Executive compensation: a calibration approach

Summary. We use a version of the Grossman and Hart principal-agent model with 10 actions and 10 states to produce quantitative predictions for executive compensation. Performance incentives derived from the model are compared with the performance incentives of 350 firms chosen from a survey by Michael Jensen and Kevin Murphy. The results suggest both that the model does a reasonable job of explaining the data and that actual incentives are close to the optimal incentives predicted by theory. Received: August 12, 1997; revised version: October 27, 1997     

The timeliness of performance information in determining executive compensation

We study whether boards of directors concentrate on performance near compensation decision times rather than providing consistent incentives for chief executive officers (CEO) throughout the fiscal year. We show empirically that managers can profit by moving sales revenue among fiscal quarters. Though this may suggest that boards use short-term trends when determining rewards, we find evidence consistent with boards tying pay to recent sales growth so as to use the best information about future performance. We also find that the timing of profits throughout the year does not affect CEO pay, which may suggest that smoothing firm income is important to CEOs.     

When does incentive compensation motivate managerial behaviors? An experimental investigation of the fit between incentive compensation,executive core self-evaluation,and firm performance

We develop and test an integrative model that examines the fit between compensation schemes, executives' characteristics, and situational factors. We propose that a fit among all three factors is crucial to motivate desirable managerial behaviors. Using a specially designed management simulation, our study demonstrates that the effectiveness of incentive compensation to motivate managerial behaviors depends on executives' core self-evaluation and firm performance. Our results show that, relative to fixed salary compensation, executives with higher core self-evaluation respond to incentive compensation with greater perseverance, competitive strategy focus, ethical behavior, and strategic risk taking during organizational decline. However, these interaction effects are not present during organizational growth. Our theory and empirical evidence provide significant insights into the complex relationships among compensation schemes, executives' characteristics, firm performance, and managerial behaviors. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Dynamic incentives and retirement

This paper examines multi-period compensation contracts when retirement is anticipated. Short-term contracts in long-term employment relationships are equivalent to a long-term renegotiation-proof contract. The dynamic of incentive rates is determined by (i) how and in which periods managerial effort affects the contractible performance measures; and by (ii) the time-series correlation of error terms in performance reports. The model explains why long-term investments can decrease while incentive rates increase as managers approach retirement. Earnings persistence is negatively associated to earnings-based incentive rates but, towards retirement, high earnings persistence implies increasing earnings-based incentive rates.     

Contestability and Pay Differential in the Executive Suites

In comparison to the abundant evidence on CEOs' compensations, little is known about the compensation of other senior executives, and on how the pay differential between CEO and other senior executives affects firm performance. We examine several potential explanations of the pay differential in the executive suite, using a sample of 367 Israeli firms listed on the Tel-Aviv Stock Exchange. The empirical results fail to support the tournament and pay equity models. Instead, our evidence suggests a model where senior executives are encouraged (by the structure implied in their pay contract) to cooperate with each other (the team playing model). In a subset of firms managed by their owners we observe greater pay differentials between the owner-CEO and other senior executives. Interestingly, only in this subset of owner-managed firms, higher pay differentials can be associated with better firm performance.     

论我国城市房屋拆迁补偿制度的完善

当前我国城市房屋拆迁补偿中存在着诸公共利益与商业利益的严重错位、补偿方式、范围与标准不合理以及补偿程序不健全等问题.对此,必须正确界定"公共利益"范围、实现补偿方式、范围与标准的合理化、明确政府的角色与定位和加强司法救济,以进一步完善我国城市房屋拆迁补偿制度.     

最佳投融资决策的经济学分析

企业的投资决策和融资决策是企业经济活动中一对互动的经营链,是围绕企业价值来实现的。企业的投融资决策受到各利益主体(经营者、股东、债权人)行为的牵制和制衡。因此本文结合实际情形,分别对基于企业价值最大化和管理薪酬机制下的投融资决策问题进行分析,在一定程度上说明最佳的投融资决策是企业各行为主体利益权衡的结果。     

论激励性薪酬的选择性运用

激励性薪酬是任何组织都必须关注的内容，对其进行恰当的选择会让组织产生意想不到的惊喜。文章探讨了时组织的激励性薪酬该如何选择运用的问题。     

要素计点法在应用中存在的问题与解决方法研究——以青岛海洋电器公司为例

要素计点法作为一种实现薪酬内部公平性的主要工具在企业薪酬管理中得到了广泛的应用,但许多企业在使用该方法时存在着许多的误区与迷惑,使该方法的作用大打折扣.文章以青岛海洋电器公司在使用要素计点法的过程中如何实现薪酬的内部公平性为例,探讨了企业在应用这种方法的过程中所存在的问题以及青岛海洋电器公司的解决方法.     

中国农业保险的赔付风险:风险测度与应对策略——基于1984~2012年农业保险与财产保险赔付率的滤波分解与比较

由于农业保险所承保的农业自然灾害具有统计学上的不可预测性,灾害学上的时空延展性和经济学上的不可控性,使得经营农业保险的保险公司面临较高赔付风险. 为测算我国农业保险的赔付风险度,收集整理1984~2012年农业保险与财产保险赔付率数据,采用H-P滤波分解法对其进行长期趋势与短期波动的分解和比较分析. 研究发现:我国农业保险整体赔付水平和赔付的波动幅度远高于财产保险,验证了农业保险具有高风险经营的特性. 但是近年来,农业保险长期赔付趋势呈现平稳略微下降态势,短期波动幅度逐步收敛. 未来随着经营主体的增加,农业保险经营中须把握保险保障度的提升与保险公司经营风险管控的有效平衡;农业保险的适当盈利性与福利改进的有效融合.