平台经济反垄断研究的热点演进与理论框架——基于文献计量方法的分析

平台经济是连接多个用户群体进行信息与资源交换的新型商业模式,近年来其垄断形势愈演愈烈,对现有监管模式和反垄断研究理论提出了新的挑战。文章利用Citespace V科学计量工具,对2003—2022年中国知网数据库中中文社会科学引文索引（CSSCI）来源期刊的平台经济反垄断研究进行知识图谱可视化研究,在探究该领域的研究热点演化路径的基础上,构建了平台经济反垄断的理论框架。研究发现,平台经济反垄断研究主题经历了从传统双边产业反垄断与反垄断法构建,到双边市场特征与相关市场界定问题,到算法、大数据引发的垄断治理困境,再到超级平台形成、“二选一”独占交易协议4个阶段的演变。总的来看,平台经济反垄断理论框架由垄断形成机理、垄断演进趋势和反垄断规制体系三个部分组成。平台经济的规模效应、网络效应和锁定效应三种特征诱致垄断发生,垄断竞争理论、双边市场理论和产业组织理论是这一问题的重要研究视角;在技术与规模驱动下,平台经济呈现“厂商垄断-平台垄断-场域垄断”的主体变迁和“价格垄断-算法垄断-数据垄断”的形式升级;对此,应当构建价格监管、算法规制与数据治理相结合的综合规制体系。     

独立董事与管理者事前与事后串谋防范问题研究

无论在理论上还是实践中,我国上市公司管理者和独立董事之间串谋行为都是一个不容忽视的问题。本文在国内外防范串谋理论成果的基础上,研究设计了同时防范管理者与独立董事之间的事前串谋与事后串谋的最优激励机制模型,给出了几种情形下主契约防范串谋的必要条件,并且对其应用提出了一些有益的建议,以促进我国独立董事制度的规范、有效运行。     

COMPETITIVENESS AND STABILITY OF COLLUSIVE BEHAVIOR

We investigate the relationship between the degree of competition and the stability of collusive behaviour, by introducing the element of relative performance in the objective functions of the firms. We show that an increase in the degree of competition destabilizes the collusion. This relation differs starkly in the standard symmetric Cournot and Bertrand duopoly models, with the former being more unstable than the latter.     

电力市场监管理论与实践的探讨

就市场成员市场力、串谋等问题分析了电力市场运营监管思路及其相关措施;在电力市场环境下。从电力系统安全运行导则、继电保护及安全控制原则、发电机组检修计划等方面分析了电力系统可靠性的监管思路及其相关措施;讨论了电力市场投机行为及其监管措施。     

Cooperative R&D and the Value of the Firm

In this paper, we investigate the stock price responses of listed firms in the U.S. markets to announcements of R & D collaborations. We find that abnormal returns of stocks are significantly positive after R & D collaborations are announced. The positive stock price response towards the R & D cooperation initiations can be partially explained by the nature of the collaborations and the characteristics of the participating firms. We also find that the stock prices of rival firms respond negatively to announcements of R & D cooperation. This result seems to support the hypothesis that cooperative R & D improves economic efficiency of the cooperative firms that gain competitive advantage. We do not find evidence supporting the hypothesis that R & D cooperation creates collusive, anticompetitive effects in the product market.     

The critical discount factor as a measure for cartel stability?

This paper considers the stability of tacit collusion in price setting duopolies with repeated interaction. The minimum discount factor above which tacit collusion can be sustained in a subgame perfect equilibrium is called the critical discount factor δ*. In addition, δ* is often used as an intuitive measure for the stability of a tacit cartel, assuming that a collusive equilibrium is more difficult to sustain when δ* increases. However, according to standard theory the distance δ − δ* between the actual and the critical discount factor does not matter for stability as long as δ > δ*. This paper contributes experimental evidence that supports the intuitive idea that a larger critical discount factor makes collusion a less likely outcome.      

Do Antitrust Laws Facilitate Collusion? Experimental Evidence on Costly Communication in Duopolies*

Bertrand supergames with non‐binding communication are used to study price formation and stability of collusive agreements on experimental duopoly markets. The experimental design consists of three treatments with different costs of communication: zero‐cost, low‐cost and high‐cost. Prices are found to be significantly higher when communication is costly. Moreover, costly communication decreases the number of messages, but more importantly, it enhances the stability of collusive agreements. McCutcheon (1997) presents an interesting application to antitrust policy by letting the cost of communication symbolize the presence of an antitrust law that prohibits firms from discussing prices. Although our experimental results do not support the mechanism of McCutcheon's (1997) argument, the findings point in the direction of her prediction that antitrust laws might work in the interest of firms.     

Product Location with Foresight

Traditional location literatureconcludes that firms will optimally differentiate inorder to alleviate a tendency toward competitivepricing. However, it has recently been shown thatfirms will minimally differentiate if they (correctly)anticipate an absence of price competition. Thispaper examines the relationship between productlocation and the sustainability of cooperativepricing, in horizontally and vertically differentiatedmarkets. Further, it describes equilibrium locationswhen firms are able to choose their locations jointlyand when they must choose independently.     

防范合谋与上市公司高管薪酬合理化测度研究

上市公司合谋问题一直是理论界研究的焦点和热点。借鉴基尼系数计算方法,构建了一个衡量我国上市公司高管薪酬合理化的计算公式,根据我国136家上市公司的实证数据,测算出我国分行业、分地区的上市公司高管的薪酬合理化系数。可以发现:我国上市公司高管的薪酬与其创造的收益对等程度总体较低,处于"较合理"与"较不合理"之间,但高管薪酬的合理化系数在逐年改善;房地产业高管薪酬的合理化系数最高,也较为合理,但其他一些行业如服务业其高管薪酬的合理化系数需要进一步改善。     

Cooperation and Competition in the Context of Organic and Mechanic Worldviews – A Theoretical and Case based Discussion

In this study we argue that there is an interconnection between; the mechanistic worldview and competition, and the organic worldview and cooperation. To illustrate our main thesis we introduce two cases; first, Max Havelaar, a paradigmatic case of how business might function in an economy based upon solidarity and sustainability. Second, TINE, a Norwegian grocery corporation engaged in collusion in order to force a small competitor out of the market. On the one hand, in order to encourage market behaviour that integrates economic, societal and environmental values we find that transparent cooperation within a context of an organic worldview takes care of important intrinsic as well as instrumental values. On the other hand, we find evidence for asserting that cooperation based upon a mechanistic worldview, typically leads to group egotistical consequences undermining the long term common good.