Combining participatory crop trials and experimental auctions to estimate farmer preferences for improved common bean in Rwanda

Participatory crop improvement raises the prospects for developing seed varieties that meet the needs of subsistence farmers but may face challenges regarding preference elicitation, particularly in complicated policy environments. We integrate binding experimental auctions with participatory variety selection to elicit farmers’ preferences for improved common bean varieties in Rwanda. We find that auctions reveal farmer preferences more accurately than stated nonbinding rankings in this context and that participatory on-farm crop research is essential to understanding how farmers evaluate tradeoffs between multiple crop attributes. We also find that farmers highly value intercrop yield despite government policy that encourages farmers to monocrop.     

Bidding for Labor

We present a competing-auction theory of the labor market, where job candidates auction their labor services to employers. An equilibrium matching function emerges which has many of the features commonly assumed, including constant returns to scale in large economies. The auction mechanism also generates equilibrium wage dispersion among homogeneous workers and constrained-efficient entry of vacancies in large economies. In a dynamic version of the model, we generate implied numerical values for equilibrium unemployment and wage dispersion. The theory makes the novel prediction that wage dispersion is a decreasing function of the discount factor and labor market tightness. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: E24, J31, J41, J64, D44.     

A Bluff-Bidding Exercise

Consider an auction in which one potential buyer wishes to participate, but the other potential buyer would rather the bidding not start. However, once bidding starts, the reluctant firm participates (submits “bluff bids”) simply to make the eventual winner pay more. This incentive exists when the marginal effect of the winning bid is to increase a rival's profit. In 2004, AT&T Wireless placed itself for sale in an English auction. Some predicted Vodafone would make bluff bids (to make Cingular pay more. Students experience this sort of activity in the game that this article describes. Students also learn that bluff bidding affects profits of the firms involved and therefore has important implications for stock prices of participating firms.     

Unfair contests

Real-world contests are often “unfair” in the sense that outperforming all rivals may not be enough to be the winner, because some contestants are favored by the allocation rule, while others are handicapped. This paper analyzes an unfair, two-player discriminatory contest (all-pay auction) with private values. We characterize equilibrium strategies, provide closed form solutions, and illustrate additional strategic issues arising in such unfair contests.     

Efficiency and competition in the long run: The survival of the unfit

In a dynamic contest the current incumbent competes against a randomly assigned entrant in a private value all pay auction each period. We focus on equilibria where the beliefs about the incumbent's type and the employed strategies are stationary. We show that inefficient types survive, even if the entrants arrive very frequently, because the entrant plays more aggressively than the incumbent, allowing a low type entrant to win against a high type incumbent. In an example we show that if the incumbent is challenged more often, then the equilibrium type of the incumbent is higher on average. When the value of the prize is the same for all players (the case studied in the public choice literature), the equilibrium rent of the bidders is fully dissipated as the incumbent is challenged infinitely often. The technical contribution lies in showing the existence of stationary equilibrium in an incomplete information game.     

Information,branding, certification,and consumer willingness to pay for high-iron pearl millet: Evidence from experimental auctions in Maharashtra,India

In this paper we use hedonic testing methods adopted from food science literature and the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism adopted from economic valuation literature to estimate consumer demand for biofortified high-iron pearl millet (HIPM) in Maharashtra, India. Unlike biofortification with provitamin A, biofortification with minerals, such as iron and zinc, does not change the color or the appearance of the biofortified crop. Therefore, we test the impact of both nutrition information, and branding and certification, as well as the nature of the brand and of the certifying authority (state level versus international), on consumer demand for HIPM. We find that even in the absence of nutrition information, consumers assign a small but significant premium to the HIPM variety relative to the local variety. This is consistent with consumers’ more favorable rating of the sensory characteristics of the high-iron variety. Nutrition information on the health benefits of HIPM increases this premium substantially, and regression analysis reveals that consumers prefer international branding and international certification authority to their state-level counterparts.     

在线拍卖中的代理研究综述

在线拍卖站点的不断增加给在线竞买人提出了具大的挑战,竞买人需要从大量的拍卖站点中选择一个恰当的拍卖站点,以保证在满足他们偏好的前提下得到他们希望的物品。不同的拍卖站点采用的拍卖方式和竞价策略是不同的,因此,不同的拍卖站点其竞价代理的设计策略也不同。本文主要对目前在线拍卖代理研究进行综述。     

EQUILIBRIA EXISTENCE AND CHARACTERIZATION IN AUCTIONS: ACHIEVEMENTS AND OPEN QUESTIONS

Abstract Establishing existence and characterizing equilibria are both important achievements in the study of auctions. However, we recognize that equilibria existence results form the basis for well accepted characterizations. In this survey, we review the landmark results and highlight open questions regarding equilibria existence and characterizations in auctions. In addition, we review the standard assumptions underlying these results, and discuss the suitability of the Nash equilibrium solution concept. We focus our review on single‐object auctions, but also review results in multi‐unit, divisible, combinatorial and double auctions.     

The demand for agricultural land and strategic bidding in auctions

A unique feature of land auctions is that the same land is auctioned twice; first the land is broken into tracts and each tract is auctioned individually. Then, the tracts are reassembled and auctioned as a whole parcel. After the two auctions are completed, the seller chooses the one that generates a higher revenue. The main purpose of this paper is to provide an explanation of why such an auction design is employed to sell farmland. We also show that this feature of land auctions leads to interesting interaction among the bidding strategies of the players in each of the two auction stages.     

Asymptotic and small sample analysis of the stochastic properties and certainty equivalents of winning bids in independent private values auctions$\!$

Summary. This paper investigates the stochastic properties of the first price and second price winning bids in auctions with risk neutral bidders with independent and identically distributed valuations. In such an environment, the winning first price bids second order stochastically dominate the second price winning bids. A key result of this paper is that the ratio of the variance of the winning first price bid to that of the winning second price bid is strictly less than one even as the number of bidders goes to infinity. This suggests that the stochastic dominance of the winning first price bids does not vanish even in the limit. Both the asymptotic and small sample properties of winning bids are investigated. In particular, the small sample results suggest that the identification power of econometric procedures that rely on winning bids can decline rapidly as the number of bidders increases. This paper also includes a systematic evaluation of the difference in certainty equivalents between the two auction formats for several common distributions and number of bidders for the case of auctioneers with constant coefficient of absolute risk aversion. These results are presented in a form that makes it easy to apply them to a specific auction of interest.Received: 15 July 2002, Revised: 7 April 2003, JEL Classification Numbers: D44.I would like to thank David Pearce for helpful comments and discussion and a referee for suggestions that have greatly improved this paper.