Auction Reforms for Effective Official Development Assistance

Auctions, which are applicable to aid-related procurement systems, have been recently recognized as an important tool for improving economic efficiency. Using data on procurement auctions for Japanese official development assistance projects, the equilibrium bid function is estimated. The data reveals that a 1% increase in the number of bidders decreases the equilibrium bid by about 0.2%. This implies that strengthening competition at procurement auctions lowers contract prices and mitigates the heavy indebtedness of developing countries. Auctions are also instrumental in fostering local business environment and governance. For intensifying bidding competition, it is useful to introduce an electronic bidding system, encourage local firms to jointly bid, and relax excessive qualification requirements.     

Optimization in electronic markets: examples in combinatorial auctions

Combinatorial auctions provide an important tool for mechanism design in multi-agent systems. When implemented they require to solve combinatorial optimization problems such as set packing and partitioning problems. We present in this paper an analysis of the complexity of the problem to assign bids to bidders in combinatorial auctions. We show that the case of identical assets can be solved in polynomial time. The case of non-identical assets is in its general version NP-hard. Extra structure, like a complete ordering of assets, or mild side conditions make the problem solvable. Finally, we present an algorithm to solve small and medium sized instances in a limited time using standard software.     

Online Auction Fraud: Ethical Perspective

Internet fraud is an issue that increasingly concerns regulators, consumers, firms, and business ethics researchers. In this article, we examine one common form of internet fraud, the practice of shill bidding (when a seller in an auction enters a bid on his or her own item). The significant incidence of shill bidding on eBay (in spite of the fact that it is illegal just as it is in live auctions) exemplifies the current ineffectiveness of regulatory means as well as the lack of effective societal mechanisms to prevent online fraud. Further, the proliferation of shill bidding along with other types of internet fraud may have broader implications. If unethical behavior such as shill bidding becomes too widespread on the internet, regulators and other societal forces may deem it necessary to institute controls that will impact the entire online marketplace as well as the future development and regulation of business activities on the internet. Our results indicate that shill bidding is perpetrated on eBay significantly more often than 0.1% rate of fraud estimated by the firm. This suggests that regulators, users, and others stakeholders may become concerned enough to act. The impact of those responses on the internet of the future may affect a broad array of users beyond the unethical sellers on eBay. Alex Nikitkov is an Assistant Professor of Accounting at Brock University in St. Catharines, Ontario, Canada Darlene Bay is an Assistant Professor of Accounting at Brock University in St. Catharines, Ontario, Canada     

Auction Fever! How Time Pressure and Social Competition Affect Bidders’ Arousal and Bids in Retail Auctions

Auction sites on the Internet frequently put bidders under time pressure or highlight the social competition that is inherent to auctions. Both aspects are believed to elicit an exciting shopping experience, which may culminate in auction fever. In two laboratory experiments, we investigate the process of auction fever in retail auctions and demonstrate when and how auction fever affects bidding behavior. In contrast to previous studies, we employ physiological measurements as an objective and continuous assessment of bidders’ arousal in addition to a subjective assessment of bidders’ emotions through psychometric scales. Moreover, we explicitly study the interaction of time pressure and social competition on arousal and bids. We find that bidders’ arousal is increased in high time pressure auctions and that this leads to higher bids in ascending auctions—but only when bidders compete with human opponents. Thus, social competition is the actual driver underlying the auction fever phenomenon. Furthermore, we show that the “joy of winning” is significantly stronger than the “frustration of losing” in ascending auctions. Finally, we discuss the implications of our findings for the design of retail auctions.     

An overview of laboratory research on conservation auctions

This paper reviews the laboratory research on conservation auctions by first suggesting a framework for organizing the literature; then by highlighting the key insights and contributions achieved to date; and thirdly by taking stock of pending questions and unresolved problems. The review framework focuses on the performance of conservation auctions and distinguishes between causal factors and resulting effects. Causal factors include auction format, implementation rules and bidder characteristics, as well as some other aspects. Resulting effects distinguish between intermediate effects, mainly in terms of bidder behaviour, and final auction performance. Rather than a standard literature review, this ‘overview’ also tries to capture the work that is currently going on and that has not yet been published.     

Willingness-to-pay for natural,organic, and conventional foods: The effects of information and meaningful labels

Vague food labels and distorted product claims have persisted in the “natural” food industry, while organic claims can be certified by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). Using experimental methods and a sample of randomly selected subjects, we test food label and information treatment effects on subjects' willingness-to-pay (WTP) for organic, “natural,” and conventional foods. Random nth-price auctions are used to elicit WTP after subjects received one of five randomly assigned information treatments. We find large information effects, including asymmetric cross-market effects for natural and organic foods. Perhaps surprising is that organic premiums increase in response to subjects seeing the “natural” foods industry's perspective on its products. Demographics effects are also important. The results have practical implications for natural and organic food marketing and valuing products where there are vague claims about their attributes.     

A Network Bidder Behavior Model in Online Auctions: A Case of Fine Art Auctions

The marketing literature provides a solid understanding of auctions regarding final sales prices and many aspects of the processes that unfold to result in those outcomes. This research complements those perspectives by first presenting a new bidder behavior model that shows the role of emergent network ties among bidders on the auction outcome. Dyadic ties are identified as the bid and counter-bid patterns of interactions between bidders that unfold throughout the duration of an auction. These structures are modeled using network analyses, which enables: (1) a richer understanding of detailed auction processes, both within auctions and across auctions of multiple lots, (2) a mapping of the processes to the forecast of prices and the trajectory toward final sales prices, (3) the clear and early identification of key bidders who are influential to the bidding action and who impact final auction sales prices, and (4) the results clearly show that the network exchange patterns are significant and contribute to an understanding of auction processes and outcomes above and beyond simple economic predictors such as the number of bids or bidders or the bidders’ economic status. We conclude by providing some managerial implications for online auction houses and bidders.     

Extrapolating experimental-auction results using a stated choice survey

During the last decade, experimental auctions and stated choice(SC) surveys have been widely used to study food demand. Thesemethods have complementary strengths and weaknesses. Experimentalauctions are limited by the availability of products and theuse of locally recruited participants, whereas SC surveys lackreal economic incentives. We use an SC survey to extrapolatethe results of an experimental auction to hypothetical productswith non-existing attribute combinations and to a representativesample of Norwegian consumers. The method is illustrated usingNorwegian consumers' preferences for country-of-origin and hormonestatus for beef.     

Maximizing bidder surplus in simultaneous online art auctions via dynamic forecasting

This paper presents a novel intelligent bidding system, called SOABER (Simultaneous Online Auction BiddER), which monitors simultaneous online auctions of high-value fine art items. It supports decision-making by maximizing bidders’ surpluses and their chances of winning an auction. One key element of the system is a dynamic forecasting model, which incorporates information about the speed of an auction’s price movement, as well as the level of competition both within and across auctions. Other elements include a wallet estimator, which gauges the bidders’ willingness to pay, and a bid strategizer, which embeds the forecasting model into a fully automated decision system. We illustrate the performance of our intelligent bidding system on an authentic dataset of online art auctions for Indian contemporary art. We compare our system with several simpler ad-hoc approaches, and find it to be more effective in terms of both the extracted surplus and the resulting winning percentage.