基于高铁竞争关系下民航的策略研究

全服务航空成立子品牌低成本型航空公司成为应对高铁竞争的有效策略之一。建立全服务航空、子公司低成本航空与高铁三者之间的竞争博弈模型,并通过数值分析研究不同策略下航空公司需求及收益情况,研究结果表明:全服务航空公司成立低成本航空有利于提高航空公司收益;航空公司之间采取合谋策略优于竞争策略。最后针对我国航空运输业的发展现状为民航部门及政府部门提出不同时期的发展建议。     

大股东-管理者合谋与监督效率——基于中国上市公司的经验证据

本文利用中国上市公司2003～2005年的面板数据对这一问题进行了检验。实证研究发现:上市公司管理者的机会主义行为与大股东的资金侵占行为显著相关,大股东对上市公司的资金侵占程度越高,上市公司管理者的机会主义行为越严重。这表明大股东与管理者的合谋行为会弱化大股东对公司管理者的监督效率。     

Cartel success and institutions. The Finnish Cotton Cartel, 1903–1939

This article uses institutional theory to interpret collusive behaviour in the pre-World War II cotton cartel in Finland. The findings do not support the optimistic view of the institutionalists about the efficiency of economic institutions in boosting cooperation. Only one (the conciliation mechanism) of the four institutions identified in the cotton cartel could check opportunism to a certain degree, although it too lacked effective enforcement characteristics. This article argues that, in cartels, the motivation to follow institutions is fundamentally different from other environments, particularly trade. Besides institutions, organisational solutions, such as a sales agency that removes individual firms' discretion over pricing decisions, are needed to enhance cartel stability.     

恶意串通型虚假诉讼的民事规制

恶意串通型虚假诉讼可以在主体、目的、手段、诉讼程序等方面进行解构,从而从不同角度把握恶意串通型虚假诉讼行为。而从认定与防范角度来讲,具体情形下实体证据的认定不可或缺。就行为规制而言,民事诉讼规则在诉讼的各个阶段的规制亦不可少,同时,诉讼监督及立法上完善对规制这一行为具有重要意义。     

Collusion Without Conspiracy: An Experimental Study of One-Sided Auctions

The study investigates collusion-nonfacilitating features of one-sided auctions. We report the results of oral nondescending bid auction experiments in which the strict bid improvement rule was absent, and compare them with the results of sealed bid auction experiments. In the sealed bid experiments the outcomes converged to the competitive equilibrium. In the oral auctions, collusive outcomes emerged and were sustained with bidders using bid matching strategies. We conclude that oral auctions provide opportunities for tacit coordination and collusion enforcement that do not exist under the sealed bid. Therefore, the strict bid improvement rule becomes critical for breaking collusion.     

激励约束机制设计与上市公司合谋的灰关联度分析

上市公司合谋问题一直是证券监管部门和理论界关注的热点和难点,而良好的激励约束机制对于防范上市公司合谋具有显著的积极作用。通过对上市公司的实证分析发现,在影响上市公司合谋的诸因素中,独立董事比例是最重要的因素,而高管的激励水平对于上市公司合谋的影响最弱。为了有效地防范上市公司的合谋行为,我们应当加大独立董事的比例和对上市公司高管的约束力。     

论我国房地产合谋下的价格形成机制

在现有的体制下,我国房地产业存在价格合谋现象,这是近几年我国房地产价格持续上涨的重要原因.本文从房地产市场垄断性入手,分析了房地产价格形成中利益主体的价值取向,剖析了房地产价格合谋的主要表现,在此基础上提出,要加大国家宏观调控力度, 抑制房地产价格过快上涨,必须从打破房地产价格合谋着手,并提出了相应的对策和建议.     

Collective Organizations versus Relative Performance Contracts: Inequality, Risk Sharing, and Moral Hazard

This paper studies collective economic organizations that share risk and mitigate moral hazard and compares them with relative performance contracts. Information-constrained optimal distributions of organizations and contracts are shown to be functions of the underlying primitives, in particular, the distribution of Pareto weights, and hence degree of inequality. Internal inequality of a potential, local group is a force for collective organization. That is, multi-agent organizations exist in order to extract wealth from some but not necessarily all members. The group organization is also shown to be information-constrained Pareto optimal at extremes of local wealth relative to an outsider. But the group organization is susceptible to both agents simultaneously deviating, colluding against the outsider, and this distortion makes an individualistic, relative performance contract an attractive alternative. More generally, organizations, contracts, and allocations are jointly determined. These implications could be distinguished in cross-sectional, time series data. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D70, D82.     

Splitting Leagues

Splitting leagues or tournaments is puzzling when agents are homogeneous and splitting leads to a negative competition effect. However, a principal can benefit from splitting under some circumstances. First, splitting can be used as a divide-and-rule strategy by the principal to create additional incentives when collusion among the agents is possible. Second, splitting leagues gives the principal the opportunity to introduce promotions and relegations between nested tournaments.