Action Research is Similar to Design Science

In management information systems (MIS) action research is long considered as promising but low-level research approach. It has an utmost relevance because action researchers are working with practitioners to solve the important practical problem. Design science outlined some years ago is just winning a wider audience. Action research was traditionally classified into qualitative research methods. But it seems to be the “wrong” home of action research. We shall show that after comparison of the seven aspects: concrete results of the study, knowledge produced, activities, the intent and the nature of a study, the division of labor in a study and generation, use and test of knowledge, the concordance between the characteristics of action research on the one hand and of design science on the other hand is very good. Hence, action research and design science should next be considered as similar research approaches, and this is a turning point in the history of both action research and design science.     

西方公司治理模式的比较及其在我国的选择

文章首先从公司治理的理论渊源及其内涵入手,进而论述了西方发达国家两种不同的公司治理模式并对其进行了比较,在此基础上,笔者结合我国的具体国情,借鉴西方公司治理的经验,认为我国公司治理模式的最佳选择是利益相关者模式。     

美英德日银行公司治理比较

本文通过对美英德日银行公司治理的比较，发现治理的目标的一致性，即通过发挥管理和监督功能，来实现公司价值的最大化或股东价值的最大化。但由于法律制度、资本市场、政治体制的差异，各国银行公司治理结构模式又不尽相同。本文试图在进行比较研究的基础上，为我国银行改善公司治理提供启示和借鉴。     

Property rights protection and access to bank loans

Poor protection of private property has limited the access to bank loans by private enterprises in developing and transition economies. Under those circumstances, private entrepreneurs have resorted to various ways of enhancing the de facto protection of private property. Using a dataset of 3,073 private enterprises in China, this paper empirically investigates the impact of political participation and philanthropic activities – informal substitutes for the lack of formal protection of private property – on the access to bank loans.     

Wealth inequality and collective action

We study the effect of inequality in the distribution of endowments of private inputs (e.g., land, wealth) that are complementary in production with collective inputs (e.g., contribution to public goods such as irrigation and extraction from common-property resources) on efficiency in a class of collective action problems. We focus on characterizing the joint surplus maximizing level of inequality, making due distinction between contributors and non-contributors, in a framework that allows us to consider a wide variety of collective action problems ranging from pure public goods to impure public goods to commons. We show that while efficiency increases with greater equality within the groups of contributors and non-contributors, so long the externalities (positive or negative) are significant, there is an optimal degree of inequality between these groups.     

Capital Mobility, Agglomeration and Corporate Tax Rates: Is the Race to the Bottom for Real?

Based on a data set for 19 OECD countries for the period 1981–2001,we estimate the impact of FDI on corporate tax rates, wherechanges in FDI are a measure for changes in capital mobility.So far the literature has been concerned with the related butrather different question as to the sensitivity of FDI to taxrates. Our article takes an opposite perspective and asks whatthe impact of capital mobility is on corporate tax rates. Indoing so, we explicitly take the role of agglomeration intoaccount. In theory, core countries can afford a higher tax ratecompared to peripheral countries. In our estimation strategy,we instrument capital mobility to deal with reverse causality.The main conclusion is that increased international capitalmobility, measured by FDI flows, implies a lower corporate taxrate. But we also find that agglomeration matters: core countrieshave a higher corporate tax rate than peripheral countries.If there is a race to the bottom, it seems that it is more realfor some countries than others. (JEL code: H25)     

The Legislator as Political Entrepreneur: Investment in Political Capital

This paper applies the standard Austrian theory of capital investment to the standard interest group model of legislator behavior. Distinguishing between reputational capital and representative capital as interdependent forms of political capital, I argue that legislator behavior (specifically roll call voting) can be explained as entrepreneurial investment in political capital under uncertainty. I discuss several examples in which this approach can potentially add predictive power regarding legislative voting.     

All in the family or public? Law and appropriative costs as determinants of ownership structure

We examine how the legal protection of outside shareholders and the appropriative costs that they induce influence the incentives for private firms to go public. A higher degree of protection of shareholders can increase the appropriative costs associated with the conflict between managers and shareholders. To counteract this effect the managers/owners increase the share of the firm they retain so that, overall, higher protection of outsiders increases the likelihood of going public. In addition, we examine how the share of funds raised used to finance the firm affects both appropriative costs and the decision to sell.For helpful comments we thank participants at the conference on Corporate Governance at UC Irvine (February 2002), seminar participants at the Athens University of Economics and Business, and worskshop participants on the New Organization of Labour at the 2002 CESifo summer Institute in Venice. Skaperdas gratefully acknowledges support from a grant for Research and Writing from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation.     

论法律制度对公司治理的影响

文章认为良好的公司治理是现代市场经济和金融市场健康运作的微观基础,研究治理具有重要意义,由于公司治理是公司自治和法律规制的统一,法律有介入公司治理的必要,鉴于公司治理的法律环境包括外部和内部法律环境,文章针对我国目前公司治理法律环境的现状提出了完善对策。     

Does support from government help firms survive? Evidence on financial and political assistance in China, 1998–2007

ABSTRACT

Using the National Bureau of Statistics data set over the period 1998–2007, this article examines the dual roles of financial assistance and strong political links on firm survival in China by applying a semi-parametric duration model. We find that generally either financial assistance or strong political links had a positive effect on the likelihood of firm survival. Furthermore, if firms received both types of support from government, their survival rate was around two times as high compared to only receiving a single support. The likelihood of survival depended on the amount of assistance a firm received. We also find firm ownership impacts on its survival pattern. Lastly, China joining the World Trade Organisation (WTO) coincided with (cet. par.) higher firm failure, especially with regard to state-owned firms; however, this period also saw the authorities targeting political and financial help on the ‘better’ firms (especially SOEs) with characteristics likely to increase their chance of survival.