分析师能发现审计合谋吗？--基于我国上市公司的经验证据

以异常审计收费作为审计合谋的代理变量,研究分析师是否能发现审计合谋行为。研究发现,分析师跟踪人数会随异常审计费用的增加而显著减少,这说明分析师能觉察到审计合谋可能带来的风险,并通过放弃跟踪该公司的方式向市场传递信息;进一步研究发现,分析师对上市时间较长的公司,以及民营上市公司的异常审计费用更为敏感,跟踪数量下降较为明显。     

商界小说的权力欲望叙事

近20年来,伴随着中国社会文化语境的逐步开放和现代性思潮的日益扩展,欲望叙事获得越来越多的表征空间。基于此,商界小说的权力欲望叙事一方面着力描摹"权力崇拜"世相,展现权力追逐的"夷平性"——就像金钱可以以低俗为标准"夷平"低俗和高贵一样;另一方面敏锐刻画权钱交易带来的人性扭曲与异化,在揭示"官商合谋"的权力腐败的同时,进一步挖掘滋生这种现象的文化土壤,警示真正规范有序的市场经济运行机制构建的艰巨性,凸显出较强的文化批判的力量。     

When imperfect collusion is profitable

This paper studies cartel stability under the assumption that member firms can choose intermediate degrees of collusion as well as the joint-profit-maximizing solution in determining the quota to be produced by each firm. After showing that firms can increase the number of participants by decreasing the degree of collusion, I prove that individual members' profits are maximized when firms choose a (possibly low) degree of collusion such that all firms in the industry want to take part in the cartel. More precisely, if the number of firms in the industry is four or less, then all of them want to take part in the cartel even if the maximum degree of collusion is chosen (i.e., the monopoly output is produced); if the number of firms is greater than four, firms will still create an industry-wide cartel but they will produce a higher quantity than the monopoly output.     

Non-cooperative Tacit Collusion,Complementary Bidding and Incumbency Premium

This article focuses on testing the intuitive idea of Folk Theorem in a repeated game, and the existence of complementary bidding and incumbency premium. Through careful analysis of bidding behaviors in the Dallas-Ft. Worth (DFW) school-milk industry, I find that cooperation based on rationality and repetition satisfies the conditions for a kind of Folk Theorem. The data also strongly suggest that all major milk processors are engaged in complementary bidding to allocate consumers geographically and command statistically significant incumbency premia in their incumbent districts. Even if the equilibrium outcomes are largely non-cooperative, some pieces of circumstantial evidence uncovered in this school-milk market study may be sufficiently convincing to enable dispensing with evidence of actual communication.     

Competition policy, collusion, and tacit collusion

In this paper, I pursue three goals. The first is to model collusion in a way that is distinct from noncooperative collusion. The second and third are to develop a particular specification of a standard model of noncooperative collusion that permits explicit solution for equilibrium outputs and reversion thresholds and to extend this analysis to allow for a deterrence-based competition policy that investigates conduct based on observed high prices (investigation thresholds).     

Optimal trade policy in the presence of changing market structure

This study examines the optimal use of tariff policy in response to a change in both the number and market behavior of domestic firms. The paper demonstrates that under certain demand conditions, optimal trade policy may require an increase in tariffs in response to an increase in consolidation or collusion among domestic firms.     

Multimarket competition and business strategy

Multimarket competition abounds in the real world. Globalization of competition (triad rivalry) and economic integration of communities (European integration) contribute to the intensification of multimarket competition. The fact that firms meet in many markets has implications for rivalry. This paper introduces five key elements of multimarket competition and illustrates their working and influence by applying game-theoretic reasoning. By way of illustration the case of the artificial sweetening industry is discussed.Professor H.W. de Jong and M. van Wegberg are gratefully acknowledged for their valuable comments. Of course, the usual disclaimer applies.     

垂直差异化与合谋稳定性关系分析

市场行为中的默契合谋能使企业获得超额利润,现存的关于生产同质品和差异化产品的经验性研究经常能发现默契合谋的证据.在现实经济的默契合谋行为中,不同的成本结构适用于不同的经济环境或者不同的行业、产业分析,也直接影响着合谋和背离合谋所得的利润,对合谋稳定性有着重要的影响.在垂直差异化的不同成本(固定成本、可变成本)结构下,企业参与竞争的不同竞争类型(古诺竞争和伯川德竞争)对合谋稳定性的影响也是有差异的.     

政府监管行为的制衡机制

政府监管行为是一种集准立法权、准司法权、执行权于一体的行政行为,因此监管机构享有广泛的权力。 如没有建立相应的制衡机制,就会导致政府监管权的滥用,如合谋、收买、寻租乃至监管权的争夺。管制分权可以作 为一种内部制衡;听证制度是一种过程制衡;司法审查则是一种外部制衡。     

考虑合谋和声誉的高能耗企业碳减排主体间博弈分析

在考虑企业和地方政府的声誉的基础上,分析了高能耗企业碳减排中各主体及其行为倾向,构建了中央政府与地方政府间、地方政府与高能耗企业间的博弈模型,并分析了两模型的混合策略均衡解。研究结果表明:提高中央政府的检查效率、降低检查成本、加大惩罚力度、提高声誉对地方政府和企业的影响、提高地方政府做假时需付出的伪装成本,可以有效制约地方政府和高能耗企业的欺骗及做假行为。最后,提出了提高高能耗企业减排积极性、避免企业与地方政府合谋行为发生的政策建议。