Merger Waves and Firm Growth: Contemporary Historical Evidence

This article presents the outcomes of an evaluation of the impact of the series of mergers of the local exchange companies that have taken place between 1988 and 2001 on an important measure of performance of the firms undergoing the mergers. The analysis reveals that after firms have undertaken one merger they experience little or no growth after such mergers, but the impact of second mergers on firm growth have been negative. If an important motive in undertaking mergers has been to enhance firm growth, then the merger waves that have been approved and consummated have led to performance declines. The impacts of the merger wave on the growth of the telecommunications sector firms have been negative.     

中国省际环境污染的动态综合评价及影响因素

基于单一污染物难以表达环境污染状况的不足,本文提出了能够代表整体环境状况的污染排放指数,并首次运用一种基于整体差异的动态客观综合评价方法对中国28个省1995～2006年的环境污染状况进行了测度,分析了中国和分区域污染排放指数的变动趋势,并基于经济结构和能源因素视角,采用面板数据模型检验了中国和分区域污染排放指数的影响因素。分析表明,要实现十一五规划中主要污染物在2010年比2006年减少10%的约束性目标,从三大区域来看,应该重点监控东部地区;从省级区域看,应该重点加大对河北、江苏、辽宁、山东、四川、河南、山西、广东、浙江、湖北、湖南等省份污染排放的治理力度,提高能源利用效率、制定符合市场机制的能源价格体系、加大贸易开放度和降低煤炭消费在能源消费中的比例可以减少污染排放。     

政府随机审计的动态博弈模型及政策启示

本文在一个三阶段动态博弈框架下,对政府随机审计过程中的政府审计机关与政府审计对象以及国家与政府审计对象之间的动态博弈特征进行了分析。分析结果显示：政府审计机关与政府审计对象之间存在一个纯策略纳什均衡,而国家和政府审计对象之间存在一个混合策略纳什均衡。政府审计对象接受国家实质性审计的概率是政府审计对象被政府机关审计发现违规或不作为后的惩罚倍数的单调递减函数,而政府审计对象的违规或不作为的概率分别是政府审计对象被政府机关审计发现违规或不作为后的惩罚倍数和政府审计对象的应尽义务或责任的单调递减函数,却是政府审计机关审计行为成本的单调递增函数。同时,结合研究结论和中国政府审计全覆盖的现实,给出了一些政策建议。     

地方政府经济竞争下的企业负担——来自上市公司的经验证据

本文基于分权体制下政企之间的两阶段动态博弈模型以及在此基础上构建的计量模型,将地级市之间经济竞争程度与A股非金融类上市公司数据相匹配,验证了地方政府经济竞争程度与企业实际税负之间的关系。研究结果表明,当地方政府所面临的经济竞争程度越激烈时,其辖区内上市公司的实际税负越低。进一步分析发现,地方政府经济竞争对辖区企业的减税效应存在显著的地区、产业和所有制异质性;分位数回归发现,辖区企业处于不同税负强度时,地方政府经济竞争的减税效应也存在明显差异。在当前减税降费、让利于企的新时代背景下,本文的研究对落实减税降费政策和规范横向竞争中地方政府行为具有启示意义。     

Pollution Control in Open Economies: Implications of Within-period Interactions for Dynamic Game Equilibrium

This paper examines a two-country, dynamic game model of pollution control in the presence of economic interactions between countries within a period, as well as the environmental interaction between periods (i.e., a change in the stock of global pollution). These economic interactions emerge because of changes in the terms of trade of polluting goods or the market share of domestic polluting industries. It is shown that if within-period externalities exist, a noncooperative equilibrium may result in a smaller stock of global pollution in the steady state than does international cooperation. Moreover, the properties of equilibrium paths depend on the direction and size of such externalities. In addition, trigger strategy equilibria that achieve the outcome of the collusive solution are examined.     

Flexible Tropism of the Enterprises＇ Organization in Uncertain Competitive Environment

With the rapid development of the computer network, communication technology and the economic globalization, the competition environment faced by the enterprises has been more and more complicated. While the interactive competition becomes more and more fierce, it has been more and more difficult for enterprises to keep sustainable advantages in competition. In this paper the author mainly discusses the severe challenge of the new competition conditions to the traditional hierarchical structure and the reason why flexible organization will be the inevitable strategy selection of the enterprises.     

Public policies as specification errors

Treating public policies as computable dynamic general equilibrium model specification errors offers computational and conceptional advantages for comparing models with data. The set of policies calculated to rationalize observed behaviors raises the substantive economic question whether, in any particular market, actual public policies sufficiently coincide with the model's behavior-rationalizing policies, or whether the model offers correct hypotheses about the determinants of demand and supply. As illustrations, public policies are calculated to rationalize, with respect to the stochastic neoclassical growth model, capital market behavior since WWII and labor market behavior in 1929–1950. One conclusion is that capital taxation drives a wedge between consumption growth and the expected pre-tax capital return, in the direction and amount predicted by the theory, and that capital taxation is the major intertemporal distortion in the postwar capital market. Second, a good theory of the Great Depression labor market must explain why measured MRS and MPL diverged so dramatically in 1929–1933 and why the wedge persisted.     

Commitment in sequential auctioning: advance listings and threshold prices

This paper models sequential auctioning of two perfect substitutes by a strategic seller, who learns about demand from the first-auction price. The seller holds the second auction only when the remaining demand is strong enough to cover her opportunity cost. Bidding in anticipation of such a contingent future auction is characterized, including a sufficient condition for existence of an invertible (increasing symmetric pure-strategy) bidding equilibrium that facilitates the seller’s learning. A unique invertible bidding equilibrium exists for the Dutch auction format, but only when the second auction is sufficiently discounted by the bidders. In the equilibrium, high-valuation bidders shade their bids down as if the second auction were guaranteed. To counter such strategic bidding, the seller would value ex-ante commitment to hold the second auction less often. Three forms of such commitment are analyzed: commitment to list future auctions in advance, commitment to not hold the second auction unless the first price exceeds a publicly announced threshold, and commitment to a reserve-price in the second auction. I would like to thank Georgios Katsenos, Thomas Jeitschko, Miguel Villas-Boas, George Deltas, and an anonymous referee for thorough and insightful feedback.     

中国经济增长模式演进的就业效应

自20世纪90年代初期以来,中国经济从原来的劳动密集的增长模式转变为资本深化的增长模式。前一种增长模式能够实现产出和就业的双重增长,缺陷在于劳动报酬增长滞后于产出增长;后一种增长模式能够促进产出增长和劳动报酬的提高,缺陷是创造就业的能力表现不足。但从现实性来考虑,后一种模式比前一种模式更具可行性。     

明代盐商“困守支”的政治经济学解释

政府是影响经济的重要制度形式."掠夺之手"模型为分析现代政府行为提供了有用的研究视角.以"掠夺之手"模型的视角来分析明代统治者行为对盐商利益以及开中法实施效果产生的一系列影响,从而得出明代开中法崩溃、盐商"困守支"的根本原因在于缺乏制约统治者掠夺之手的制度安排的结论.