供应链中上下游企业间讨价还价的博弈分析

运用鲁宾斯坦的讨价还价模型的思想,构造了供应链上下游企业间不完全信息轮流出价的讨价还价模型,求解模型并对所得结果进行分析,得出双方达成协议主要取决于双方的“谈判成本”及其关于对方价格的预期。     

Natural resources,technological progress,and economic modernization

The present inquiry focuses on the modernization perspectives of the commodity‐exporting countries through the lens of development economics. To this end, the study adopts the Kaldorian framework to address the modernization effects, epitomized in the absorption of surplus labor. To trace the process of economic modernization, the study augments Lewis’s dualistic economy model by the extractive sector. Three different scenarios for the management of resource revenues are scrutinized. An altruistic mode, which implies a pure redistribution of the revenues among the poor swaths of the population, protracts the process of economic modernization, requires a greater amount of capital stock, and harbors a greater risk of a poverty trap. This effect is less pronounced if the modern sector is more capital‐intensive. A productive mode, which elicits full reinvestment of the commodity revenues, in contrast, accelerates the pace of economic modernization. Further, predicated on the scrutiny of a more realistic scenario, a bargaining mode, the study derives the condition for a net positive (or negative) modernization effect. The study identifies technical progress alongside capital accumulation as a further important source of economic modernization.     

Profit sharing and strike activity in Cournot oligopoly

Within an incomplete-information framework, we develop a model of wage determination in a unionized Cournot oligopoly. The assumption of incomplete information allows the possibility of strikes or lockouts, which waste industry potential resources, at equilibrium. Facing such deadweight loss, the government or the social planner may decide to adopt a policy, such as a profit-sharing scheme. Under two different bargaining structures (firm level vs. industry level), we investigate the effects of adopting profit sharing on the wage outcome and the strike activity. If the base-wage bargaining takes place at the industry level, then the introduction of a profit-sharing scheme increases the strike activity. But if the base-wage bargaining takes place at the firm level and the number of firms in the industry is greater than two, then the introduction of a profit-sharing scheme reduces the strike activity.     

Constitutional coordination in unstable party systems: the Brazilian constitution of 1988

Constitutional assemblies are a common feature of many democratic transitions. However, the goal of coordinating constitutional choice would seem nearly impossible when assemblies are comprised of highly fragmented and volatile political parties. Building on Knight’s bargaining model, this article argues that the main challenge to coordination in unstable party systems is the procedural disequilibrium that results from incomplete information over breakdown payoffs. The likelihood of compromise in such circumstances is a function of the ideologies that frame constitutional choice and inform coalition-building. Thus, unstable party systems are not chaotic, although they may be deeply conflict-laden. These issues are illustrated empirically via the Brazilian Constitution of 1988, which demonstrates the possibilities for a stable constitutional order emerging from a fragmented and volatile party system.

Bargaining externalities in a privatization programme

In privatization programmes, the state commonly keeps a minority ownership stake in firms. We provide an explanation based on the externality that privatization of one firm has on the profitability of others. If this externality is negative, as with oligopolistic firms, the government can gain a strategic advantage in bargaining over the sale of one firm if it keeps an ownership share in another. We consider both the simultaneous and the sequential sale of firms. The results apply to the period in which privatization takes place, and are consistent with the delayed sale of minority ownership often observed in practice.     

Wage drift and minimum contractual wage: Theoretical interrelationship and empirical evidence for Italy

A two-stage wage setting process whose outcomes are identified in the wage drift, at the local level, and in the tariff wage, at the central level, is analyzed. The impact of insider and outsider factors in each stage of the bargaining process is investigated both theoretically and empirically for Italy. In the light of its extreme policy relevance, particular attention is devoted to the analysis of the interrelationships between the wage drift and the tariff wage. Panel data estimation carried out on a sample of 105 Italian three-digit industries and 41 contract groups, reveals that: (1) Insider factors (productivity, inventories and the insider workers power) are important determinants of the wage drift while outsider factors (aggregate wage and unemployment) have a prominent role in determining the tariff wage. (2) Wage drift and tariff wage are closely interrelated.     

Opacity in bargaining over public good provision

We consider ultimatum bargaining over the provision of a public good. Offer-maker and responder can delegate their decisions to agents whose actual decision rules are opaque. We show that the responder will benefit from strategic opacity, even with bilateral delegation. The incomplete information created by strategic opacity choices does not lead to inefficient negotiation failure in equilibrium. Inefficiencies arise from an inefficient provision level. While an agreement will always be reached, the public good provision will fall short of the socially desirable level. Compared with unilateral delegation, bilateral delegation is never worse from a welfare perspective.     

A bargaining perspective on strategic outsourcing and supply competition

This article considers the outsourcing choice of a downstream firm with its own upstream production resources or assets. The novelty of the approach is to consider the outsourced function as involving resources consistent with the resource‐based view of the firm. From a bargaining perspective, we characterize a downstream firm's decision whether to outsource to an independent or to an established upstream firm. In so doing, the downstream firm faces a trade‐off between lower input costs afforded by independent competition, and higher resource value associated with those who can consolidate upstream capabilities. We show that this trade‐off is resolved in favor of outsourcing to an established firm. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Classification of ownership patterns in Korean conglomerates

This study classifies the ownership structure of conglomerates considering the conglomerates' choices of pyramidal vs. horizontal structures and the magnitude of equity held by the controlling shareholders, namely the owner family. It proposes four patterns of ownership structure: (1) horizontal ownership with a high family stake, (2) horizontal ownership with a low family stake, (3) pyramidal ownership with a high family stake, and (4) pyramidal ownership with low family stake. Further, an attempt has been made to identify the series of economic variables contributing to the varying patterns of ownership structure in the 30 largest Korean conglomerates.