近五年来国内学衡派研究综述

近五年来,国内关于学衡派的研究取得了较大的成绩。其研究特点主要体现在:学术创新意识、人文关怀意识与历史反思意识不断增强,学术视角日趋多元化;专题研究日趋深化、细化。学者们以"同情和理解"的态度来研究学衡派,以参与历史和重建历史的方法,在研究上取得了一些重要成果。     

Monetary Policy with Uncertain Parameters

This paper shows that—in contrast to the received wisdom—uncertainty about the parameters in a dynamic macroeconomic model may lead to more aggressive monetary policy. In particular, when there is uncertainty about the persistence of inflation, it may be optimal for the central bank to respond to shocks more aggressively in order to reduce uncertainty about the future development of inflation. Uncertainty about other parameters, on the other hand, dampens the policy response.
JEL classification : E 43; E 52     

Earnings Conservatism, Litigation and Contracting: The Case of Cross‐Listed Firms

Abstract:   We compare earnings conservatism of UK companies cross‐listed in the US to that of UK companies without a US‐listing. We expect that conservatism will be more pronounced for cross‐listed firms than for firms with a UK listing only, because the cross‐listed firms face a stricter enforcement regime. Furthermore, cross‐listed firms may use a listing on a US exchange to signal high‐quality reporting to investors. Using a matched‐pairs research design, we find that earnings of UK cross‐listed firms are significantly more conservative than earnings of UK firms without a US listing. Moreover, cross listed firms display particularly high levels of conservatism during the early years of their cross‐listing. This indicates that firms use earnings conservatism to commit to highly demanding reporting requirements and in doing so communicate a perception of investor care.     

Value or Glamour? An empirical investigation of the effect of celebrity CEOs on financial reporting practices and firm performance

In this study, I investigate the impact of managerial reputation, as proxied by high‐profile awards to CEOs, on financial reporting practices and firm performance. Using a sample of 269 awards given to 189 celebrity CEOs (CEOs who win awards) from 1987 to 2003, I compare within‐firm changes in financial reporting practices and firm performance before and after each CEO wins their first award. I find that celebrity CEOs engage in more conservative accounting practices and are less likely to engage in opportunistic earnings management to meet short‐term earnings benchmarks. In addition, firm performance improves after celebrity CEOs win awards.     

Does accounting conservatism pay?

We investigate whether or not there is a link between conservative accounting practices and the sensitivity of executive pay to accounting performance. Using several accrual‐based measures of accounting conservatism as well as alternative measures of accounting performance, we estimate an econometric model of CEO compensation that incorporates the interaction of accounting conservatism and accounting performance. Consistent with optimal contracting theory, we find that the sensitivity of executive pay to accounting performance is higher for firms that report conservative accounting earnings. These results support the hypothesis that accounting conservatism, by limiting earnings management opportunities and improving the reliability of accounting performance measures, allows firms to formulate contracts that tie executive compensation more closely to accounting performance.     

Conservatism in residual income models: theory and supporting evidence

In this paper, we develop a framework for evaluating the impact of conservative accounting on the structure of residual income models of equity valuation. We explore specific examples of both unconditional and conditional conservatism and observe a common mathematical structure. We proceed to generalise our model and identify the joint dependency of conservatism and the persistence of abnormal earnings on the weights attached to book values, earnings and dividends. We are able to show theoretically the likely numerical impact of conservatism on price-earnings ratios and under-valuations produced by residual income models. We investigate empirically the interaction between conservatism and persistence and find they accord well with the theory developed. We briefly discuss the implications of testing the effect of conservatism on valuation and linear information dynamics.     

内部控制、会计稳健性与融资约束

本文以2005--2012年沪深A股上市公司为研究对象,基于现金一现金流敏感性视角探讨了内部控制与会计稳健性对企业融资约束的影响效应。研究发现：会计稳健性水平的提高有助于缓解企业的融资约束,内部控制水平的提高也有助于缓解融资约束。进一步研究发现：随着会计稳健性水平的提高,内部控制的有效性对降低融资约束的作用在下降;随着内部控制水平的提高,会计稳健性缓解融资约束的效应在减弱,即内部控制与会计稳健性在缓解融资约束方面存在一定的替代效应。     

Asset specificity and conditional accounting conservatism

Asset specificity, the redeployability of an asset to alternative uses, is a key determinant of an asset's resale value. Asset specificity has a direct impact on a firm's ongoing fair value determination, bankruptcy risk, liquidation value, and abandonment option. We document a significant negative association between asset specificity and conditional conservatism. Further tests reveal that this inverse relation manifests as bad news being less quickly incorporated in earnings as asset specificity increases. We find no difference in the extent to which good news is delayed in earnings for firms conditional on asset specificity. In addition, the documented association is stronger when asset specificity arises from lower within‐industry acquisition activity. The association is also more pronounced for firms that are in less competitive industries, have institutional investors, have limited access to the public debt market, and/or have more unsecured debt. Our findings are noteworthy for regulators and researchers given the recent interest in the determinants of conservatism.     

Accounting Discretion and Managerial Conservatism: An Intertemporal Analysis*

Accounting discretion and the principle of conservatism are two salient features embedded in financial reporting systems. Arguably, the practice of conservative accounting choices can never be well understood without incorporating their effect on future periods (the intertemporal effect). This paper provides one explanation for managerial conservatism in a two‐period agency model with hidden information (a binary project type) and hidden actions (the agent's efforts). A piece‐wise linear incentive scheme with accounting earnings as the performance measure is employed. The agent's discretion is the choice of a depreciation method. Discretion is valuable if and only if the agent's marginal productivity of a “bad” project is greater than that of a “good” project, but not to an extreme degree. A conservative depreciation method decreases current compensation in exchange for a “bet” on future compensation and, hence, serves as a commitment device for the agent to signal that the prospect is indeed good. The accounting mechanism replicates the performance of the optimal direct mechanism.     

European Momentum Strategies,Information Diffusion,and Investor Conservatism

In this paper we conduct an out‐of‐sample test of two behavioural theories that have been proposed to explain momentum in stock returns. We test the gradual‐information‐diffusion model of Hong and Stein (1999) and the investor conservatism bias model of Barberis et al. (1998) in a sample of 13 European stock markets during the period 1988 to 2001. These two models predict that momentum comes from the (i) gradual dissemination of firm‐specific information and (ii) investors’ failure to update their beliefs sufficiently when they observe new public information. The findings of this study are consistent with the predictions of the behavioural models of Hong and Stein's (1999) and Barberis et al. (1998) . The evidence shows that momentum is the result of the gradual diffusion of private information and investors’ psychological conservatism reflected on the systematic errors they make in forming earnings expectations by not updating them adequately relative to their prior beliefs and by undervaluing the statistical weight of new information.