转型期中国国有商业银行规模不经济的政治经济学解释

本文尝试从政治经济学的角度来解释改革开放以来中国国有商业银行高市场集中度、低盈利能力以及高不良资产率并存的事实。文章证明：在政治家主导的经济中,选择垄断性大银行是最优的;当政治家与银行家之间存在利益交换的途径时,政治家与银行家实现合谋,交换的金额取决于双方的谈判能力与合谋获得的租金;进一步,官员政绩考核方式的改变以及金融市场的开放都能削弱这种合谋的力量,并提高社会效率。     

激励约束机制设计与上市公司合谋的灰关联度分析

上市公司合谋问题一直是证券监管部门和理论界关注的热点和难点,而良好的激励约束机制对于防范上市公司合谋具有显著的积极作用。通过对上市公司的实证分析发现,在影响上市公司合谋的诸因素中,独立董事比例是最重要的因素,而高管的激励水平对于上市公司合谋的影响最弱。为了有效地防范上市公司的合谋行为,我们应当加大独立董事的比例和对上市公司高管的约束力。     

Low-Wage Labor Markets and the Power of Suggestion

The paper argues that a non-binding minimum wage may serve as a focal point which facilities tacit collusion by low-wage employers, effectively pulling down wages of the lowest-paid workers. This can explain the puzzle as to why the minimum wage does not reduce employment, as predicted by the traditional economic theory. A simple game-theoretic argument explains when collusion emerges. The hypothesis is tested using the 1990–2002 CPS data on service occupation workers. The results suggest that during this period, on average 19.3%, and as much as 31% of service occupation workers, who earned minimum wage or less, could had been affected by collusive wage-setting.     

Price Behavior in a Dynamic Oligopsony: Washington Processing Potatoes

Punishment strategies are necessary to sustain a collusive oligopsony in a repeated game context when demand is uncertain and only market variables are observable. This paper proposes a test for tacit collusion among potato processors in Washington state using a dynamic regime-switching model estimated with a finite mixture method. The results support the existence of punishment and collusive regimes and show the welfare losses due to anti-competitive behavior on the part of processors to be significant. Processors' oligopsony power is enhanced by higher domestic production, imports, and existing stocks, but it is ameliorated by high capacity utilization rates and exports.     

政府掠夺、内部人合谋与公司治理——兼论中小投资者保护

通过建立一个综合考虑法律、股权结构、大股东监督、经理人激励和证券监管、政府掠夺在内的分析大股东和经理人合谋侵权的委托—代理模型,运用标准逆向归纳法分析不同法律环境保护下利益相关者之间的利益关系。结果显示,法律对中小投资者保护至关重要;在中等或弱法律保护下,应提高证券监管和执法效率;在强法律保护下,证券监管效率对公司价值没有影响,政府管制应该逐渐淡出证券市场。不管法律保护水平如何,都应该坚持改善政府治理水平,提高政府运行效率,减少对企业的掠夺,从而达到提高公司价值和保护中小投资者权益的目的。     

Cross ownership of wireline and wireless communications carriers: synergy or collusion?

This paper examines whether the ‘cross ownership’ of wireline and wireless communications carriers is socially beneficial or harmful, and therefore should be allowed or regulated. We analyze a generic model of cross ownership of the firms which produce different but inter-related services. We show that, first, if both of the wireline and wireless industries are monopolistic, cross ownership results in social gains when the two services are complements, and social losses when they are substitutes. Secondly, if the wireless industry is sufficiently competitive, there’s little or no welfare loss from cross ownership. Finally, we briefly address the effect of network externality on the welfare consequences of cross ownership.     

Networks,Law, and the Paradox of Cooperation

There is a tension between libertarians' optimism about private supply of public goods and skepticism of the viability of voluntary collusion (Cowen 1992, Cowen and Sutter 1999). Playing off this asymmetry, Cowen (1992) advances the novel argument that the free market in defense services favored by anarcho-capitalists is a network industry where collusion is especially feasible. The current article dissolves Cowen's asymmetry, showing that he fails to distinguish between self-enforcing and non-self-enforcing interaction. Case study evidence on network behavior before and after antitrust supports our analysis. Furthermore, libertarians' joint beliefs on public goods and collusion are, contrary to Cowen and Sutter (1999), theoretically defensible.     

战储物资采购定价过程中合谋问题的博弈分析

战储物资采购定价过程的容易发生在军方和供应商之间的合谋问题可分成两情况:一种是信息不对称情况下合谋问题;另一种是存在第三方监管下合谋问题。运用博弈理论对这两种情况进行了探讨,在此基础上,得出解决此类合谋问题的最佳策略。     

理货行业串谋现象博弈分析与防范研究

当前理货体制改革进展缓慢,举步维艰,究其原因主要是因为理货服务中存在着串谋,致使理货服务的根本性原则--公正性得不到贯彻.本文从博弈的角度出发,利用决策分析手段,建立简单的博弈模型,在模型上求解,并对解进行了讨论分析,给出了串谋发生的一些基本条件,在此基础上提出了防范串谋的措施.     

Tacit Collusion in a Spatial Model with Delivered Pricing

Received August 5, 1999; revised version received July 20, 2001