and 1970s. One of these stories—the dual decision hypothesis of Clower—was seen then as the beginning of a story of
unemployment. This article reports the results of an experiment designed to test this hypothesis. Specifically, we set up
an experiment in which there are two sequential double-auction markets, in the first of which one good (labour) is traded,
after which the second market (goods) is opened and the second good traded. We compare the outcome of our experiment with
that of the competitive theory. One general finding is that not enough trade takes place in the two markets. In other words,
the usual finding that competitive equilibrium is achieved in double-auction markets is not replicated in this sequential
setting.
This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. 相似文献
220.
Sales promotions are an important part of retail advertising strategy. Traditionally, research on sales promotions has generally assumed that the buyers are end consumers who do not engage in reselling, in large part due to high transaction costs. However, the recent Internet related technologies have dramatically lowered the cost of transferring goods between consumers, leading to relative ease of reselling activity amongst individual consumers. Little is known about the impact of this phenomenon on retailer's sales promotion strategy. In this research we investigate the reselling activity in online auctions for products that active deal seekers can obtain at deeply discounted prices from retailers. We further investigate the role of deal-forums in the resale process. Data is collected from an online deal-forum (http://www.fatwallet.com/) and eBay to test various reselling-related hypotheses. The results show that there is a significant abnormal increase in the number of newly posted auctions of a product after the deal information of this product is posted on deal-forum website. We also find that there is a significant price incentive for individuals to resell. The implications for sales promotion research and practice are discussed. 相似文献