Strategic product showcasing mode of E-commerce live streaming

E-commerce live streaming can considerably help brands improve sales dynamics, but it is multiple dilemmas in choosing suitable e-commerce live streaming product showcasing modes. To address the multiple dilemmas, we first employ the Stackelberg game to depict three e-commerce live streaming product showcasing modes: brand self-live streaming, influencer-led live streaming mixture, and influencer-led special live streaming. Second, we analyze the relationship between choices and game parameters, including live streaming stimulus sensitivity, unit service quality improvement cost, and service sensitivity. Meanwhile, through the comparative analysis of the three modes, we get the optimal threshold of each mode. Last, we conduct a case study comparing Chinese apparel and accessories brands Hodo and RUANS to verify the above relations. The results suggest that: (i) the more sensitive consumers are to live streaming stimulus, the more beneficial it is for the brand manufacturer to employ special live streaming, while the increase in unit service quality improvement cost will harm the brand manufacturer; (ii) the fixed participation fee determines the choice of e-commerce live streaming product showcasing modes; (iii) e-commerce live streaming product showcasing modes can help brands to optimize their decision-making.     

Mitigating panic buying behavior in the epidemic: An evolutionary game perspective

The panic buying behavior under public health emergencies will lead to many adverse consequences, such as material waste, price fluctuation and uneven distribution of epidemic prevention materials, which will pose a threat to the social stability and economic development. In this paper, we construct a tripartite game model to explore the strategic choices of the public, merchants and the government in order to effectively respond to the panic buying behavior in the epidemic. The results demonstrate that: (1) Eight evolutionary stable strategies emerge in the panic buying events. The worst scenario can be improved by adjusting some relevant parameters. (2) The probability of the public choosing the strategy of “not involving in panic buying” depends on the potential benefits and losses of snapping up, rather than the extent of price rising. (3) The probability of merchants choosing the strategy of “not bid up price” depends on the intangible benefits. (4) The probability of the government choosing the strategy of “active supervision” depends on the supervision costs and government credibility, rather than the amount of fines. In addition, strategic suggestions to mitigate panic buying behavior are put forward from the perspective of each stakeholder.     

家族企业制度安排演化的博弈分析

家族企业制度安排是保证其持续成长的内在基础,而缺乏系统的制度安排是目前我国家族企业主要弊病之一。本文运用演化博弈论的基本原理分析了家族企业制度安排的演进过程,具体论证了确立家族企业制度安排的必要性。     

双重二元结构下化解西部农村融资难的对策——基于演化博弈理论的研究

长期的赶超战略使我国形成了城乡和东西叠加的双重二元结构。本文通过对双二元结构下的政府政策与西部农村金融机构的支农行为进行演化博弈分析,得出如下结论:政府的激励、约束政策以及西部农村金融机构支农的净损失是影响机构支农和政府缩小双重二元结构差距目标实现的决定因素;在实现政府目标的初期,约束政策较激励政策更有效;随着政府目标实现程度的提高,激励政策将发挥更大效用;目前政府实行的单向激励政策作用不大;现阶段政府应该在强化约束政策的同时进一步加大激励政策力度,使西部农村金融机构在积极支农的同时实现可持续发展。     

营销渠道的冲突与协调研究——基于我国食品制造商和直接零售商合作博弈的实证分析

当渠道的非合作导致的冲突被逐渐认识到时,渠道成员就会有意识地开展合作。那么,合作是否确实减少了冲突,增进了协调呢？本文利用博弈理论提出六个假设,然后用现代计量方法进行实证检验,最后得出以下结论：渠道合作博弈优于非合作博弈,渠道成员间倾向于合作博弈,合作博弈下的营销渠道纵向成员（参与方）选择为地位相当者,渠道合作博弈中普遍存在隐性冲突,其程度与成员影响力的运用有关,合作博弈下的渠道成员普遍比较协调,营销渠道成员合作的协调及持续协调与诚信公平相关。     

基于地下经济行为的博弈分析

第二次世界大战以后,经济学家在对传统经济进行反思的过程中,开始从地下经济角度来解释现实经济现象中宏观经济预测的偏离及菲力普斯曲线开始向上和向外盘旋现象。地下经济一般被认为是由那些企业或个人防止和逃避政府的管制、税收和监察的经济活动和由此获得的收入构成的。根据政府作为政策制定者和观察者及受调查者即企业或个人之间的关系,本文提供了一个相互作用系统的样板,通过政府和企业及个人之间在交税行为过程中产生的信号传递反馈系统,拟用一种不完全信息的动态博弈分析方法,论证得出信息系统的完整化、公开化、政府法律政策严明性及政府的相机抉择制度对社会经济发展的重要作用。     

Why Punish? Social reciprocity and the enforcement of prosocial norms

Recently economists have become interested in why people who face social dilemmas in the experimental lab use the seemingly incredible threat of punishment to deter free riding. Three theories with evolutionary microfoundations have been developed to explain punishment. We survey these theories and use behavioral data from surveys and experiments to show that the theory called social reciprocity in which people punish norm violators indiscriminately explains punishment best.JEL Classification: C91, C92, D64, H41 Correspondence to: Jeffrey P. CarpenterWe thank Carolyn Craven, Corinna Noelke and two referees for comments, and Middlebury College for financial assistance. In addition, Carpenter acknowledges the support of the National Science Foundation (SES-CAREER 0092953).     

社会困境中的社会建设——以成都市为例

基于博弈论和社会心理学的基础,首先说明了社会建设能够调和个人利益和整体利益,眼前利益和长远利益之间的矛盾,随后介绍社会困境的含义,旨在说明社会建设本质上就是为了解决社会困境,接着将社会困境分为多人困境和两人困境,并分别介绍了相应的解决办法,最后详细介绍了成都市社会建设举措能调解社会困境的价值,处理好效率与公平的关系。     

基于生态学的工艺创新竞争博弈模型分析

分析了工艺创新竞争的先动者劣势、共生共荣性两大特点,以工艺创新能力的逻辑斯蒂增长模型为基础,基于生态学的捕食、竞争与竞合建立了相应的工艺创新竞争博弈模型,并分别探讨了博弈模型均衡解的稳定性。