Successfully selling accommodation packages at online auctions – The case of eBay Austria

In this era of e-commerce online auctions have emerged as a valuable distribution channel (36 and 52). Displaying low entry and exit barriers but also vast coverage rates, online auctions may effectively augment the distribution potential of hotel businesses. This paper identifies those factors that positively affect the final price level obtained in online auctions for hotel room vouchers. Based on data gathered at eBay comprising 53,406 auctions, linear structural equation modelling (SEM) was conducted to identify significant relationships between auction characteristics and the obtained final price for hotel room vouchers. By drawing on these results and through an example of the Austrian eBay platform, selling strategies for successfully listing accommodation packages at online auctions are proposed.     

Role of Information on Consumers’ Willingness‐to‐pay for Genetically‐modified Rice with Health Benefits: An Application to China

Despite their potential health benefits, the controversial nature surrounding the use of GM technology in biofortified crops remains a subject of discussion. This paper investigates the role of information on willingness‐to‐pay for folate‐biofortified rice in a Chinese folate‐deficient region. We conducted second price auctions with 252 women of childbearing age, split up into two target groups based on street (n = 132, non‐student sample) or school auctions (n = 120, student sample). Notwithstanding a general positive effect of folate‐related information (i.e. content, benefits and regional situation), evidence reveals that the non‐student sample is less concerned about GM technology. The results also provide insight into serial position effects in conflicting GM information. Whereas participants in the non‐student sample are more prone to a primacy bias when receiving both positive and negative information, an alarmist reaction is observed in the student sample. This study highlights the need for segmented, targeted communication strategies on biofortification.     

Preference Learning in Consecutive Experimental Auctions

This paper explores the origins of the strikingly high price premia paid for new food products in lab valuation exercises. Our experimental design distinguishes between two explanations of this phenomenon: novelty of the experimental experience versus the novelty of the good, i.e., preference learning—bids reflect a person's desire to learn how an unfamiliar good fits into their preference set. Subjects bid in four consecutive experimental auctions for three goods that vary in familiarity, candy bars, mangos, and irradiated meat. Our results suggest that preference learning is the main source of the high premia, and that novelty of the experimental experience does not in itself artificially inflate valuations.     

The effect of bid withdrawal in a multi-object auction

The Federal Communications Commission currently utilizes a simultaneous multi-round ascending bid auction to allocate Personal Communication Services licenses. In the auction, participants are allowed to withdraw standing bids at a penalty. The penalty is equal to the maximum of zero or the difference between the value of the withdrawn bid on a license and the highest bid after the withdrawal on that license. The withdrawal rule is designed to assist bidders wishing to assemble combinations of licenses who find themselves stranded with an assortment of licenses for which their bids sum to more than their value. This paper reports results of experiments that examine the effect of the withdrawal rule in environments in which losses can occur if packages of licenses must be assembled piecemeal. The experiments demonstrate that there is a tradeoff with using the rule: efficiency and revenue increase, but individual losses are larger. Furthermore, the increased efficiency does not outweigh the higher prices paid so that bidder surplus falls in the presence of the withdrawal rule. Received: 10 October 1997 / Accepted: 10 September 1998     

On the Magnet Effect of Price Limits

The ‘magnet’ or ‘gravitational’ effect hypothesis asserts that, when trading halts are rule‐based, investors concerned with a likely impediment to trade advance trades in time. This behaviour actually pushes prices further towards the limit. Empirical studies about the magnet effect are scarce, most likely because of the unavailability of data on rule‐based halts. In this paper, we use a large database from the Spanish Stock Exchange (SSE), which combines intraday stock specific price limits and short‐lived rule‐based call auctions to stabilise prices, to test this hypothesis. The SSE is particularly well suited to test the magnet effect hypothesis since trading halts are price‐triggered and, therefore, predictable to some extent. Still, the SSE microstructure presents two particularities: (i) a limit‐hit triggers an automatic switch to an alternative trading mechanism, a call auction, rather than a pure halt; (ii) the trading halt only lasts 5 minutes. We find that, even when prices are within a very short distance to the price limits, the probability of observing a limit‐hit is unexpectedly low. Additionally, prices either initiate reversion (non limit‐hit days) or slow down gradually (limit‐hit days) as they come near the intraday limits. Finally, the most aggressive traders progressively become more patient as prices approach the limits. Therefore, both the price patterns and the trading behaviour reported near the limits do not agree with the price limits acting as magnetic fields. Consequently, we conclude that the switching mechanism implemented in the SSE does not induce traders to advance their trading programs in time.     

