劳动保护中政府官员自利性官商勾结的解读

把劳动保护中官商勾结归结为政府整体本身基于发展观或者改善投资环境而采取的行为有可能被归咎于集体决策或者为了本地人民的福祉而免除处罚或者减轻处罚,其缺陷在于许多个人自利性的官商勾结也会隐藏在"发展观"或者"改善投资环境"的招牌下逃避处罚。文章通过对关系运作的阐述,可以构建自利性官商勾结的模型。分析表明影响政府官员个人性官商勾结的因素有:诚实工作的正常收益、行为被发现的概率、贴现因子、股份的多少,行为被发现以后的次优收益。结论认为只有提高违法成本,才能有效制止个人自利性官商勾结。     

含分布式电源的链式串供线路运行探讨

分布式电源接入地区电网以后给地区电网的运行和控制带来多方面的影响。本文探讨分布式电源的引入对链式串供线路继电保护和安全自动装置的影响及相应的对策,对保证地区电网的安全运行有一定的意义。     

Technology licensing and collusion

This paper considers the possibility of technology licensing via fixed-fee, royalty or two-part tariff and tacit collusion between firms that produce homogeneous goods under asymmetric cost structures and compete in quantities. In contrast to Lin (1996), all forms of licensing facilitate (obstruct) collusion, if the initial cost difference between the firms is relatively less (more). Technology will always be licensed, and the optimal form of licensing is either fixed-fee or royalty or two-part tariff, but collusion may or may not be possible post-licensing. Welfare decreases after licensing if the firms collude only after licensing but not collude under no-licensing.     

上市方式、股权制衡与合谋——基于中国民营上市公司面板数据的实证研究

股权制衡对公司绩效的影响是公司治理领域中的重要问题,而制衡能力是股权制衡效果实现的首要前提。文章建立在具备股权制衡能力的基础上,对不同类型的民营上市公司股权制衡、合谋与公司绩效之间的关系进行了分析。研究发现,在直接上市的民营公司中,第一大股东与其他大股东之间具有合谋的倾向;在间接上市的民营公司中,第一大股东与其他大股东之间倾向于相互监督,股权制衡与公司绩效之间呈倒U型关系。因此,建议针对不同类型的民营上市公司采取不同的政策措施。     

Is the “smoke-filled room” necessary? An experimental study of the effect of communication networks on collusion

We investigate how well firms can collude with partial communication in relation to full communication. We find that firms vary their communication strategies with network structures. In the networks that have either an isolated firm or full communication, more players send “pure promises” suggesting everyone select the collusive actions unconditionally. In the network with leadership, more players send a “promise and threat” which includes a reward for collusion and a punishment for deviating. Because of the inability to communicate in the network with the isolated firm and the high frequency of deviation and punishment in the network with leadership, the full communication network achieves significantly higher payoff than partial communication.     

Vox Populi,Vox Dei? Tacit collusion in politics

We study competition between political parties in repeated elections with probabilistic voting. This model entails multiple equilibria, and we focus on cases where political collusion occurs. When parties hold different opinions on some policy, they may take different policy positions that do not coincide with the median voter's preferred policy platform. In contrast, when parties have a mutual understanding on a particular policy, their policy positions may converge (on some dimension) but not to the median voter's preferred policy. That is to say, parties can tacitly collude with one another, despite political competition. Collusion may collapse, for instance, after the entry of a new political party. This model rationalizes patterns in survey data from Sweden, where politicians on different sides of the political spectrum take different positions on economic policy but similar positions on refugee intake—diverging from the average voter's position, but only until the entry of a populist party.     

共同机构所有权对企业金融化的影响：促进还是抑制

基于2003—2021年中国A股上市企业数据，实证检验了共同机构所有权对企业金融化的影响效应及作用机制。研究结果表明，共同机构所有权发挥了合谋同群效应，促进了企业金融化；机制检验发现，共同机构所有权通过加快金融化同步性、加剧代理问题来促进企业金融化，宏观经济政策不确定性和债权人监督削弱了共同机构所有权的合谋同群效应；进一步分析发现，共同机构所有权的合谋同群效应在同行业势力强、非国有企业的样本中更为显著，且在促进企业金融化的同时更倾向于对投机性短期金融资产的配置。研究不仅为共同机构所有权的合谋同群效应提供了新的证据，也为政府引导企业“脱虚向实”提供一定的理论参考。