Theoretical approaches to lowest unique bid auctions

In this paper, we analyze a game called the lowest unique bid auction (LUBA). It is known that there is no closed form solution for the symmetric mixed strategy equilibria in LUBA. We propose two alternative approaches. We use weak dominance to identify upper bounds for players’ bids. Under symmetry, we provide a method to compute a mixed strategy equilibrium by utilizing the recursive structure of the winning chances of the bids under one assumption.     

Nonverbal cues in computer‐mediated communication,and the effect of chronemics on relational communication

Computer‐mediated communication (CMC) has been described as lacking nonverbal cues, which affects the nature of interpersonal interaction via the medium. Yet much CMC conveys nonverbal cues in terms of chronemics, or time‐related messages. Different uses of time signals in electronic mail were hypothesized to affect interpersonal perceptions of CMC senders and respondents. An experiment altered the time stamps in replicated e‐mail messages in order to assess two time variations: (a) the time of day a message was sent and (b) the time lag until a reply was received. Results revealed significant interactions among these variables, and the task‐orientation or socioemotional orientation of the verbal messages, which affected perceptions of communicators’ intimacy/liking or dominance/submissiveness. Findings extend recent theories regarding social attributions and the adaptation of social cues in CMC behavior.     

The differential CEO dominance-compensation and corporate governance-compensation relations: Pre- and post-SOX

We examine the relationship between corporate governance (as measured by traditional corporate governance variables and a new measure of corporate governance, called CEO dominance) and executive compensation, pre- and post-SOX. We conceptualize CEO dominance as a measure of a CEO's power and define it as the difference between CEO pay and the next highest executive's pay divided by the CEO's pay. We argue that for traditional corporate governance variables, the inverse governance-compensation relation that exists pre-SOX will improve post-SOX. On the other hand, we expect a strong and positive CEO dominance-compensation relation to exist both pre- and post-SOX. Consistent with expectations, our results indicate that SOX has changed the relationship between CEO duality and compensation relation, but it has not changed the CEO dominance-compensation relation. This suggests that SOX regulatory reforms do not limit the ability of CEO power to obstruct traditional corporate governance mechanisms in extracting compensation-related rents.     

ASSET PRICE BUBBLES IN INCOMPLETE MARKETS*

This paper studies asset price bubbles in a continuous time model using the local martingale framework. Providing careful definitions of the asset's market and fundamental price, we characterize all possible price bubbles in an incomplete market satisfying the “no free lunch with vanishing risk (NFLVR)” and “no dominance” assumptions. We show that the two leading models for bubbles as either charges or as strict local martingales, respectively, are equivalent. We propose a new theory for bubble birth that involves a nontrivial modification of the classical martingale pricing framework. This modification involves the market exhibiting different local martingale measures across time—a possibility not previously explored within the classical theory. Finally, we investigate the pricing of derivative securities in the presence of asset price bubbles, and we show that: (i) European put options can have no bubbles; (ii) European call options and discounted forward prices have bubbles whose magnitudes are related to the asset's price bubble; (iii) with no dividends, American call options are not exercised early; (iv) European put‐call parity in market prices must always hold, regardless of bubbles; and (v) futures price bubbles can exist and they are independent of the underlying asset's price bubble. Many of these results stand in contrast to those of the classical theory. We propose, but do not implement, some new tests for the existence of asset price bubbles using derivative securities.     

Conservation Payments under Risk: A Stochastic Dominance Approach

Conservation payments can be used to preserve forest and agroforest systems. To explain landowners' land-use decisions and determine appropriate conservation payments, it is necessary to focus on revenue risk. Marginal conditional stochastic dominance rules are used to derive conditions for determining the conservation payments required to guarantee that the environmentally preferred land use dominates. An empirical application to shaded coffee protection in the biologically important Chocó region of West Ecuador shows that conservation payments required for preserving shaded coffee areas are much higher than those calculated under risk-neutral assumptions. Further, the extant distribution of land has strong impacts on the required payments.     

Equilibrium selection through incomplete information in coordination games: an experimental study

We perform an experiment on a pure coordination game with uncertainty about the payoffs. Our game is closely related to models that have been used in many macroeconomic and financial applications to solve problems of equilibrium indeterminacy. In our experiment, each subject receives a noisy signal about the true payoffs. This game (inspired by the “global” games of Carlsson and van Damme, Econometrica, 61, 989–1018, 1993) has a unique strategy profile that survives the iterative deletion of strictly dominated strategies (thus a unique Nash equilibrium). The equilibrium outcome coincides, on average, with the risk-dominant equilibrium outcome of the underlying coordination game. In the baseline game, the behavior of the subjects converges to the theoretical prediction after enough experience has been gained. The data (and the comments) suggest that this behavior can be explained by learning. To test this hypothesis, we use a different game with incomplete information, related to a complete information game where learning and prior experiments suggest a different behavior. Indeed, in the second treatment, the behavior did not converge to equilibrium within 50 periods in some of the sessions. We also run both games under complete information. The results are sufficiently similar between complete and incomplete information to suggest that risk-dominance is also an important part of the explanation.      

Equilibrium selection in bargaining models

This paper examines evolutionary equilibrium selection in bargaining models. We show that random best-response and continuous best-response learning dynamics give rise to (different) simple sufficient conditions for identifying outcomes as stochastically stable. This allows us to characterize the implications of these dynamics in simple bargaining games.     

Value versus growth: stochastic dominance criteria

In this paper, we study the relative performance of value versus growth strategies from the perspective of stochastic dominance. Using half a century US data on value and growth stocks, we find no evidence against the widely documented fact that value stocks stochastically dominate growth stocks in all three orders of stochastic dominance relations over the full sample period as well as during economic boom (good) periods. However, we observe no significant stochastic dominance relation between value and growth stocks during recession (bad) periods, which is inconsistent with the risk-based predictions but is better explained by behavioural models.     

Capital market equilibrium with heterogeneous investors

As a two-parameter model that satisfies stochastic dominance, the mean-extended Gini model is used to build efficient portfolios. The model quantifies risk aversion heterogeneity in capital markets. In a simple Edgeworth box framework, we show how capital market equilibrium is achieved for risky assets. This approach provides a richer basis for analysing the pricing of risky assets under heterogeneous preferences. Our main results are: (1) identical investors, who use the same statistic to represent risk, hold identical portfolios of risky assets equal to the market portfolio; and (2) heterogeneous investors as expressed by the variance or the extended Gini hold different risky assets in portfolios, and therefore no one holds the market portfolio.     

Public Relations Autonomy, Legal Dominance, and Strategic Orientation as Predictors of Crisis Communicative Strategies

This article investigates the factors affecting how public relations autonomy, legal dominance, and strategic orientation affect crisis communicative response in corporate contexts. Communication managers, crisis managers, public affairs managers, and/or public relations managers were solicited from Taiwan’s top 500 companies to participate in a survey. The results revealed that, in contrast to public relations autonomy being the strongest and sole predictor of concession strategy, legal dominance could predict defensive and diversionary responses in crisis events. The article concludes with a discussion of practical applications and theoretical implications.