廉价交谈文献综述

廉价交谈指的是没有直接支付后果的言论，它与经济理论的协调问题密切相关。本文概述了廉价交谈在协调问题中的作用，它起作用的关键在于言论是否“自我信号显示”和“自我执行”；综述了相关实验研究的成果；梳理了廉价交谈在共谋理论中的作用，即对达成共谋协议与卡特尔的作用和影响；最后对廉价交谈与机制设计、默契共谋等的关系以及反垄断法实践等问题进行了简要评述。     

审计师选择权与审计合谋的治理

本文通过分析导致审计合谋的自发性和引致性动因，以及由于中国国情所导致审计合谋的特有动囚，指出改革现有审计委员会的必要性，并对于改制後的审计委员会产生机制及其运行机制提出建议，以此来确定审计师选择权的归属问题。     

On Antitrust Enforcement and the Deterrence of Collusive Behaviour

This paper examines an antitrust enforcement policy of using significant price changes in an industry as a sorting mechanism for the allocation of resources devoted to policing collusion. That is, in either responding to complaints or initiating investigations on their own, I examine the issue of whether an antitrust enforcement policy of inferring possible collusion from significant prices changes is effective in deterring collusion given that antitrust officials have no direct knowledge of the costs of individual firms. Using the imperfect information repeated game of Green and Porter (1984), I show that this investigation strategy if coupled with uniform costs being borne by firms, can reduce the expected profits from the collusive agreement: however, unless the punishment is large enough, it will be ineffective in reducing the frequency of collusion. More importantly, it can have the undesirable effect of reducing the output agreed to by firms, if firms choose quantities, or raise collusive prices if firms are choosing price. Moreover, if the enforcement policy is anticipated by firms, the punishment mechanism adopted to support collusion will be altered to offset the policy.     

电信产业默契合谋的存在性与稳定性分析

合谋是产业组织理论研究的重要问题之一,它易出现于寡头垄断行业中。合谋的出现会降低消费者剩余,对整个社会福利造成损失,因此应当尽量去除。电信产业是一个典型的寡头垄断产业,电信运营商之间具有很强的相互依赖性,易出现合谋,特别是默契合谋。所谓默契合谋是指寡头垄断厂商以一种纯粹“非合作”的方式进行的合作。本文首先应用古诺模型对电信产业默契合谋的存在性进行理论分析,并举出实例予以佐证。在此基础上,从理论上进一步证明了电信产业默契合谋具有不稳定性,指出运营商之间的合谋是一个“囚徒困境”。进而应用冷酷策略,研究了电信产业默契合谋维持的激励条件,并从成本对称性、市场信息透明度、产品差异性、卖方集中度和技术进步程度等方面分析了影响电信产业默契合谋的相关因素。并指出现实中,默契合谋和价格竞争往往是交替出现的。     

腐败问题研究的理论回顾及展望

关于腐败问题的研究是一个横跨政治学、经济学、法学等多个领域的、生动的研究主题。文章详细阐释了腐败的含义,从寻祖理论、委托代理理论、合谋理论、法经济理论、制度经济理论等五个方面回顾了关于腐败问题研究的重要理论视角,并在综述反腐败问题的文献基础上分析了腐败治理问题的思路。针对研究的现状,提出了可以作为研究视角的议题以及未来的研究方向,如社会声誉和腐败、分权和腐败、更多的经济治理方式选择、更多的实证和其他视角等。     

产品差别化、价格战与合谋

随着中国市场化改革的不断深入,价格战成为各行各业企业间不断上演的舞台剧。文章旨在从产品差别化与企业间合谋的相互关系出发,来分析企业频繁选择价格竞争而难以进行合谋的原因,即产品垂直差别水平的降低将使合谋难以维持,价格战容易爆发。因此,解决价格战的途径之一是中国企业应该加大自主创新的能力,提高产品垂直差别化程度。     

The Collusion-deterring Effect of Pre-attributed Supplies and the Hog Auction in Quebec

The hog/pork industry in Quebec has been going through major institutional changes since 1989, the year an electronic auction was put in place to market all of the hogs in the province. Because the auction's ability to generate high prices did not meet the expectations of hog producers, the pure auction system was replaced by a hybrid one in 1994. In this system, most of the hog supply was pre-attributed to processors at a negotiated price based on the US. price while the remainder of the provincial supply of hogs was sold through the auction. In this paper, we investigate how a seemingly inefficient marketing mechanism like pre-attributions can increase the efficiency of a usually efficient mechanism like an auction. We present theoretical arguments regarding the sustainability of collusion under the pure auction and hybrid systems in addition to analyzing auction prices with modern time series tools.     

Product market competition, R&D, and welfare

We compare the subgame perfect equilibrium emerging in four regimes of research and development (R&D) competition between duopolists: (i) full competition, (ii) coordination of research strategies, (iii) joint venture with cross licensing of patents, and (iv) full collusion in R&D and the product market. The outcome of the firms' interaction depends on the interplay of the degree of product market competition, the similarity of the research strategies, and the cost of R&D, relatively to market size. Our main result is that each of the four regimes can, for plausible parameter combinations, yield the highest level of welfare. Therefore it is problematic to draw general rules applicable to all proposed research joint ventures.     

R&D COOPERATION BETWEEN IMPATIENT RIVALS

We analyse R&D cooperation between product‐market competitors within a repeated‐game framework with imperfect monitoring. When firms are patient enough, R&D cooperation is attainable without product‐market collusion. However, if firms are less patient, we show that collusion in the product market is necessary to sustain R&D cooperation. Moreover, consumers can be better off when collusion is allowed in this case.     

大股东——管理者合谋影响因素的理论分析

公司大股东与管理者合谋程度主要受公司内部治理结构和公司外部治理环境两方面因素的影响。公司内部治理结构是适应于外部治理的一种内生性安排,外部治理环境是影响大股东与管理者合谋程度的因素。