金融危机下广西对外贸易与产业结构关系的实证研究

文章认为,广西对外贸易结构与产业结构之间具有很强的相关关系。广西的产业结构不合理,进而影响对外贸易结构的优化,高新技术产业发展对广西产业结构的升级具有重要影响。文章提出了加快三次产业结构调整、承接广东产业转移、大力发展高新技术产品贸易、加强广西对外贸易人才队伍建设等在金融危机下促进广西对外贸易又好又快发展的对策建议。     

The dark and the bright side of liquidity risks: Evidence from open-end real estate funds in Germany

During the 6-month period from December 2005 to June 2006, the German Real Estate mutual fund industry suffered an unprecedented liquidity crisis. We investigate to what extend competing theories of liquidity crises help explain this event. Our results show that fundamental factors not only mattered for the liquidity outflow in normal times but also during the crisis. However, strategic complementarities accelerated the withdrawals during the crisis suggesting that pure panic behavior contributed substantially to the massive outflows. Thus higher liquidity buffers might help mitigating these tail events. Furthermore, we find that funds with a lower fraction of shares held by institutional investors suffered from less significant outflows suggesting that a segmentation of funds for different investor groups might help mitigate panics.     

The cost of firms’ debt financing and the global financial crisis

We provide an assessment of the determinants of the risk premium paid by non-financial corporations on long-term bonds. By looking at 5500 issues over the period 2005–2012, we find that in recent years the sovereign debt market turbulence has been a major driver of corporate risk. Compared with the three-year period 2005–2007 before the global financial crisis, in the years 2010–2012 Italian, Spanish and Portuguese firms paid on average between 70 and 120 basis points of additional premium due to the negative spillovers from the sovereign debt crisis, while German firms received a discount of 40 basis points.     

Hedging house price risk with futures contracts after the bubble burst

This paper extends the existing literature on managing house price risk. While previous work finds that a hedger would have reduced a large amount of variance in housing returns in Las Vegas, Nevada using Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) futures contracts, we show that neither static nor dynamic strategies would have maintained an effective hedge during the significant decline in housing prices. The inability to hedge house price risk using CME futures contracts ultimately calls into question the long-term viability of housing futures.     

Fair value accounting from a distributed cognition perspective

This study offers a unique interdisciplinary perspective on fair value accounting. The growing influence of esoteric financial instruments whose valuation is becoming increasingly complex makes it necessary to focus on actual valuation practices. Based on an extensive review, this paper regards fair value accounting for complex financial instruments as involving processes distributed among actors located inside and/or outside a reporting entity. It also draws attention to collaboration by organizations that apply their external and internal resources to perform complex financial valuations. Furthermore, it demonstrates that cases involving unusual market conditions underline the importance of human interactions to the valuation process.     

Granular institutional investors and global market interdependence

We study the propagation of global investment risk across markets through the granular view of institutional investors. Applying the conditional value-at-risk estimation to micro-level weekly observations of international mutual funds between 2003 and 2011, we find that idiosyncratic shocks to large institutional investors explain both aggregate market risk and cross-market risk interdependence. Conditional on the US capital markets being in financial distress, idiosyncratic shocks to the top 10% largest funds investing in the US explain about 40% of the risk fluctuations in other non-US markets. The findings are also economically and statistically significant for the top largest funds investing in non-US markets, with the effects becoming especially large during the global financial crisis of 2007–09. These results are robust after controlling for common risk factors and applying alternative measures of idiosyncratic shocks.     

The effects of news events on market contagion: Evidence from the 2007–2009 financial crisis

In this paper, we use the quantile regression technique along with coexceedance, a contagion measure, to assess the extent to which news events contribute to contagion in the stock markets during the crisis period between 2007 and 2009. Studies have shown that, not only the subprime crisis leads to a global recession, but the effects on the global stock markets have also been significant. We track the news events, both in the UK and the US, using the global recession timeline. We observe that the news events related to ad hoc bailouts of individual banks from the UK have a contagion effect throughout the period for most of the countries under investigation. This, however, is not found to be the case for the news events originating from the US. Our findings regarding the evidence of contagion effects in the UK reinforce the argument that spreads and contagion—an outcome of the risk perception of financial markets—are solely a result of the behaviour of investors or other financial market participants.     

The euro exchange rate during the European sovereign debt crisis – Dancing to its own tune?

This paper studies the determinants of the euro exchange rate volatility during the European sovereign debt crisis, allowing a role for macroeconomic fundamentals, policy actions and the public debate by policy makers. It finds that the euro exchange rate mainly danced to its own tune, with a particularly low explanatory power for macroeconomic fundamentals. The findings of the paper also suggest that financial markets might have been less reactive to the public debate by policy makers than previously feared. Still, there are instances where exchange rate volatility increased in response to news, such as on days when several politicians from AAA-rated countries went public with negative statements, suggesting that communication by policy makers at times of crisis should be cautious about triggering undesirable financial market reactions.     

Testing the fire-sale FDI hypothesis for the European financial crisis

Using a panel of corporate transactions in 27 EU countries from 1999 to 2012, we investigate the impact of the financial crisis on the market for corporate assets. In particular, we test the ‘fire-sale FDI’ hypothesis by analyzing the number of cross-border transactions, the price of corporate assets and the impact of credit and macroeconomic conditions. According to the fire-sale FDI hypothesis, countries affected by a crisis attract foreign buyers selling assets at a discount. We find a dampening effect of the crisis on cross-border transactions in all EU countries. Although countries with higher sovereign default risk and lower economic demand attracted more foreign buyers in the crisis, lower domestic credit is associated with less cross-border transactions. Corporate assets in crisis countries are cheaper, particularly if domestic credit is low; however, these findings are not limited to the crisis period. This pattern is strikingly different from the East Asian and Latin American financial crises. Overall, we find little evidence for ‘fire-sale FDI’ suggesting an integrated European market without significant frictions.     

Floating a “lifeboat”: The Banque de France and the crisis of 1889

When faced with a run on a “systemically important” but insolvent bank in 1889, the Banque de France pre-emptively organized a lifeboat to ensure that depositors were protected and an orderly liquidation could proceed. To protect the Banque from losses on its lifeboat loan, a guarantee syndicate was formed penalizing those who had participated in the copper speculation that had caused the crisis bringing the bank down. Creation of the syndicate and other actions were consistent with mitigating the moral hazard from such an intervention. This episode contrasts the advice given by Bagehot to the Bank of England to counter a panic by lending freely at a high rate on good collateral, allowing insolvent institutions to fail.