政府主导与社会主义市场经济

社会主义市场经济是市场经济与社会主义制度的有机结合。中国在向市场经济转型过程中,政府的主导与推动起到了根本性的作用。中国社会主义市场经济中的政府主导与东亚政府主导模式有相似之处,但更有本质区别。中国市场经济的发展必须从中国国情出发,学习借鉴东亚政府主导模式中的积极因素,努力克服政府主导过程中存在的问题,将政府主导与市场调节的作用优势有效地结合起来,以形成强大的经济社会发展动力。     

The rejection of brand hegemony

Purveyors of strong brands can, through a number of the means intended to bolster their brand image, alienate and frustrate their consumers to the point of creating a broad-based reaction — the rejection of brand hegemony. The literature describes a number of motivations for anti-consumption behavior. This paper explores the rejection of brand hegemony as a motivation for, and an expression of, anti-consumption, through a phenomenological study of the open source software (OSS) community. The study explores whether, and to what extent, the OSS community actively rejects software's dominant brand, Microsoft, and what motivations may be at work in the creation and expression of that rejection. Findings elucidate the necessary conditions for the rejection of brand hegemony to occur, revealing valuable lessons for vendors. These conditions comprise environment, positive motivation and negative motivation factors. The first two conditions are relatively constant, regardless of vendor's actions, while the last is largely of the vendor's creation. The managerial and theory-building implications of the study indicate that purveyors of strong brands may inadvertently create their own anti-consumption nemesis.     

Rate-of-return dominance and efficiency in an experimental economy

Summary. One of the main challenges for monetary economics is to explain the use of assets that are dominated in rate-of-return as media of exchange. We use experimental methods to study how a fiat money might come to be used in transactions when an identically marketable, dividend-bearing asset, a consol, is also available. Our experimental economies, which have an overlapping generations structure, have the property that the only stationary rational expectations equilibria (SREE) require exclusive use of the consol as the medium of exchange. In a baseline treatment, agents use the consol exclusively, as would occur in an SREE. However, in other treatments, we observe episodes of rate-of-return dominance,with consistent use of fiat money as a medium of exchange. The results show that two properties of our economies are associated with the rate of return dominance anomaly. The first is a history of trading with fiat money, prior to the introduction of the consol. The second is the timing of the dividend payment; when the dividend payment follows the execution of trades between generations, hoarding of the consol occurs on the part of the old, who earn dividends by hoarding. In our economies, settling transactions with a dividend-bearing asset does not improve allocations over those resulting from trading with fiat money. Received: July 11, 2002; revised version: July 25, 2002 RID="*" ID="*"We thank Anne Villamil, participants in the 2000 Purdue University Conference on Monetary Economics, the Summer 2000 meetings of the Economic Science Association, and a referee, for very helpful comments. We thank the Krannert School of Management and the Purdue University Center for International Business, Education and Research for financial support and Vivian Lei for research assistance. We also thank Ron Michener for referring us to the historical account of the early introduction of money into the American colonies, as reported by Benjamin Franklin. Correspondence to: G. Camera     

Iterated strict dominance in general games

We offer a definition of iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies (IESDS^*) for games with (in)finite players, (non)compact strategy sets, and (dis)continuous payoff functions. IESDS^* is always a well-defined order independent procedure that can be used to solve Nash equilibrium in dominance-solvable games. We characterize IESDS^* by means of a “stability” criterion, and offer a sufficient and necessary epistemic condition for IESDS^*. We show by an example that IESDS^* may generate spurious Nash equilibria in the class of Reny's better-reply secure games. We provide sufficient/necessary conditions under which IESDS^* preserves the set of Nash equilibria.     

Options can induce risk taking for arbitrary preferences

Summary. It is widely believed that call options induce risk-taking behavior. However, Ross (2004) challenges this intuition by demonstrating the impossibility of inducing managers with arbitrary preferences to always act as if they were less risk averse. If preferences and price distributions are unknown, risk-taking behavior cannot be always induced by an option contract. Here, we prove a new result showing that, with no information about preferences and some knowledge about prices, one can write a call option that makes all managers prefer riskier projects to safer ones. This points out that in order to design options that induce risk taking it is sufficient to have information about price distributions.Received: 5 November 2003, Revised: 1 November 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D81, G00, J33, M21. Correspondence to: Luis H.B. BraidoWe thank Renée Adams, Heitor Almeida, Carlos E. da Costa, Andrew Horowitz, Paulo K. Monteiro, Walter Novaes, Sergio O. Parreiras, Rodrigo R. Soares, and especially Marcos Tsuchida for many helpful comments.     

Stochastic convexity in dynamic programming

Summary. This paper explores sufficient conditions for a continuous stationary Markov optimal policy and a concave value function in stochastic dynamic programming problems. Also, the paper addresses conditions needed for the differentiability of the value function. The paper uses conditions such as first order stochastic dominance, second order stochastic dominance and concave stochastic dominance that are widely applied in economics. Received: February 23, 2001; revised version: May 19, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" I am deeply indebted to Prajit Dutta for patient assistance and advice. This paper has benefited from discussions with Tsz Cheong Lai, Tackseung Jun, Werner Stanzl and Satyajit Bose as well as feedback from an anonymous referee.     

论随机占优理论在基金绩效评价中的应用

现行的建立在均值方差分析基础上的基金绩效评价方法依赖于两个重要假定:风险厌恶的投资者和正态分布的投资风险。然而,一方面越来越多的研究表明这两项假定是难以验证的,另一方面Roll也对建立在均值方差分析基础上的基金绩效评价方法的逻辑基础进行了批判。那么,是否可以避开这两个假定建立一套基金绩效评价方法?本文提出运用随机占优理论可以达到这个目的。     

The dark side of making transit irresistible: The example of France

The French experience in developing policies to reduce car use in metropolitan areas is presented in this paper as an illustration of the lack of recognition of the broader set of criteria on which specific policy frameworks should be judged. One of the major challenges, and often failings of policies focussed on reducing car use, is the lack of a structure that ensures that the downside impacts are not relocated to other parts of a system such that potential gains end up being eroded by the potential losses. We draw on experiences throughout France, as well as case studies in Lyon, to highlight the dark side of French transport policy promoting a switch from car to public transit and non-motorised modes, in terms of financial, equity and environmental outcomes.     

循环经济中企业行为的协调博弈分析

当前循环经济的研究已经进入理论体系的建构阶段.文章运用协调博弈理论,从支付占优和风险占优两个方面,分析了企业间发展循环经济的相互作用关系.分析表明,政府作为协调者可以提高循环经济中企业的博弈支付,政府还可以运用其他手段降低合作风险促进循环经济的发展.     

电力现货环境下市场力风险管控体系设计

国内电力市场改革建设长期面临着发电主体市场力问题,现有的市场力管控方法未在国内电力法律框架下构建,合规性存疑。为此,借鉴美国电力市场管控经验,基于《中华人民共和国反垄断法》中滥用市场支配地位等相关条例,在法律框架内搭建“相关市场界定-市场支配地位识别-滥用市场支配地位行为”的市场力管控思路,提出中长期市场和现货市场的市场力管控方案。最后对国内电力市场力风险管控提出短期和长期的建议。