Lead-farmer extension and smallholder valuation of new agricultural technologies in Tanzania

Encouraging the widespread adoption and use of new on-farm technologies is an important part of productivity-led strategies to promote agricultural transformation. While many interventions have been designed to promote adoption through extension and education, little is known about how these efforts influence farmer willingness-to-pay (WTP) for new technologies. We use a Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) mechanism to elicit farmer WTP for two improved seed varieties and a new seed treatment product, Apron Star, under two different lead-farmer extension treatments in Tanzania: (i) a demonstration plot showcasing the technologies within a village; and (ii) a demonstration plot coupled with distribution of trial packs enabling some farmers to test the technologies on their own land. In the BDM, farmers were presented with six products – the two bean varieties: without Apron Star, with Apron Star already applied, and with a sachet of Apron Star for the farmer to treat the seed him/herself. Our results suggest that neither extension treatment significantly affects WTP for these technologies. However, we find that farmers are willing to pay more for seed that is pre-treated with Apron Star than for seed bundled with a sachet of Apron Star for self-treatment.     

Polish experience from first-ever spectrum auction

The Polish 4G spectrum auction was a watershed event for the Polish telecommunications market. For the first time in history, the Office of Electronic Communications decided to award spectrum by using an auction process. Polish regulators implemented a simultaneous multiple-round ascending-bid auction, which was widely used worldwide for selling spectrum. The process leading to the auction and the auction itself was lengthy and eventful. Due to the wrong auction design, the auction dragged on indefinitely, causing a delay in spectrum distribution. The auction ended only as a result of the government's intervention, after 8 months (513 rounds) of bidding that raised revenue of over PLN 9 billion (over EUR 2 billion). This paper describes in detail the rules of the Polish 4G auction, analyses bidding behaviour and auction dynamics of the crucial phases of auctions, and presents the final outcomes. It also draws lessons that could help policy makers in Poland and other countries in auction design.     

Round‐Robin Tournaments with a Dominant Player

We analyze the subgame perfect equilibrium of the round‐robin tournament with one strong (dominant) and two weak players, and we compare this tournament and the one‐stage contest with respect to the players' expected payoffs, expected total effort, and their probabilities of winning. We find that if the contest designer's goal is to maximize the players' expected total effort, then – if the asymmetry between the players is relatively low – the one‐stage contest should be used. However, if the asymmetry is relatively high, then the round‐robin tournament should be used.     

User acceptance of complex electronic market mechanisms: Role of information feedback

This paper broadens the scope of evaluating the design of economic mechanisms that is traditionally done solely from an economic perspective. We introduce and demonstrate the application of acceptability to evaluate complex economic mechanisms. In particular, we apply our approach to the evaluation of continuous combinatorial auctions, which represent a complex, sophisticated market mechanism that has not been generally available in the online marketplace but has the potential to enhance the economic efficiency of trade for assets with interdependent values. Such auctions are being increasingly used in industry, e.g., to procure logistical services. Intuitively, acceptance and usage of a complex mechanism can be fostered by a design that provides information and tools that meet the users’ task demands. Based on prior research and an analysis of the auction tasks, we discuss practical and innovative information feedback schemes for reducing the cognitive burden of formulating bids in combinatorial auctions. Then, we use constructs from the technology acceptance model (TAM) – which have been consistently shown to be key determinants of technology acceptance in the extant literature – to compare the acceptability of the mechanism under three different information regimes. In addition, we borrow constructs from marketing theory to assess the potential growth in adoption of the mechanism. We compare user perceptions of the three alternative designs in a laboratory experiment with over 130 subjects. Our study constitutes a complementary and novel approach in evaluating the design of complex economic mechanisms. Results indicate a higher adoption and usage potential of the mechanism with advanced information feedback, supporting the potential of combinatorial auctions as a user-acceptable market mechanism with appropriate feedback.