企业在同质产品市场的差异化战略行为——一个对我国反垄断立法的产业组织理论解释

我国在加入WTO后,一些重要的服务领域面临着全面对外开放。由于转换成本的存在,使得该领域中本来在购买前功能相近的同质商品或服务,在购买后成为异质的商品。企业因而拥有相对于消费者的事后垄断的权力。为此,企业有动机在初期采取战略行为吸引消费者。这既缓和了后续阶段的企业间竞争,也在整体上将该行业的产品价格维持较高水平。它可能会降低社会效率和消费者福利。文章通过分析企业间在同质商品市场竞争的市场效果和福利后果,为在我国该领域反垄断立法提供了理论解释。     

Incentive Regulation of Prices When Costs are Sunk

We present a model featuring irreversible investment, economies of scale, uncertain future demand and capital prices, and a regulator who sets the firm’s output price according to the cost structure of a hypothetical replacement firm. We show that a replacement firm has a fundamental cost advantage over the regulated firm: it can better exploit the economies of scale because it has not had to confront the historical uncertainties faced by the regulated firm. We show that setting prices so low that a replacement firm is just willing to participate is insufficient to allow the regulated firm to expect to break even whenever it has to invest. Thus, unless the regulator is willing to incur costly monitoring to ensure the firm invests, revenue must be allowed in excess of that required for a replacement firm to participate. This contrasts with much of the existing literature, which argues that the market value of a regulated firm should equal the cost of replacing its existing assets. We also obtain a closed-form solution for the regulated firm’s output price when this price is set at discrete intervals. In contrast to rate of return regulation, we find that resetting the regulated price more frequently can increase the risk faced by the firm’s owners, and that this is reflected in a higher output price and a higher weighted-average cost of capital.     

论企业物流成本管理

进入21世纪后,企业通过在生产领域降低成本获得竞争优势的空间已非常狭小,无疑,物流管理成为当前企业最重要的竞争领域。文中通过对企业物流成本现状进行分析,提出加强物流成本管理、降低流通费用、建立科学的物流成本核算体系的方法,从企业综合管理角度和物流方向各环节进行物流成本管理和控制,以获取市场竞争优势。     

All in the family or public? Law and appropriative costs as determinants of ownership structure

We examine how the legal protection of outside shareholders and the appropriative costs that they induce influence the incentives for private firms to go public. A higher degree of protection of shareholders can increase the appropriative costs associated with the conflict between managers and shareholders. To counteract this effect the managers/owners increase the share of the firm they retain so that, overall, higher protection of outsiders increases the likelihood of going public. In addition, we examine how the share of funds raised used to finance the firm affects both appropriative costs and the decision to sell.For helpful comments we thank participants at the conference on Corporate Governance at UC Irvine (February 2002), seminar participants at the Athens University of Economics and Business, and worskshop participants on the New Organization of Labour at the 2002 CESifo summer Institute in Venice. Skaperdas gratefully acknowledges support from a grant for Research and Writing from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation.     

The economic costs of biological predation

This paper developes a bioeconomic model to analyse the economic losses from the reduced harvesting of prey species resulting from an increase in the stock of a natural predator. Examples of large mammals creating economic damage are whales and African elephants. The economic losses depend critically on the actual management of the prey stock, although the three measures we develop are equal when the stock is managed so as to maximize the sustained economic rent from the prey species. Predation losses are illustrated by the case of the Northeastern Atlantic Minke whale, where the estimate of the average predation cost per whale in 1991–1992 is between $US 1780 and $US 2370, using Norwegian cost and earnings data. A ten percent stock increase is estimated to cause a loss of almost $US 19 million to the fishers of the prey species. If half of this cost were assigned to Norway it would be equivalent to 2.8 and 6.7 percent of the gross profits of the Norwegian cod and herring fisheries, respectively.     

The damage costs of climate change toward more comprehensive calculations

It is argued that estimating the damage costs of a certain benchmark climate change is not sufficient. What is needed are cost functions and confidence intervals. Although these are contained in the integrated models and their technical manuals, this paper brings them into the open in order to stimulate discussion. After briefly reviewing the benchmark climate change damage costs, region-specific cost functions are presented which distinguish tangible from intangible losses and the losses due to a changing climate from those due to a changed climate. Furthermore, cost functions are assumed to be quadratic, as an approximation of the unknown but presumably convex functions. Results from the damage module of the integrated climate economy modelFUND are presented. Next, uncertainties are incorporated and expected damages are calculated. It is shown that because of convex loss functions and right-skewed uncertainties, the risk premium is substantial, calling for more action than analysis based on best-guess estimates. The final section explores some needs for further scientific research.     

Searching for the sunk cost fallacy

We seek to isolate in the laboratory factors that encourage and discourage the sunk cost fallacy. Subjects play a computer game in which they decide whether to keep digging for treasure on an island or to sink a cost (which will turn out to be either high or low) to move to another island. The research hypothesis is that subjects will stay longer on islands that were more costly to find. Eleven treatment variables are considered, e.g. alternative visual displays, whether the treasure value of an island is shown on arrival or discovered by trial and error, and alternative parameters for sunk costs. The data reveal a surprisingly small sunk cost effect that is generally insensitive to the proposed psychological drivers. Electronic Supplementary Material Supplementary material is available in the online version of this article at . Jel Classification C91, D11     

Collaboration, peer review and open source software

Open source software development may be superior to proprietary development because the open source organizational form naturally minimizes transactions costs associated with privately distributed information. This manifests itself in the ability of open source communities to encourage critical peer review and the sharing of ideas. When these activities are important, the open source organizational form may do better than a proprietary organizational form. My results suggest why open source is particularly powerful when maintainability of software is critical, and also suggest that the founder of a software project may be more likely to choose open source if there is an existing dominant proprietary software project.     

Multinational firms, international trade and international telecommunications

The study analyses the determinants of international telephone, telex, telegram and leased lines communication between the United States and 46 countries. It focusses on the role of multinational firms, international trading firms and new information technologies within the framework of the theory of transaction costs.Results of the econometric estimates suggest that: (a) technological conditions of telecommunication infrastructure, i.e., international diffusion lags of new information technologies, play an important role in the explanation of international telephone and telex telecommunication flows but not in the demand for telegraph and leased lines, (b) multinational firms use international telecommunication to reduce the coordination costs and are strong customers of leased lines and telephones, but less so of telex and telegrams, (c) international trading firms exhibit less clear preferences in the use of the different media to reduce transaction costs.     

Comparing Environmental Policy Instruments in the Presence of Imperfect Compliance – A Case Study

In this paper, we aim to include rule making, implementation, monitoring and enforcement costs into the cost comparison of policy instruments. We use a simple partial equilibrium model and apply it to the textile industry. The model includes discrete abatement functions and costly monitoring and enforcement. The case study uses individual firm data to simulate the differences in abatement costs and compliance decisions between firms. We compare combinations of regulatory instruments (emission taxes, emission standards and technology standards) and enforcement instruments (criminal fines, civil fines and transaction offers). We show that the inclusion of information, monitoring and enforcement costs indeed alters the relative cost efficiency of the different instruments.