从交易费用的角度看行政补偿程序

我国新的宪法修正案确定了财产征收或征用必须给予补偿的规定之后,对补偿程序不合理之处的修改愈显必需。行政补偿程序是双方当事人一个讨价还价的过程,降低在谈判协商过程中的交易费用,要求行政补偿程序设计者必须合理配置双方的权利与义务。     

Does Team-Based Compensation Give Rise to Problems When Agents Vary in Their Ability?

This paper reports the results of an experiment on how team heterogeneity in terms of productivity influences both the revenue sharing proposed by the principal to the team and the employees' performance. Experimental evidence shows that when the team is heterogeneous, the principal does not try to motivate the agents through her sharing offer. Regardless of the level of team-based compensation, a large amount of free riding occurs since each agent is mainly influenced by his teammate's behavior. In contrast, when the team is homogeneous, agents are better able to cooperate, reciprocating the principal's offer.     

退耕还林（草）生态补偿实施现状与问题分析——以甘肃省定西市安定区为例

为了建立合理的国家生态补偿机制，了解现阶段生态补偿中存在的问题，我们运用PRA（Participatory rule appraisal）即参与性农村评估和传统的问卷调查相结合的方法，通过对研究区内生态建设补偿措施实施过程中的现状研究、问题分析，发现本区在实施退耕还林（草）生态补偿中的主要问题是仍然没有有效解决生态补偿的三个基本问题：补偿主体、补偿强度、补偿资金来源。生态补偿处于初级阶段，没有形成制度化、法律化，有必要在政策、法律层面建立比较完善的生态补偿机制。     

东西部地区之间公益林生态补偿负担与分摊

由于东部和西部地区之间自然和社会经济条件的差别，在公益林生态补偿问题上将会存在严重的地区之间生态建设责任与利益不平衡．因此需要建立地区之间的财政支付方式来平衡这种不公平状况．以利于公益林生态补偿制度的建立和完善。     

城市房屋拆迁补偿制度的缺陷

以市场经济公平交易的原则为基点,系统分析了我国城市房屋拆迁补偿制度存在的包括补偿方式、补偿标准和相关的法规政策的缺陷及其根源,提出了解决问题的相应对策.     

论我国区际生态补偿制度之构建

区域之间通过固有的地域联系发生环境关系而产生区际问题,要解决区际问题,应当建立区际生态补偿制度,设立区际生态补偿基金,明确补偿主体、资金来源及其管理分配方式。区际生态补偿制度蕴涵了公平的法律理念和良好的制度价值。     

基于交换关系的薪酬解释

薪酬是雇佣双方进行交换的价值尺度。因此，从这种意义上讲，薪酬代表了雇佣双方基于雇佣合同的一种交换关系，这种交换关系可以从经济学、心理学、社会学、政治学等角度分别进行解释，薪酬交换关系的解释对企业建立薪酬制度有重要的现实指导意义。     

论我国土地征收补偿制度之完善

我国征地补偿标准以耕地常年产值为依据,以被征地农民的利益为代价来换取城市的发展建设,与当前我国的市场经济体制不相适应.发达国家的土地征收补偿制度为我国土地征收补偿制度的完善提供了宝贵借鉴.我国土地征收补偿制度可通过提高补偿标准、完善土地征收补偿方式、建立和完善失地农民社会保障制度等方式逐步完善.     

我国土地征用制度探讨

国家为了公共利益的需要,可以依法对土地实行征用,但是这种征用必须符合公共利益、给予公平补偿、满足正当程序的要求。完善我国土地征用制度应该在这三个方面着手。     

Investor efficiency in the face of takings

Governmental entities at all levels are empowered to acquire private property for the public's benefit, provided that just compensation is paid. The level of compensation typically viewed by courts as just is market value, but questions arise as to whether market value compensation motivates the private owner of land, potentially subject to a taking, to improve the property to a degree that is socially efficient. Earlier works have found market value to be a compensation level too high to promote efficiency. The present paper offers an analysis, based on a simple model of investor profit maximization, that provides a unified view of models presented in some important earlier works. In a special application of the general case, it is shown that market value can be too low a level of compensation to promote efficient behavior by the land owner.